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SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE DOMAIN
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE ORIGINAL
INTENT OF THE CONSTITUTION
HISTORICALLY EXAMINED
Arthur Bestor*
INTRODUCTION

In 1765, the year of the Stamp Act and of the resulting flare-up
of American resistance to British authority, William Blackstone,
Vinerian Professor of Law at Oxford, published the first book of his
magisterial Commentaries on the Laws of England. The four-volume
work, completed in 1769, was to play a major role in transmitting to
the nascent American republic both the legal principles and procedural details of the English common law. Blackstone's subject was
not merely law in the narrow technical sense familiar to members
of the Inns of Court-that is, the law that lawyers litigate and that
courts adjudicate-but also an exposition of public law, that is, of the
principles of the English constitution as they stood on the eve of the
American Revolution.
The American attitude toward this aspect of Blackstone's treatise
was necessarily ambivalent. On the one hand, the Commentaries eulogized those great principles of English liberty which the discontented
American colonists felt themselves to be defending against a faithless
king and a forgetful Parliament. On these matters Blackstone's authoritative and often eloquent statements commanded unhesitating respect
in America, after independence as well as before. On the other hand,
Blackstone likewise defended with learning and zeal those elements
* Ph.B., Ph.D., Yale University; M.A., Oxford University; LL.D., Lincoln University;
Professor of History, University of Washington, Seattle. The author gratefully acknowledges
financial assistance received from the Graduate School Research Fund (Agnes Anderson
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Original Intent of the American Constitution in the Light of the Preceding Century and
a Half of English and Colonial History, to be published by the Oxford University Press.
Some of the material contained herein has been presented in public lectures at Linfield
College, McMinnville, Oregon (The Kenneth Scott Latourette Lectures in History), AprilMay 1973, and at the University of Washington, July 1973; and in a paper read to a joint
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in English constitutionalism that were goading the Americans into
revolution and propelling them toward independence. As a consequence Blackstone's Commentaries are both a source book for American conceptions of law and a concise and illuminating guide to those
constitutional principles and practices that Americans were bent on
eliminating. To the historian, therefore, the Commentaries are peculiarly valuable for the focused light they throw on the divergences
between the constitutional principles adopted by the Federal Convention of 1787 and those that underlay the late eighteenth-century
English system with which the Americans were dissolving all political
connection. Blackstone's book, in short, effectively pinpoints the elements of English constitutionalism that the framers of the American
Constitution deliberately rejected.
I.

AMERICAN

DEPARTURES FROM ENGLISH PRECEDENT

It was in the realm of foreign policy that the break was sharpest
and clearest. The crucial contrast can be briefly stated. In Blackstone's
Commentaries the entire range of powers relating to war and peace,
to diplomacy and the making of treaties, and to military command is
treated within the confines of a single chapter, "Of the King's Prerogative."' Though the corresponding chapter on Parliament describes
the power of that body as "transcendent and absolute," 2 Blackstone
nowhere mentions a specific role that Parliament is expected to play
in the determination of foreign policy, save the negative role of impeaching ministers of the Crown "for improper or inglorious conduct,
in beginning, conducting, or concluding a national war,' 3 or for entering into treaties that "shall afterwards be judged to derogate from
4
the honour and interest of the nation."
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *237 et seq.
2 Id. at 160.
8 Id. at 258.
4 Id. at 257.
By way of contrast, Blackstone listed an impressive set of powers unconnected with
foreign affairs which were within the "transcendent and absolute" jurisdiction of Parliament:
It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military,
maritime, or criminal . . . . It can regulate or new model the succession to the
1

crown ....

It can alter the established religion of the land . . . . It can change

and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves . .

Id. at 160-61.

.

.
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In the American Constitution, by contrast, the vast aggregate of
powers connected with foreign affairs. is broken down into its constituent parts, and the fragments deliberately placed in separate hands.
Thus the power to declare war and to raise armed forces is vested in
Congress, 5 while actual military command is assigned to the President.6
Treaties are to be made by the latter, but only by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate.7 Ambassadors from foreign countries may be
received by the President without prior approval," but no ambassador
to a foreign country can be appointed by him except with the advice
and consent of the Senate. 9 A system of checks and balances is thus
prescribed as explicitly for the conduct of foreign relations as for the
handling of domestic matters, even though the precise allocations of
power are different in detail.
The intent of the framers of the American Constitution becomes
even clearer when the specific provisions of the document they wrote
are laid side by side with Blackstone's analysis of comparable elements
in the English system. Before commencing such a comparison and
contrast, however, it is desirable to clear up one matter of terminology
that is potentially confusing to a modern reader. When discussing the
prerogative of the King or the powers of the Crown, Blackstone never
suggests or implies that these powers were still wielded personally
by the monarch. He is careful to point out on more than one occasion
that the powers exercised by authority of the Crown constitute simply
the "executive part of government,"' 10 and he treats the phrase "prerogative of the crown" as an exact synonym of "power of the executive
magistrate."" Proof that Blackstone's concern is with the power of the
executive branch rather than the personal power of the King is furnished, in unmistakable fashion, by a passage in which, after recounting the various measures that had curtailed royal power during the
preceding century and a half,' 2 he went on to say that during the same
period other political developments had "thrown such a weight of
5 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
6 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
7 Id. cl. 2.
8 See id. § 3.
9 Id. § 2, cl. 2.
10 1 W. BLACKSrONE, COMMENTARIES 250. See id. at 147, 190, 240. This is, of course,
the accepted twentieth-century definition. "The term, the Crown, represents the sum total
of governmental powers and is synonymous with the Executive." E. WADE & G. PHILIPS,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 171 (8th ed. E. Wade & A. Bradley 1970).
11 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *334.:

12 See id.

.
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power into the executive scale of government as we cannot think was
intended by our patriot ancestors."' 13
Executive power signified to Blackstone, as it did to the American
framers, those powers of decision and action that can be exercised by
a chief executive, or in his name, simply by virtue of the authority
granted directly to him by the constitution or the laws. Though the
executive may ultimately be held responsible-by impeachment or by
repudiation at the polls-for executive decisions made or executive
actions carried out, executive powers themselves are almost by definition discretionary, and therefore capable of being exercised without the
necessity of submitting a proposed course of action to prior legislative
14
deliberation and approval.
Once it is recognized that the nature of executive power-and
therefore the boundary between executive and legislative power-is
the subject of Blackstone's chapter "Of the King's Prerogative" just
as truly as it is the subject of the second or executive article of the
American Constitution, point-by-point comparisons become possible
between Blackstone's exposition of the foreign-policy aspects of
eighteenth-century English constitutionalism and the corresponding
provisions of the written Constitution of the United States.
At the outset, Blackstone recognizes two different sources for the
authority of the chief executive in the domain of foreign relations.
Vis-a-vis other nations, the King "is the delegate or representative of
his people."' 5 Therefore, the handling of all aspects of the "nation's
intercourse with foreign nations" is an executive prerogative. 16 The
King is also "the generalissimo, or the first in military command,
within the kingdom,"' 17 and this fact places in executive hands the
control of a variety of matters relating to military security. In similar
fashion, the American Constitution designates the chief executive as
the representative of the nation in its dealings with other nations and
makes the President the commander in chief of the armed forces. The
1s Id. at 335.
14 The point is stated succinctly in the following account of present-day English con-

stitutional practice:
For the exercise of a prerogative power the prior authority of Parliament is not
required.. . . Parliament may criticise Ministers for the consequences which result from the exercise of prerogative; Parliament too may abolish or curtail the
prerogative by statute; but in regard to the exercise of the prerogative Parliament
has no right to be consulted in advance.
E. WADE & G. PmisIsps, supra note 10, at 185 (footnote omitted).
15 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0252.
16 See id. at 261.
17 Id. at 262.
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corollaries deduced from these two similar circumstances, however,
are profoundly different in the two constitutional systems.
The divergence is apparent from the very beginning of Blackstone's detailed catalogue. Because the chief executive represents the
nation in foreign affairs, he must possess, according to Blackstone, "the
sole power of sending ambassadors to foreign states, and receiving ambassadors at home. ' 18 Only the second half of this power, however, is
granted exclusively to the executive by the American Constitution.
The President may receive foreign envoys on his own authority, but he
cannot appoint American ambassadors to serve abroad except with
senatorial approval.
Far more significant are the next three powers that Blackstone
regards as exclusively executive in nature. One is the "prerogative to
make treaties, leagues, and alliances with foreign states and princes."' 9
The next is "the sole prerogative of making war and peace." 20 Then,
as a corollary of the latter, comes the power "to issue letters of marque
and reprisal" and thus to authorize "an incomplete state of hostilities." 21 In its turn, the American Constitution deals specifically with
each of these powers, but assigns none of them to the executive exclusively. Treaties, though they are said to be "made" by the President,
are to be made only "by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate.1 22 The power to declare war is specifically vested in Congress,

not the President, 23 as is the power to "grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal." 2 ' All these matters, which Blackstone had classified as ex-

ecutive, are thus treated in the American Constitution as proper subjects for legislative deliberation and decision.
From among all the prerogative powers listed by Blackstone as
belonging to the British Crown, only one, aside from the formality
of receiving ambassadors, was singled out by the American framers
as unquestionably and exclusively executive in character and therefore
properly delegated to the President alone. This was the power of
military command. Blackstone had described the King as "the generalissimo, or the first in military command, within the kingdom. ' 25
18 See id. at 253.
19 Id. at 257.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 258. Also listed by Blackstone is "the prerogative of granting safe-conducts"
and passports. Id. at 259-60. No one at the Federal Convention, however, considered the
matter important enough for inclusion in the American Constitution.
22 US. CONST. art. II,§ 2. ci. 2.
23 Id. art. I,§ 8, cl. 11.
24 Id.
25 1 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES 0262.
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The American framers, following Blackstone in this one particular,
provided that
[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States.26
But the King's power of command went far beyond the framework of
the title of military commander. Blackstone had included within it not
only the actual command "of all forces by sea and land, and of all forts
and places of strength," 27 but also many ancillary powers that the
American framers decided to bestow elsewhere. Thus, Blackstone had
said that the King, as "general of the kingdom," possessed "the sole
power of raising and regulating fleets and armies," or "the prerogative
of enlisting and of governing them." 28 By contrast, the American
framers carefully limited the scope of this power. The Constitution
specifically vests every one of the above-mentioned powers in Congress,
not the President, employing the very same words that Blackstone had
used.

29

II.

TnE

REAL MEANING OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

This deliberate fragmentation of the powers relating to peace and
war, and the parcelling out of the component parts to different bodies
and agencies of government, represented an application to the domain
of foreign affairs of the same concept of separation of powers that the

framers were applying as rigorously as possible to domestic govern26 U.S. CONsT. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1. The qualifying phrases are often overlooked by those
who exalt presidential power. The President does not stand in the relation of commander
in chief to any of the civil officers of the government even though they serve under him.
A fortiori he is not the commander in chief of an ordinary citizen unless the latter is a
member of the armed forces or is serving on active duty in the militia.
27 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0262.
28 Id.
29 The Constitution states in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power . . .

To raise and support Armies . . .
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces ....
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ds. 12-14. Moreover, the King was in command of the militia under
all circumstances, whereas the American Constitution allowed the President to command
the militia only "when called into the actual Service of the United States." Id. art. II,
§ 2, ci. 1. The Constitution also placed in the hands of Congress the power "[t]o provide
for calling forth the Militia"--that is, to prescribe by law the circumstances that would
warrant a call-up. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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ment. The purpose and- effect of any such arrangement is to require
the joint participation-the co-operation and concurrence--of the
several branches in the making and carrying out of any genuinely
critical decision. If the power to raise and finance armies is vested in
Congress (with a veto power in the President), and the power to declare
war is in the same hands, but if actual military command belongs
exclusively to the President, then the power to make war is necessarily
a shared power. Like those ancient treasure chests with two locks,
only the joint action of the holders of the two keys can open the lid.
At this point the question is bound to be asked whether such
mandatory collaboration is not the very antithesis of the idea of separation of powers. Many present-day commentators appear to think so.
Separation of powers is assumed by them to mean that each branch of
government must go it alone; that each is right in insisting that it
must have exclusive control of what is done within the particular
sphere it considers to be its own; and that each must jealously conceal
from the other branches, on the ground of confidentiality, its own
processes of decision. So deeply ingrained has this view become that
it will hardly suffice simply to say that it is a complete misinterpretation of the doctrine of separation of powers. The point must be driven
home by what will perhaps seem a digression.
From a certain point of view, it is true, the arrangement that
Blackstone describes, whereby the executive is vested with complete
control over foreign affairs and the legislature retains control of
domestic policy-making, can be called a system of separation of powers.
This, indeed, was the kind of separation that the Stuart monarchs insisted upon in the seventeenth century. The House of Commons in
1677 refused "to grant Supplies for Maintenance of Wars and Alliances, before they are signified in Parliament," and called upon the
King "to enter into a League, offensive and defensive, with the States
General of the United Provinces, against the Growth and Power of the
French King" and "to declare such Alliances in Parliament."3 0 King
Charles II delivered an indignant reply, excoriating the legislative
body for its unconstitutional encroachment on the executive prerogative vested in him:
Gentlemen,
COULD I have been silent, I would rather have chosen to be
so, than to call to mind Things so unfit for you to meddle with,
as are contained in some Part of your Address; wherein you have
entrenched upon so undoubted a Right of the Crown, that I am
30 9 H.C. JOUR. 425 (1677) (emphasis in original).
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confident it will appear in no Age (when the Sword was not
drawn) that the Prerogative of making Peace and War hath been
so dangerously invaded .... Should I suffer this fundamental
Power of making Peace and War to be so far invaded (though but
once) as to have the Manner and Circumstances of Leagues prescribed to me by Parliament, it is plain, that no Prince or State
would any longer believe, that the Sovereignty of England rests in
the Crown; nor could I think Myself to signify any more to foreign
Princes, than the empty Sound of a King. Wherefore you may rest
assured, That no Condition shall make me depart from, or lessen,
so essential a Part of the Monarchy. 3'
This concept of separation of powers was one of the features of a
monarchical constitution that the framers of the American Constitution
plainly rejected. This divergence can be demonstrated by looking at
the formulations of the idea of separation of powers written contemporaneously with the Constitution. The classic statements are in
the group of papers that James Madison published in 1788 as Numbers
47, 48, and 51 of The Federalist. In an effort to establish the true
meaning of the doctrine, Madison took pains to deny that it required
the different branches to "be wholly unconnected with each other."
He maintained the precise contrary, writing that
unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to
give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of
separation which the maxim requires, as essential32 to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained. Instead of prohibiting, the doctrine of separation of powers required
each branch to maintain a vigilant check upon the doings of the others
and to act when necessary to halt encroachments and usurpations.
Quoting Montesquieu, Madison insisted that that "oracle" (as he
termed him) did not mean that the various departments or branches
"ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of
each other,"3 3 but rather that
where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same
hands which possess the whole power of another department, the
fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.3 4
The evil is "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many."
31 Id. at 426 (emphasis in original).
32 THE FnERALUsr No. 48, at 308 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Madison) [hereinafter cited
as THE FEDERALisr].
33 Id. No. 47, at 301-02 (J.Madison).
34 Id. at 302.
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Such an accumulation, said3 5Madison, "may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny."
The meaning that he and the other framers attached to the
principle of separation of powers was summed up in a constitutional
amendment that Madison proposed on the 8th of June 1789 for inclusion in the Bill of Rights:
[T]he Legislative Department shall never exercise the powers
vested in the Executive or Judicial, nor the Executive exercise the
powers vested in the Legislative or Judicial, nor the Judicial exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Executive Departments.86

In the Massachusetts constitution of 1780, where this formulation
originated, the clause concluded with a memorable reminder of its
purpose: "To the end it may be a government of laws and not of
37
men."
The issues of domestic government were obviously uppermost in
the minds of most European political theorists who expounded the
doctrine of separation of powers. To apply the concept in thoroughgoing fashion to the making of foreign policy was by no means a
common idea. Even Montesquieu, who undertook to universalize the
theory, cannot be said to have extended it clearly into the domain of
foreign relations. Accordingly, the deliberate parcelling out to different hands of the various kinds of power required for the making of
war and peace can be considered an essentially American concept,
like judicial review. Sensing the danger that could result were any
branch of government allowed to accumulate all the powers relating
to war and peace, the American framers proposed to prevent it by the
same means they were using to prevent a possible monopoly of domestic powers.
III.

SEPARATION

OF POWERS APPLIED TO THE HANDLING

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In particular, the American framers recognized, as few of their
predecessors had done, that the conduct of foreign relations includes
Id. at 300.
86 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435-36 (1789) [1789-1791]. The provision was included in the
Bill of Rights as passed by the House on August 24, 1789, but was eliminated when the
Senate reduced the number of amendments from 17 to 12. See E. DUMBAULD, THE BuL OF
RIGHTS AND WHAT rr MEANS TODAY 46-47, 209, 212, 216, 219 (1957).
85

•7 MASSACHusETTs,

COLONY TO COMMONWEALTH: DOCUMENTS ON THE FORMATION OF ITS

CONSITrUTION 131, 1775-17.80, at (R. Taylor ed. 1961) (Part 1, Article 30).
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elements that are . essentially legislative in nature, others that are
clearly executive, and still others that are primarily judicial. Madison
remarked in The Federalist that "treaties with foreign sovereigns"
take on, once they are made, "the force of legislative acts." 38 In the
Constitution itself, the power to declare war was unhesitatingly assigned to the legislative branch, and the power of military command
to the executive. The enforcement of treaties, so far at least as their
domestic consequences are concerned, was made a judicial responsibility.8 9 Foreign affairs, in brief, were brought by the framers under
the dominion of all the accepted maxims relating to separation of
powers and to checks and balances.
The meaning of these arrangements is obvious. As applied to
foreign affairs, separation of powers signified above all that the President should not usurp the congressional power to declare war, that
Congress should not usurp the power of the commander in chief by
attempting to direct military operations, that the President should not
negotiate foreign agreements without first seeking the advice of the
Senate or attempt to make them binding without its consent, and that
no person should officially represent the nation abroad except after
concurrent action on the appointment by President and Senate.
The corollary of the principle of separation of powers is that no
program of action of crucial importance can be decided upon and carried through except by the concurrence of the several branches to
which the different types of power have been entrusted. This is axiomatic where domestic laws are concerned: the legislature must enact
them; the executive must administer or execute them; and the courts
must adjudicate the cases that arise under them. Though the parallelism can never be exact, the implication for foreign affairs of the doctrine of separation of powers is essentially the same-the making and
carrying out of foreign policy is not the prerogative of any one branch
of government. To make war requires a definite decision by Congress
to engage in hostilities, a body of legislation providing men and money,
an exercise of military command by the President, and an enforcement
by the courts of whatever compulsive statutes are necessary and proper.
To negotiate a treaty calls for previous advice on policy from the Senate, nomination of envoys by the President and their approval by.the
Senate, communication with foreign nations through the machinery of
the executive branch, submission of the completed treaty to the Senate
for its approval, exchange of ratifications by the President as repre88 TnE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison).
89 US. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl.11; id. art. II, § 2,cl.1; id. art. VI, cl. 2.
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sentative of the -.nation, enactment by Congress of any measures that
the treaty may have made necessary, and enforcement by the courts of
such provisions of the treaty as have domestic implications.
The ancient argument nevertheless persists that ultimate powers
of decision in foreign affairs must be placed in the hands of one man
(a "monarch," in the literal sense of that classic Greek term of political
analysis), unhampered by any requirement that basic policy be worked
out in consultation with a body representative of the nation as a whole.
In every period essentially the same reasons have been given. A consensus between governors and governed is alleged to be impossible because the issues are too complex for the people's representatives to understand, or because secrecy is so imperative that only the executive
can be allowed to know what is happening, or because events are too
fast-moving for the executive to wait for broadly-based advice before.
acting.
The Founding Fathers were fully aware of these traditional arguments, but they nevertheless opted for a system founded on what the
Declaration of Independence called "the consent of the governed"-a
phrase that is, after all, virtually synonymous with "consensus." The
corresponding language of the Constitution is "advice and consent."
That pair of words-for one must remember that there are two and
they connote different things--come close to stating in a nutshell the
central intent of the framers of the American Constitution with respect to the conduct of foreign affairs.
The phrase itself-"by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate"-is applied by the Constitution to only two activities connected with foreign relations, namely the making of treaties and the
appointment of ambassadors. 40 The phrase, as such, does not appear
in the clauses concerned with declaring war and raising troops; the
reason, however, is quite simple. These powers are vested by the Constitution in the legislature, and the legislative process of deliberation
and decision is nothing else than a procedure for giving authoritative
political advice and consent in the most direct and the most binding
fashion possible. By treating a declaration of war as a legislative act,
the American Constitution is requiring Congress and the President to
reach a consensus before committing the nation to war, just as it requires the Senate and the President to reach a consensus before committing the nation to any international agreement. Moreover, by
choosing the phrase "advice and consent" to describe the Senate's role
in treaty-making and in the appointment of ambassadors, the framers
40 Id. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
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indicated their intention that the determination of foreign policy in
peacetime should be a deliberative process, with participation by the
Senate at every stage.
IV.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ADVICE"

AND "CONSENT"

The phrase "advice and consent" contains two distinctively different words, which denote two quite different things-different in
nature and different in timing. If language is used rationally, "advice"
means counsel offered before a decision is reached; "consent" means
acceptance of a proposed course of action after plans have been worked
out in detail and are ready to be carried out. Accordingly, the selfevident meaning of the treaty clause is that the Senate is to reach
through discussion a consensus as to the policy to be embodied in a
projected treaty; that the President, acting through the nation's diplomatic agents, is to take charge of negotiations designed to realize that
policy; and that when an international agreement is negotiated (with
concessions necessarily given and received), the Senate is to decide
whether its final terms are acceptable.
In actual practice, the Senate's constitutional right and duty to
proffer advice on the terms of treaties about to be negotiated has been
allowed to dwindle away, until today it is no more than the power to
advise the President to ratify or not to ratify a treaty that he has already negotiated at his own discretion. The Senate has accepted this
role for itself by adopting the practice of conveying both its advice and
its consent in a single resolution, passed at a single time, after negotiations have been completed. The following is the formula employed:
"Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),
That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of" the treaty
in question. 41 Thus the Senate no longer purports to give advice about
41 E.g., 87 JouR. EXEC. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 505-06 (1945)
(resolution of ratification of the Charter of the United Nations). Even when the Senate
demands changes in a treaty it does not invoke its constitutional right to give "advice" to
the President on the making of treaties, but instead attaches reservations to its resolution
giving advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty already drawn up. For example,

the Senate gave its approval to the Jay Treaty of 1794 "on condition that" an article be
added, and consented to an 1800 treaty with France "provided" one article be expunged
and another substituted. 2 U.S. DE"'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 175, TREATIEs AN OTHER INTERNATIONAL AcTs OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 271, 482 (H. Miller ed. 1931). The
Senate's practice of giving advice and consent to the ratification,instead of to the making,
of a treaty can perhaps be traced to the historical accident that the first treaty submitted
to it (aside from Indian treaties) was one that had already been negotiated before the Senate
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the making of a treaty, though "make" is the word in the Constitution,
but only about its ratification. This is hardly the sort. of continuous,
informed, full-bodied advice on foreign policy that the Constitution
makes the Senate responsible for giving.
By adopting the clause that gives the President "Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties," the
framers of the Constitution were not assigning to the Senate the mere
function of rubber-stamping such agreements as the President might
decide to make in furtherance of his own conceptions of policy. The
past history of the phrase "advice and consent" clearly shows that it
connoted the veiy opposite of this to Americans of the constitutionmaking generation. For a full century, the phrase in question had been
a recognized synonym for parliamentary debate and decision and for
the comparable procedures of other high governmental bodies charged
with reaching, through deliberation and consultation with executive
officials, a consensus on policies and courses of action.
V.

"ADVICE AND CONSENT" AS A TRADITIONAL FORMULA
OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONALISM

The twice-repeated formula "by and with the Advice and Consent
of" was not invented in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. It was
taken verbatim from the enacting clause that had appeared at the head
of every English statute since the latter part of the seventeenth century:
[B]e it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
came into existence. Precluded as it was from giving advice on the making of that particular treaty, the Senate could only fulfill its responsibility of giving advice by advising the
President to ratify it. The Senate managed, in fact, to put the cart before the horse by
first consenting to the treaty and then advising its ratification. The situation was this: In
1782 Congress sent instructions to Benjamin Franklin in Paris for the negotiation of a
treaty with France for the establishment of consulates. The proposed treaty that resulted
in 1784 was unacceptable to Congress, which felt that there were deviations from the plan
contained in the instructions. Thomas Jefferson, who had succeeded Franklin, was instructed in 1786 and 1787 to re-negotiate the treaty, and the old Congress promised-with
"candor and good faith"-that if the treaty were made to conform with the original plan,
and if a time limit were included, then Congress would "immediately ratify it." The treaty
was signed on November 14, 1788, after the new Constitution was ratified but before the
new government was organized and put in operation. At the request of the Senate, John
Jay gave his official opinion on July 25, 1789 that the treaty met the conditions laid down
by the old Congress and that "the United States ought to ratify it." 1 JouR. ExEc. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1789). On July 29, accordingly, it was "Resolved,
unanimously, That the Senate do consent to the said convention, and advise the President
of the United States to ratify the same." Id. at 9.
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.the Conimons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the
Authority of the same .... 42
These are the opening words of a statute of 1685 in the reign of James
II, the words by force of which the enactment became part of the law
of the land. The same phrase to this day has been employed to give
binding force to any and every statute that the British Parliament has
43
seen fit to enact, whether a public law or simply a money bill.
A glance at history will show the weight of meaning that the brief
phrase carried at the time of the making of the American Constitution.
Until the latter part of the seventeenth century, it is true, various
phrasings had been employed, as generally happens before formulas
become fixed. Thus the Treason Act of 1534 was
enacted by the Assent and Consent of our Sovereign Lord the
King, and the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons
in this present Parliament assembled. .... 44
Numerous variants could be quoted, but the sense was the same until,
in the 1640's, the Long Parliament began to enact ordinances without
the King's approval. In those years, the enacting clauses took such
forms as the following: "[I]t is Ordained by the Lords and Commons
now in Parliament assembled that . . . . 45 During the Protectorate
of Oliver Cromwell, after both the execution of Charles I and the expulsion of the Rump Parliament, the formula became: "Be it Ordained by His Highness the Lord Protector, by and with the advice of
his Council ..... .,46
42 An Act against the Importation of Gunpowder, Arms, and other Ammunition, and
Utensils of War, 1 Jac. 2, c. 8 (1685) (emphasis added).
43 A money bill begins with a recital that it is "the Commons of England in Parliament assembled" who "freely and unanimously ...
give and grant" to the King or
Queen "the several Rates, Duties, Impositions and Charges herein after mentioned," but
it then continues with the enacting clause in regular form. E.g., An Act for the better
Support of her Majesty's Houshold, and of the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, 1 Anne,
stat. 1, c. 7 (1701/1702). To A public law the royal assent is given (in Norman or law
French) by the words "Le Roy le veult;" to a money bill by the words "Le Roy remercie
ses bons Sujets, accepte leur Benevolence, et ainsi le veult;" to a private bill (which is in
form a petition that has been approved by Parliament) by the words "Soit fait comme il
est desire." E.g., 27 H.L. JOUR. 460-62 (1750).
44 An Act whereby Offences be made High Treason, and taking away all Sanctuaries
for all manner of High Treasons, 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (1534).
45 E.g., An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, for the Safety and
Defence of the Kingdom of England, and Dominion of Wales (1641/1642), in 1 Acrs Axn
ORDINANCES OF THE INTERPEGNUM, 1642-1660, at 1 (C. Firth & R. Rait eds. 1911) [hereinafter
cited as Acrs AND ORDINANCES]. For variations of this clause, see id. at 202, 348, 1261; 2 id.
at 18.
46 E.g., An Ordinance for the better ordering and disposing of the Estates under
Sequestration (1653/1654), in 2 Acrs AND ORDINANCES 839.
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When, in 1660, the English constitution was restored to its ancient monarchical form, it' became a matter of high constitutional importance to permanently adopt a formula that would recognize both
the principle that laws could be made only in the King's name and
with his approval (thus repudiating the ordinances of the interregnum), and also the principle that laws could not be made except when
formulated, debated, amended, and finally adopted by both houses of
Parliament (thus repudiating the attempt of Charles I at personal
rule). The enacting formula that resulted and that has ever since remained unchanged thus summed up in capsule form both parts of this
fundamental principle of English constitutionalism, a principle of
consensus. The phrase "by and with the Advice and Consent of [the
two houses of Parliament]" was shorthand for the legislative process
itself and all its constitutional implications.
Like most formulas resulting from historical give-and-take, this
one did not say exactly what it meant and what everyone understood
it to mean. The "advice" that Parliament gave was no mere recommendation; it amounted in fact to a mandate. Furthermore, it was the
King, rather than the Lords and Commons, who was cast in the role
of giving consent (though in his case it was called "assent")-a formal
approval which, by the end of the first decade of the eighteenth century, he had lost the power to withhold. 47 No one acquainted with
eighteenth-century English constitutional language and usage could
possibly have mistaken the phrase "by and with the advice and consent of . . .

."

as signifying no more than a formal, last-stage ratifica-

tion by the legislature of decisions reached and measures perfected
wholly within the executive branch. "Advice and consent" was the
formula already in use for more than a century at the time of the
American Revolution to signify the active, deliberative, decisionmaking role that Parliament played in dealing with the great issues of
domestic governmental policy.
"Advice and consent" was also the constitutional formula applied
to mandatory forms of consultation involving bodies other than Parliament-notably the Privy Council. In this context, as in the parliamentary one, the phrase signified genuine deliberation, not rubber-stamp
approval, and it imposed on participants some responsibility for the
final decision. This essential identity of meaning was strikingly illustrated in a resolution adopted by the Long Parliament at the beginning of June 1642. In the second of Nineteen Propositions presented
47 The royal veto was last exercised by Queen Anne in 1707. 1 W. ANSON, THE LAW
AND CUSTrOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 301 (3d ed. 1897). The form had been "le roy s'avisera."
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by Parliament to King Charles I just before the conflict. between them
broke out into overt civil war, the demand was made:
That the great affairs of the kingdom may not be concluded or
transacted by the advice of private men, or by any unknown or
unsworn councillors, but that such matters as concern the public,
and are proper for the High Court of Parliament, which is your
Majesty's great and supreme council, may be debated, resolved
and transacted only in Parliament, and not elsewhere .. .and

such other matters of state as are proper for your Majesty's Privy
Council shall be debated and concluded by such of the nobility
and others as shall from time to time be chosen for that place, by
approbation of both Houses of Parliament: and that no public act
concerning the affairs of the kingdom, which are proper for your
Privy Council, may be esteemed of any validity, as proceeding
from the royal authority, unless it be done by the advice and consent of the major part of your Council, attested under their
hands ....48
Compressed into this paragraph are many concepts of vital significance for later British and American constitutional history. Certain
of the distinctions made, as well as certain of the definitions implied,
will call for comment later, but one point at least should be examined
here. As the first quoted clause makes clear, the word "advice" had
acquired, before the middle of the seventeenth century, a technical
constitutional significance far removed from its everyday sense of an
"[o]pinion from one not immediately concerned as to what could or
should be done about a problem." 49 When employed in a constitutional context, the term "advice" had come to signify a formal recommendation for action, made to the sovereign by someone of recognized
authority, acting in his official capacity and assuming political responsibility for what he might advise. In the seventeenth century, of course,
the monarch was still free (as today the occupant of the throne is not)
to reject the advice thus tendered. Nevertheless, the consequences of
doing so had to be carefully weighed. For both parties, therefore, the
giving or receiving of advice involved constitutional responsibilities
and liabilities that were not to be taken lightly. Furthermore, the effect
of stipulating "consent" as well as "advice" is to reinforce the requirement of genuine consultation, for if the advice at the beginning is disregarded without good reason, the consent at the end is not likely to be
forthcoming.
48 THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION

(3d ed. rev. S.Gardiner 1906) [hereinafter cited as

CONSTITUTIONAL

1625-1660, at 250-51

DOCUMENTS].

49 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

19 (1971).
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To digress for a moment, one should note that the word "opinion" has retained a far looser meaning. In a political context (though
not in a judicial one) an "opinion" generally signifies little more than
a suggestion or a tentative judgment or a point of view offered as a
basis for discussion. An "opinion" so conceived commits neither the
speaker nor the hearer in any final or irrevocable way, but obtains
only such weight as the person in authority may choose to give it.
This distinction of meaning between "advice" and "opinion" is reflected (though often overlooked) in the American Constitution, the
phrasing of which is notable for precision. That document requires the
President to obtain the "advice" as well as the consent of the Senate
on treaties and appointments, but it gives him the discretion to demand the "opinion" of the head of any executive department. 50 Such
an opinion once given may be accepted or rejected as the President
wishes, for he is under no necessity of obtaining the consent of any of
his subordinates to the course of action he decides to pursue. Quite different is the constitutional "advice" that the President is required to
obtain from the Senate. When coupled as it is with "consent," the word
"advice" acquires a mandatory force that is unmistakable.
The framers of the American Constitution did not have to look
across the Atlantic for examples of this well-understood usage of the
phrase "advice and consent." Until late in the seventeenth century
American colonial assemblies were allowed to paraphrase the English
enacting formula in the laws they passed: "Be it enacted by the
King's most Excellent Majesty by and with the consent of the general
assembly." ' Eventually the style was altered in such a way as to emphasize the subordinate position of colonial governments; enactment
was simply "[b]y the governor, council, and assembly." 52 The phrase
50 The President

may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices ....
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The President's consultation with his Cabinet (a body nowhere mentioned in the Constitution) represents, constitutionally speaking, a canvassing
of its members' opinions in accordance with this clause, and is not a request for their
advice in the sense in which that word is used in the treaty clause.
51 E.g., I ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS 1670-1776, at 126
(L. Labaree ed. 1935) (style of enacting laws in Virginia, 1679) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL
INSTRUCTIONS]. The charter of Maryland of 1632 provided in Article VII that laws should
be made "with the Advice, Assent, and Approbation of the Free-Men . . . or of their
Delegates or Deputies." DOCUMENTARY SOURCE BOOK OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1606-1898, at
34 (W. MacDonald ed. 1909).
52 This form "and no other" began, to be prescribed as early as 1680 for Jamaica
and 1682 for the mainland colonies, commencing with Virginia. 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS
126-27.
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"advice and consent" remained in use, however, for the purpose of defining the relationship of consultation and collaboration that the royal
governor was required to maintain with the Council of the colony.
The nature of that intended relationship was spelled out in the
instructions regularly issued by the English Privy Council to each new
governor of a royal colony throughout the century preceding the American Revolution. Typically the governor was instructed
to fit yourself with all convenient speed and to repair to our said
province of
. And being arrived there you are to take upon
you the execution of the place and trust we have reposed in you,
and forthwith to call together the members of our council for that
province . .

.5

Some of the governor's instructions referred to duties that he could
perform without consultation, but on most matters he had to be given
a large measure of discretion. To guard against abuses of power, especially such arbitrary acts as an administrator from abroad might commit
through ignorance of the interests, customs or convictions of the inhabitants, the Privy Council instructed the royal governor, firmly and
clearly, to exercise the most crucial of his discretionary powers only
"with the advice and consent of our said council.

'54

Furthermore, to

prevent concealment from the members of the Council of the powers
entrusted to them, the governor was ordinarily instructed "forthwith
to communicate unto our said council such and so many of our instructions wherein their advice and consent are mentioned to be
requisite." 55
6
Except in special situations, such as a threatened Indian attack,
the power to decide on war and peace remained in the hands of the
imperial authorities in London. Therefore the advice and consent that
the royal governor was required to obtain from the colonial Council
related solely to internal affairs. The situation in England was somewhat parallel, for parliamentary advice and consent was likewise limited to domestic legislation, thanks to the possession by the Crown of
a monopoly of the conduct of foreign relations.
It should now be clear how immensely significant was the particular use that was made of the phrase "advice and consent" in the Constitution of the United States. A requirement which under the English
53

Id. at 14-15. On the appointment, function, and power of the provincial Council,

see L. LABAREE, RoxAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 134-71 (1930).
54 See, e.g., 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS 82, 88; 2 id. at 696.
55 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS 45, 46.
56 See id. at 82.
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constitution pertained only to internal- affairs was extended by the
American- framers to the making, of international agreements. Instead
of recognizing an executive "prerogative to make treaties," they prescribed that treaties were to be made by the head of state (in conformity with traditional diplomatic protocol), but only "by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate"-therein employing the traditional
phrase that connoted legislative deliberation and decision and executive concurrence. At the same time that the American Constitution
thus assimilated the process of treaty-making into the process of lawmaking, it also boldly converted a declaration of war from an executive
into a legislative act, thereby automatically applying the requirement
of congressional advice and consent to the matter in the most direct
of all possible ways.
By thus subjecting to legislative deliberation and decision the
great issues of war and peace, the framers of the United States Constitution were breaking sharply with English tradition. In so doing,
however, the Americans were falling in line with a vigorous dissident
strain in English constitutional thinking. For almost a century and a
half, the phraseology of "advice and consent" had been employed to
voice a recurrent demand in England itself that questions of war and
peace be determined not by the will of the executive but by the deliberations of a representative assembly.
VI.

PARLIAMENT'S DEMAND

FOR A VOICE IN FOREIGN POLICY

Beginning early in the reign of James I, criticism of the Spanishoriented foreign policy of the King became rife in Parliament. The
Great Protestation of the 18th of December 1621, in which the Commons asserted their right to discuss foreign affairs, was torn from their
journals by the King's own hand.Y7 In the next reign relations between
the King and Parliament reached the breaking-point in the 1640's, and
in this context parliamentary demands for a voice in th making of
foreign policy began to be formulated definitively in terms of "advice
and consent."
When events finally forced Charles I to abandon his attempt to
rule without Parliament, and obliged him to summon in 1640 the first
meeting of that body since 1629, parliamentary leaders were determined to re-establish their constitutional right of full participation in
the making of governmental decisions. The Short Parliament of April
57 See THE STUART CONSTITUTION

43-48 (J. Kenyon ed. 1966).

1603-1688:

DOCUMENTS

AND

COMMENTARY

29-30,
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and May 1640 was dissolved before it could act, but the Long Parliament, which convened on the 3rd of November 1640, moved rapidly
and in dead earnest. It proceeded at once to impeach and then (after
substituting a bill of attainder) to send to execution the Earl of Strafford, the King's principal minister, "for endeavouring to subvert the
Ancient and Fundamental Laws and Government of His Majesty's
Realms . . . and to introduce an Arbitrary and Tyrannical Govern-

ment against Law."5 8 There followed a rapid succession of acts designed to make secure the place of Parliament in the constitutional
system. One enactment provided for the summoning of Parliament,
every three years, whether the King acted or not, and another prohibited the dissolution of the existing Parliament without its own
consent. 59 Measures were also taken to reverse the decision in the ShipMoney case, in which the judges had upheld the King in imposing a
tax without parliamentary grant. 60 Other acts of Parliament abolished
the Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission,6" which had for58 THE TRYAL OF THOMAS EARL OF STRAFFORD 756 (8 J. RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLEcrIONs (1721)) (Bill of Attainder) [the 1721 edition of the Collections is a reprinting of
the original editions, published between 1659 and 1701]. The phrases quoted above from
the act of attainder were a repetition of those contained in the first of the original articles
of impeachment, voted by the Commons on November 24, 1640. Id. at 8. The trial commenced on March 22, 1641, but on April 9, 1641 the Commons decided that it would be
"prejudicial to the Kingdom" to spend "any more [time] than has been spent." Id. at 44-45.
The next day, therefore, a bill of attainder was introduced, by-passing the impeachment
procedure. The bill passed the Commons on April 21 and the Lords on May 7; it received the royal assent on May 10; and Strafford was beheaded two days later. Id. at 45,
54, 60, 759-61. In 1662, after the Restoration, Strafford's attainder was reversed and
the act provided that all records "be wholly Cancel'd, and taken off the File, or otherwise
Defaced and Obliterated, to the intent the same may not be visible in After-Ages." An Act
for the Reversing of the Earl of Strafford his Attainder, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 29 (1662).
Eventually, by orders in 1693 and later, the House of Lords authorized a restoration of
the record, with the result that the act of attainder is officially published in 5 Statutes of
the Realm 177. See 3 Cob. St. Tr. 1381-82 n.* (1809).
59 An Act for the preventing of inconveniences happening by the long intermission
of Parliaments, 16 Car. 1, c. 1 (1640/1641), in CONSTrTUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 144-55; An Act
to prevent inconveniences which may happen by the untimely adjourning, proroguing,
or dissolving this present Parliament, 17 Car. 1, c. 7 (1641), in CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
158-59.
60 An Act for the declaring unlawful and void the late proceedings touching Shipmoney, and for the vacating of all records and process concerning the same, 17 Car. 1, c. 14
(1641), in CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 189-92. Moreover certain of the judges had already
been impeached for their role in the case. See 2 J. RUSHwORTH, HIsTORICAL COLLECTxONS
606-14 (1721) [hereinafter cited as J. RUSHWORTH]; 4 id. at 318-46; 5 id. at 361 (articles of
impeachment). The proceedings in the Ship-Money case of 1637, involving John Hampden's refusal to pay, are in 3 Cob. St. Tr. 825-1314.
61 An Act for the Regulating the Privy Council and for taking away the Court commonly called the Star Chamber, 17 Car. 1, c. 10 (1641), in CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
179-86; An Act foi the repeal of a branch of a Statute primo Elizabethae, concerning Coin-
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feited their claim to respect as judicial bodies by becoming primarily
agencies for the carrying out of royal policy. 2 With the Thirty Years
War still raging on the Continent, England's possible role in the balance of power between the Catholic and Protestant nations could never
be far from men's minds. For the moment, however, the reforms that
the parliamentarians were demanding had little directly to do with the
conduct of foreign relations. Even the gravest of all the challenges to
the prerogative, Parliament's demand for control of the militia, resulted from the fear that the armed forces might be used to intimidate
the Commons. 63 When compromise on this issue proved impossible,
the conflict quickly escalated into full-fledged civil war. As a symbol
that the break was complete, the King raised his standard at Nottingham on the 22nd of August 1642, and fighting began at Edgehill on
64
the 23rd of October.
missioners for causes ecclesiastical, 17 Car. 1, c. 11 (1641), in CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
186-89.
62 Especially memorable are the scathing comments of Edward Hyde, later Earl of
Clarendon, who observed matters at first hand. See 1 EARL OF CLARENDON, THE HISTORY OF
THE REBELLION AND CIVIL WARS IN ENGLAND, BEGUN IN THE YEAR 1641, at 68-69 (1707).
63 The Militia Ordinance, adopted by both Houses on March 5, 1642, essayed to put
the militia of each county under the command of a lord lieutenant of Parliament's own
choosing, to be employed under "directions from the Lords and Commons assembled in
Parliament." An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, for the safety and
defence of the kingdom of England and dominion of Wales, in CONsT'rITIoNAL DocUMENTs 245-47 (footnote omitted). The preamble referred, by way of justification, to a
recent "dangerous and desperate design upon the House of Commons"-an allusion to the
incursion of the King with armed supporters into the House of Commons on January 4,
1642, in an attempt to arrest five of the members. See generally C. WEDGWOOD, THE KING'S
WAR 1641-1647, at 55-60 (1959).
84 On May 27, 1642, the King by proclamation forbade his subjects to obey the Militia
Ordinance, warning them that they would be called "to a strict account . . . as violators
of the laws and disturbers of the peace of this kingdom." A Proclamation, forbidding all
His Majesty's subjects belonging to the trained bands or militia of this kingdom to rise,
march, muster or exercise, by virtue of any Order or Ordinance of one or both Houses of
Parliament, without consent or warrant from His Majesty, upon pain of punishment according to the laws, in CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 249. Parliament reiterated its demand
for control of the armed forces in the 9th, 15th, and 16th of the Nineteen Propositions
of June 1, 1642. Id. at 252, 253. And on June 6, in a declaration defending the Militia
Ordinance, Parliament asserted its constitutional authority to take whatever measures
might be necessary to "preserve the public peace and safety of the kingdom" even though
the King, "seduced by evil counsel, do in his own person oppose or interrupt the same." A
Declaration of the Lords and Commons in Parliament concerning His Majesty's Proclamation, the 27th of May, 1642, in id. at 256-57. A month later, on July 12, 1642, Parliament
voted to raise an army of its own. 4 J. RUSHWORTH, supra note 60, at 755. The signal for
actual war was the King's raising of his standard at Nottingham on August 22, 1642-the
first major battle was fought at Edgehill on the 23rd of October. See generally C. WEDcwOOD, supra note 63, at 108-45. Though the ultimate causes of the English civil wars were
varied and deep-seated, the precipitant of actual hostilities was the conflict over command
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Just before, the final -breakdown, Parliament embodied its constitutional views in the Nineteen Propositions of the 1st of June 1642,
especially in the second of these, already quoted. 65 The -guiding principle, in brief, was that every exercise of the royal prerogative should
be performed only with the advice and consent of some clearly designated and responsible body. Matters traditionally regarded as legislative-taxes and domestic laws generally-would be dealt with in Parliament. Other powers-in other words, those traditionally assigned to
the prerogative-would be exercised only with the advice and consent
of the Privy Council, appointment to which would be subject to parliamentary approval. Privy councillors, moreover, would be bound by
oath to maintain the Petition of Right and other fundamental statutes,6 6 and their consent to every executive act would be a matter of
record, attested by the signatures of those who made up the approving
majority. In two other of the Nineteen Propositions, Parliament itself
gave specific advice on matters of foreign policy,6 7 but in general, the
constitutional scheme set forth in the second proposition paid ostensible respect to the traditional view that "matters of state"-therefore
foreign policy-belonged to the prerogative and were to be debated
68
and decided in the Privy Council rather than in Parliament.
Only in the winter of 1644-45, after the first Civil War had been
raging for two years, was an explicit demand put forth for parliamentary advice and consent to the making of foreign war and peace.
By this time, the Scots had joined the parliamentary forces, and consequently the parleying with the King took place in the name of the
representatives of both England and Scotland. Among the propositions
presented by them to the King on the 24th of November 1644 and
discussed at Uxbridge the following January was one that challenged
in explicit and unmistakable terms the contention that the conduct of
foreign affairs was a royal prerogative, that is, a power belonging exclusively to the executive. The Propositions of Uxbridge demanded:
of the militia. The issue can be stated in terms of subsequent distributions of power under
the American Constitution by observing that the King was insisting on a range of powers
connected with the raising of armed forces which the American Constitution would vest
clearly in Congress, while at the same time Parliament was insisting on a power of military
command which the American Constitution would vest with equal definiteness in the
President.
65 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
66 CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 253 (Proposition 11).
67 Id. at 251-52, 253-54 (Proposition 5 concerned marriage-of the King's children with
foreign princes; Proposition 17 concerned alliances with Protestant rulers on the continent).
68 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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That by Act of -Parliament the concluding of peace or war

with foreign Princes and States, be with advice and consent of
both Parliaments, or in the intervals of Parliaments, by their Com69
missioners.
No agreement with Charles proved possible, however, either at this
time or after his defeat and surrender to the Scots in May 1646.70 By
the summer of 1647, negotiations had broken down so completely that
blueprints for a totally reorganized English commonwealth began to
be drawn up and discussed. Legislative advice and consent in matters
of peace and war formed a common element of all the plans, conservative and radical alike. The "Heads of the Proposals," published on the
1st of August 1647 and embodying the conservative views of the higher
officers of the army, proposed to create a Council of State which would
control the military forces and would also be vested with "[p]ower
as the King's Privy-Council, for and in all foreign Negotiations," but
subject to the important proviso "that the making of War or Peace with
any other Kingdom or State shall not be without the Advice and Consent of Parliament." 7' The more radical "Agreement of the People,"
published on the 28th of October and supported by the rank and file
of the army and by democratic and republican elements generally,
made no mention of either a privy council or an upper house, but
prescribed instead an equalitarian redistribution of seats in Parlia,
ment, after which the authority of these "Representatives of [the]
Nation" would "extend, without the consent or concurrence of any
other person or persons," to all proper governmental functions, including "the making war and peace" and "the treating with foreign
72
States."
69 CONSTITUTIONAL DocuMENTs 284
70 After the surrender of Charles I

(Proposition 23).
to the Scots on May 5, 1646, Parliament sent to the
King on the 13th of July the so-called Propositions of Newcastle, which elaborated most
of the earlier demands-particularly for control of the militia-but did not reiterate the
article requiring parliamentary consent for the making of peace or war with foreign states.
See 6 J. RUSHWORTH, supra note 60, at 309-17 (1722). See C. WEDGWOOD,supra note 63, at
565-75, for details concerning the drawing up of the terms, and of the King's subsequent
intransigence.
71 The Heads of the Proposals agreed upon by . . . the Council of the Army, in 7
J. RustWOTH, supra note 60, at 733 (incorrectly numbered 233).
'72 CONSTITUTIONAL DocuMErS 334. A revised and elaborated version of the "Agreement of the People," drawn up in January of 1649, just before the trial and execution of
the King, did provide for a Council of State. Though less explicit on the power of making
war and peace, the new Agreement certainly included that power in the grant to the
Representatives of ."the highest and final judgment, -concerning all natural or- civil
things," though it did specifically deny to government any power "to impress or constrain
any person to serve in foreign war." Id. at 368. This revised "Agreement of the People"
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The "Agreement of the People" was, for the mid-seventeenth century, the climactic expression of faith in genuinely representative parliamentary deliberation and decision-making. Though the execution
of the King in January 1649 and the conversion of England into a
Commonwealth without King or House of Lords might have been expected to make legislative power supreme over executive, nothing of
the sort actually happened. Power of decision in both foreign and domestic matters was concentrated in executive hands as fully under
Cromwell as it had been under the Stuarts. Moreover, any contention
that Parliament somehow spoke for the nation as a whole ceased to
be credible, as blow after blow was struck against its independence.
The undermining of confidence and power began with Pride's Purge,
engineered by the army in December 1648, which reduced Parliament
to a Rump. It continued with the dismissal of even this remnant by
Cromwell in April 1653. And it culminated in the farce of the Nominated Parliament of that same year, which might claim to represent
the "godly," but hardly anyone else. 73 The naming of Cromwell as
Lord Protector in December 1653, under an Instrument of Government drawn up by the Council of Officers, translated the realities of
the situation into explicit written form. The Protector's power to
"dispose and order the militia and forces" was subject to the "consent
of Parliament" (or of the Council when Parliament was not in session).
The same advice was to be sought by the Protector in exercising his
power to "direct in all things concerning the keeping and holding of a
good correspondency with foreign kings, princes, and states." However, in the crucial matter of deciding on war and peace, Parliament
was given no role. The Instrument of Government provided "[t]hat
the Lord Protector . . .shall . . .with the consent of the major part
of the council, have the power of war and peace." 74
The first Parliament under the Protectorate attempted to amend
the Instrument in the direction of full parliamentary participation in
the making of foreign policy. Among the resolutions which it adopted
,were two crucial ones dealing with war and peace, both passed on the
6th of December 1654. One declared "That the Power of making War,
was approved by the Council of the Officers on January 15, 1649, and thus represented in
a sense a combination of and compromise between the two rivals of 1647. Id. at 359 n.l.
73 Members of the Nominated Parliament (also nicknamed "Barebones Parliament')
were handpicked by the Council of Officers from names recommended by a select group
of religious congregations, and they were officially summoned by Cromwell as "CaptainGeneral and Commander-in-Chief of all the armies and forces raised, and to be raised,
within this Commonwealth." See id. at 405.
74 Id. at 406.
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is only in the Lord Protector and the Parliament"-i.e., in the executive and the legislature jointly. The other provided that when Parliament was sitting,
no Peace shall be concluded but by Consent of Parliament; and, in
the Intervals of Parliament, the Power of making Peace shall be in
the Lord Protector and the Council, with such Reservations and
Limitations as the Parliament shall approve. 75
When, however, Parliament proposed a further limitation on Cromwell's military authority by voting, on Saturday, the 20th of January
1655, that "the Militia of this Commonwealth ought not to be raised,
formed, or made Use of, but by common Consent of the People assembled in Parliament," 76 the exasperated Protector responded by dissolving Parliament the first thing on Monday following.7 7 With the
dissolution died the entire parliamentary bill for "Settling the Government."
The Restoration of Charles II in 1660 was as much a restoration
of traditional parliamentary institutions as it was of traditional monarchical ones. This meant, of course, that it'
was also a restoration to
the Crown of its traditional prerogative of making war and peace.
Nevertheless, the old ideal remained alive among the small band of
republican liberals who had opposed both Stuart and Cromwellian
absolutism-the "Commonwealthmen," to use the label that Caroline
Robbins has happily revived. In the early 1680's, for example, Henry
Neville published a dialogue, Plato Redivivus, in which an "English
Gentleman" (obviously the author himself) called for "an abatement
of [the] royal prerogative," naming, first of all, "the absolute power of
making war and peace, treaties and alliances"-a power often misused
by rulers (Cromwell being specifically included) to make "confederations and wars, very contrary and destructive to the interest of England."7 8 Such a tiny voice of dissent could hardly shake the confidence
of Charles II in the constitutional view he proclaimed in 1677 when he
denounced Parliament for having "dangerously invaded" his "fundamental Power of making Peace and War" by presumptuously recommending to him the foreign alliances he should make.79
So imperious a claim in behalf of the royal prerogative could
7 H.C. JOUR. 396 (1654).
Id. at 421 (1654/1655).
77 Id.
I/8Neville, Plato Redivivus, in Two ENGLisH
ed. 1969).
79 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
75
76

REPUDLIcAN

TLcrs 184-85 (C. Robbins
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not go long unchallenged, however, once the Glorious Revolution of
1688-1689 displaced the last of the Stuart kings and installed as joint
sovereigns the prince and princess of Orange, William III and Mary,
who occupied the throne not by divine right but simply and obviously
by invitation of the Convention Parliament. The Declaration of
Rights, which the new King and Queen were required to accept and
which was also given statutory form as the Bill of Rights, settled in
favor of Parliament one of the bitterly contested questions of the
1640's by providing "That the raising or keeping a Standing Army
within the Kingdom in Time of Peace, unless it be with Consent of
Parliament, is against Law." 80 The Bill of Rights, however, did not
reach so high as to touch the royal prerogative of making war or peace
with foreign nations. Indeed, by bringing to the throne the chief
architect of a coalition against France-namely William III, the Dutch
stadholder-the English Parliament was almost necessarily committing
the nation to war with France. Not surprisingly, King William's War
(as the English called it) began immediately in 1689 and lasted until
1697. Only in the aftermath of that war, with the European diplomatic
situation growing ever tenser, was there a renewed challenge in England to the royal prerogative in foreign affairs.
What precipitated the discussion was the handling by the King
and his advisers (Dutch as well as English) of the complex diplomatic
problems connected with the succession to the throne of Spain, currently occupied by the childless Carlos II. Essentially the issue was
whether the Spanish empire, with its vast American possessions, would
suddenly be merged (by the accidents of inheritance) with the other
Hapsburg empire centered in Austria; united with the French kingdom, which Louis XIV was building up to imperial dimensions; or
(as the other powers obviously wished) placed under a ruler independent of both France and Austria.
On the outcome depended the balance of power in Europe, a
matter of vital concern to England. 8 ' Employing the royal prerogative
80 An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and settling the Succession of the Crown, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2 (1689). This enactment of December 16, 1689,
customarily called the Bill of Rights, recited the provisions of the Declaration of Rights,
drawn up by the two Houses and previously accepted by William and Mary on February
13, 1689, at which time they were proclaimed King and Queen of England. See 14 H.L.
JOUR. 125-27 (1688/1689).

81 On international diplomacy in the closing years of the seventeenth and first years
of the eighteenth century, see Clark, From the Nine Years War to the War of the Spanish
Succession, in 6 Tar NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HIsToRY 381-409 (J. Bromley. d. .1970). On
the impact of these developments on English politics, see G. CLARK, THE LATER STUARTS
1660-1714, at 188-99 (2d ed. 1956) (10 THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ENGLAND (G. Clark ed.)).
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in its fullest traditional scope, William III and his ministers made
England a party to two secret Partition. Treaties, first in 1698 and
again in 1700.2 Not only was Parliament kept in the dark, but even
the Privy Council was by-passed. Acting on the basis of a letter from
the King, then on the Continent, Lord Chancellor Somers affixed the
great seal to a crucial diplomatic commission made out in blank and
forwarded it to William, without the knowledge, let alone the approval, of his fellow Privy Councillors. s3 The treaties failed, however,
to prevent Louis XIV from seizing the advantage, and the War of the
Spanish Succession resulted in 1701. Before hostilities commenced,
the revelation of the secret treaties and of the manner in which they
had been negotiated opened up once more to public consideration the
extent of, and the justification for, the royal prerogative of war and
peace. One consequence was the impeachment of Somers and three
other Whig peers (who were not, however, brought to trial in the
end).8 4 A second outcome was the inclusion in the Act of Settlement
82 The Second Partition Treaty is printed in 4 H.L. Mss. (n.s.) 252-58 (1700/1701).
83 The second of the articles of impeachment of Somers, voted on May 19, 1701,
charged him with high crimes and misdemeanors for having affixed the great seal to a commission which conferred full power upon persons "whose names were to be afterwards
inserted beyond the seas" (that is, by the King, who was in Holland), and of having done
so "without communicating the same to the rest of the then lords justices of England, or
advising in council with his majesty's privy council thereupon." 5 W. CORBETr, PARLIAMENTARY HSroRv OF ENGLAND 1269 (1809). In his answer of May 24, 1701, Somers quoted a
letter from the King commanding him "to send full powers to him, under the great seal
of England, with blanks for the names of commissioners," and urging him to take care that
the job
be done secretly; that none but the lord Sorners [sic] and Mr. Secretary [James]
Vernon, and those to whom the said lord Sommers and Mr. Secretary should
communicate it, might have knowledge thereof; and that the clerks who were to
write the full powers might not know what they were.
Id. at 1278-79. See G. CLARK, supra note 81, at 194-96. Whether such actions violated the
constitution was debatable at the time, but at least one writer in 1701 stated what would
later be accepted as the duty of a minister when faced with an unconstitutional command
of the King:
"[I]n setting the seal to foreign alliances the Chancellor has a safe rule to follow;
that is, humbly to inform His Majesty that he cannot legally set the great seal to
a matter of that consequence unless the same be first debated and resolved in
Council."
A. FiTzRoy, THE HISTORY OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL 205-06 (1928).
84 Because of a quarrel between the two Houses over procedure, the Commons failed
to appear to press the charges, whereupon the Lords acquitted the four peers who had
been impeached, namely Lord Somers and the Earls of Portland, Orford, and Halifax. See
G. CLARK, supra note 81, at 194-95; T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HisTORY 600 (10th ed. rev; T. Plucknett 1946). Despite the acquittals,- these impeachments
played an important role in defining for the future the individual and the collective responsibility of ministers. See, for example, Castlereagh's classic statement on, responsibility
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of 1701 (which 'prescribed the future succession of the Crown) of certain new limitations on royal power.8 5
VII.

CRITICISMS OF THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE
OF WAR AND PEACE

The situation produced still a third result, namely a philosophic
re-examination of constitutional doctrines regarding the conduct of
foreign affairs. In 1701, Charles Davenant, best known as an economist,
published a 400-page volume with the long, self-explanatory title,
Essays upon I. The Ballance of Power. II. The Right of making War,
Peace, and Alliances. III. Universal Monarchy.8 6 His announced purpose was
to inquire how far, and in what manner the Right of making War
and Peace, Alliances and Treaties is by 8the
Constitution of this
7
Kingdom vested in the Executive Power?
made in Parliament in 1806, reprinted in THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY

CONSTrTUTION

1688-

1815: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 123-25 (E. Williams ed. 1960).
85 The Act of Settlement of 1701 provided that if the Crown should go "to any Person, not being a Native of this Kingdom of England," the nation would not be obligated
to defend his non-English territories "without the Consent of Parliament." It also barred
foreigners from the Privy Council and from Parliament. An Act for the further Limitation
of the Crown, and better securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, 12 & 13 Will.
3, c. 2 (1700/1701). Furthermore, in a provision repealed shortly after, the Act prescribed
that matters
which are properly cognizable in the Privy Council . . . shall be transacted there,
and all Resolutions taken thereupon shall be signed by such of the Privy Council
as shall advise and consent to the same,
Id. This was, of course, a reiteration of the principle whose recognition was demanded in
the Nineteen Propositions of 1642. See text accompanying note 48 supra. Not quite to the
point is Maitland's witty comment that "it seems to say no more than that things which
by law ought to come before the council ought to come before the council." F. MAITLAND,
THE CONSITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENcLAND 390 (1908). The purpose was not to differentiate
between matters to be decided by Parliament and those to be decided in the Privy Council,
but to make sure that every act of government should be authorized by some known and
responsible deliberative body. From this point of view the provision announced a fundamental principle of the English constitution. The defects of the provision were two: it
made the mistake of treating the Privy Council, rather than the new and still-suspect
Cabinet, as the executive organ of government; and it stood in the way of imposing collective responsibility upon all ministers for Cabinet decisions. By requiring only those
members of the Council who approved a measure to sign, it freed the minority members
from responsibility. The result, as one constitutional historian has put it, would have
been that "their differences of opinion would have come continually before Parliament,
and the doctrine of collective responsibility would never have developed." M. THOMSON,
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1642 to 1801, at 217 (1938).
8g [Hereinafter cited as C. DAVENANT]. Although the book was published anonymously
in 1701, the authorship is not in doubt.
87 C. DAVENANT 131 (1701). It should be noted that Davenant usually spoke not of
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The inquiry was an historical one, and Davenant did not confine his
attention to the diplomacy of the current reign or even of the whole
century just ended, but searched the records as far back as the Norman Conquest of 1066. His emphatic conclusion was that "from the
Time of William the Norman downwards," the proper constitutional
practice ("observ'd by all our Ancestors") had been
not to make Declarations of War, Conclusions of Peace, Truces,
Leagues, Alliances, nor indeed to Transact any important Matter,
especially with the Realm of France, without Advice of Parliament.
And this has been so much the constant practice of all former
Ages, Two or Three Reigns excepted, that it seems to have been
one of the Fundamental Constitutions of this Kingdom. 8
Like most constitutional arguments of the seventeenth century,
Davenant's had an antiquarian flavor, for he was appealing to the
ancient constitution against what he considered recent usurpations of
power. From the period prior to 1485 he cited numerous instances,
beginning with William I and ending with Henry VII, in which English monarchs sought the advice and consent of parliaments or great
councils on questions of foreign policy.89 His highest praise was for
Henry V, "that Heroick King" (victor at Agincourt in 1415), who
thought it no diminution to his Glory, or lessening of his Prerogative, to Advise with and be Advis'd by his Parliament in Matters of Peace, War, and Foreign Alliances ....90
Davenant's precedents dwindled away, however, with the acquisition
of power by the Tudors in 1485. Davenant did not hesitate to describe
the reign of Henry VIII as "the most Arbitrary and Tyrannical that
England ever saw," 9' and he admitted that Elizabeth I exercised
"Arbitrary Power" in foreign affairs, though he excused her on the
patriotic and chivalrous ground "that it could never enter into her
the power of the King, but of the "Executive Power," as did Blackstone half a century
later. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra. Davenant also carefully distinguished between the "Authority" which the Prince derives from the laws (and which is therefore
"circumscrib'd by Laws'), and his "Prerogative" which is "intrusted with him to Act
where the Laws are silent, and sometimes to Act even against the Written Letter of the
Law," but which is justified only "by the Necessity" and can only be exercised "upon a
great Emergency." C. DAVENANT 204-05. Davenant concludes this passagge with a warning:
But if this Prerogative were extended to every common Case, or if it were allow'd
to Act without the Peoples Consent where their Consent may be had, there would
be an end of Liberty.
Id. at 206.
88 C. DAVENANT 92-93 (emphasis in original).
89 See id. at 136-93, Appendix.
90 Id. at 180.
91 Id. at 193 (emphasis in original).
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Thoughts to make any Step that should hurt England."9 2 For the
Stuart kings, however, Davenant could find no mitigating circumstances, and his chronicle of their four reigns was one long indictment
of absolutism wedded to folly.
Despite appearances, however, Davenant was not really seeking
to turn back the clock. As an economist, strongly influenced by the
economic determinism of James Harrington's Oceana (which he
quoted), 93 Davenant argued that the constitutional distribution of
political power must reflect the "Ballance of Property." This had now
tipped toward the Commons, thereby entitling them to a
[r]ight to interpose with their Councils, since at their Expence
chiefly, Peace was to be preserv'd, Alliances were to be maintain'd,
and Wars were to be supported.94
Basically, then, Davenant's purpose was to determine, for a
modern and not a mediaeval state, the nature of executive power and
the way in which it could be made both responsive and responsible to
the political representatives of the community as a whole. He described the role of the executive in purely practical terms, devoid of
mystical trappings:
[D]eclaring War, concluding Peace, and Signing or Ratifying Alliances, are Acts requiring the Personal performance of some one or
more, and consequently must be vested in the Executive
Power ....

95

He pointed out, however, that many other powers-such as those required for "the Protection of Trade" and for "the Administration of
the Publick Revenues"-are likewise vested in the executive, and for
the same reasons; yet no one has ever questioned the legislative authority "to enquire into, and correct the Errors and Abuses committed
by those upon whom the Prince has devolv'd any part of the Executive
Power."9 6 Accordingly,
if Ministers of State advise an unnecessary War, a dishonourable
Peace, or a dangerous Alliance, they are as much accomptable to
Id. at 198 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 228-29, 232-33.
94 Id. at 234-35. These pages refer to the second essay upon "The Right of making
War, Peace, and Alliances." There are gaps and overlaps in the pagination of the bookthus, while the aforementioned essay ends at page 237, the third essay upon "Universal
Monarchy" begins at page 233.
95 Id. at 220.
96 Id. at 207, 208.
92
93
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Parliament, as for any other Neglect or Crime in the Administra-

tion of Affairs.9 7
Furthermore,

it follows by an inevitable Chain of Consequences, That both
Houses have a Right to be consulted in the Beginning concerning
those Important Affairs upon which in the Conclusion they must

determine. 98

Davenant was, of course, urging two different, though not necessarily incompatible, procedures. On the one hand, he was insisting
that ministers who exercised executive power should be held personally
responsible for the decisions they made in the area of foreign affairs.
On the other hand, he was insisting that the decisions themselves
should be made not by ministers on their own responsibility, but
through processes of deliberation in Parliament, to whom the burden
of responsibility would be thereby largely transferred.
It was the first alternative-namely, ministerial accountability
or responsibility to Parliament-that ultimately prevailed in English
constitutional history, rather than the alternative of direct participation by Parliament in foreign-policy decisions. In Davenant's day,
accountability tended to signify impeachment, and the proceedings of
that sort against Lord Chancellor Somers and the three other Whig
peers in 1701 exemplified this approach in the very year of Davenant's
Essays. A dozen years later, at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, it was the Tory ministers responsible for the Treaty of Utrecht
who were impeached.9 9 Half a century later, these precedents indicated
to Blackstone-and especially to his Swiss-born contemporary J.L. De
Lolme-that the impeachment of ministers was both the appropriate
and the available method for dealing with lapses of judgment or
91

98

Id. at 208-09.

Id. at 221-22.

99 After the accession of George I in 1714, the Whigs came to power and in 1715 the

Commons impeached the four leaders of the Tories for their part in the Treaty of Utrecht
of 1713. Charges against one were dropped. Two others fled to the Continent and were
declared traitors by acts of attainder. Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, the leading minister
in the Tory cabinet at the time of the Utrecht negotiations, was imprisoned for two years
in the Tower, but was acquitted in 1717 by the Lords when the Commons failed to put
in an appearance against him. B. WILIAms, THE WHIG SUPREMACY 1714-1760 (2d ed. rev.
C. Stuart 1962) (11 THE OXFORD HISroR OF ENGLAND (G. Clark ed.)). These acts, writes
Williams,
were the last of that series of purely political impeachments revived in the seventeenth century by parliament as the only weapon, apart from an act of attainder,
then available against servants of the king.
Id. at 156.
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dishonorable conduct on the part of ministers in the making of war
or peace. 100
In fact (as historical hindsight permits us to see) impeachment
was already obsolescent in England, and a new custom of the constitution was establishing itself, subsequently fully realized in Victorian
times. This i8 the rule that the entire cabinet must resign if a vote
on a major measure (or on a motion of no confidence) reveals that it
has ceased to command the support of a majority of the House of
Commons. This kind of immediate and unremitting responsibility,
coupled with the obligation of ministers to answer queries from members during the daily question period, 101 is the method relied on, in
present-day English constitutional practice, to bring foreign policy
under the ultimate control of public opinion, even without a requirement that treaties and declarations of war are to be made, as statutes
102
are, by and with the advice and consent of Parliament.
Though the direction that English constitutional development
100 See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0257, 258; J. DELOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF
ENGLAND 93 & n.(a) (4th ed. 1784).
101 In sharpest contrast to the doctrine of "executive privilege," frequently invoked
by the American Presidents to avoid questioning by Congress, is the question period at the
beginning of each day's session of the House of Commons, in which ministers are called
upon to reply to questions filed by members. The history and function of this practice
are analyzed in I. JENNINGS, PARLIAMENT 99-110 (2d ed. 1969), in which the author labels it
as "of the utmost constitutional importance." Id. at 99. See also 1 A. LowELL, THE GovERNMENT OF ENGLAND 331-33 (new ed. 1914).
102 The relevant principles and procedures of the English constitution today are authoritatively stated in E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 10, and the
following excerpts amount to highly condensed summaries of their subjects: Prerogative
powers are powers "which the common law recognises as exercisable by the King," and
they include "the right to declare war and make peace." Constitutional development, however, has long since established the rule "that the prerogative powers [can] only be exercised through and on the advice of Ministers responsible to Parliament." Responsibility
means, among other things, that Ministers are subject to "questions relating to those public duties for which the Sovereign is responsible, provided that the duties fall within the
province of the particular Minister." On the other hand, "in regard to the exercise of
the prerogative Parliament has no right to be consulted in advance." Id. at 183-85. It is
obvious, however, that
[c]ertain prerogative powers could of course only be exercised if the Government
were assured of parliamentary support. The Crown may declare war, but no
Government could take the risk of declaring war without being assured of popular
support, and Parliament alone can vote supplies to enable war to be waged.
Id. at 185.
Treaties requiring ratification by the Crown are usually laid before Parliament for
twenty-one days before the instrument of ratification is submitted to the Sovereign,
but there is no legal requirement that the consent of Parliament is required before
a treaty is either made or ratified by the Sovereign.
Id. at 279. On the concept of ministerial responsibility, both collective and individual,
which underlies the entire system, see id. at 86-89.
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would take was toward the principle of accountability to, rather than
participation by, Parliament in the conduct of foreign affairs, the latter
idea remained very much alive among eighteenth-century English
political thinkers. A notable argument for direct legislative participation in the making of foreign policy, coupled with a denunciation of
executive "usurpation" of the power, was advanced in two pamphlets
published in 1760 by Owen Ruffhead. At that particular moment it
was Ruffhead's expectation that the recent series of victories over
France, newly won through the organizing genius of William Pitt the
Elder, would be speedily followed by negotiations for bringing to an
end the Seven Years War, known in America as the French and Indian
War.
The title of Ruffhead's first pamphlet stated its purpose With
complete explicitness: Reasons Why the Approaching Treaty of Peace
Should be Debated in Parliament:As a Method Most Expedient and
Constitutional.0 The motto on its title-page summed up the philosophical and moral basis of his argument. It was quoted from the writ
with which Edward I had summoned Parliament in 1295: "[W]hat
concerns all should be approved by all."'' 04 Ruffhead pressed the
aphorism to its logical conclusion:
Shall the Representatives of the Nation be summoned together to
furnish the Means of Victory, and shall not they be consulted
about the Disposal of the Fruits of Conquest?
Can any valid Reason be assigned, why a Treaty of Peace
should not be debated as well as an Act of Parliament?
....
Shall the Articles be kept from their Inspection, till the
Ratification of them has made it too late for them to offer Objections and propose Amendments? 05

Like Davenant sixty years earlier, Ruffhead reviewed the history of
103 [Hereinafter cited as 0. RUFFHEAD, REASONS]. This pamphlet was published contemporaneously with the pamphlet entitled Ministerial Usurpation Displayed in 1760. Both
pamphlets were published anonymously, but Ruffhead's authorship is not in doubt;
furthermore the second makes frequent cross-references to the first. A copy of' the first pamphlet is in the University of Pennsylvania Library; a copy of the second is in the Yale
University Library. I aia indebted to both for furnishing photocopies.
104 0. RUFFHEAD, REASONS 14. The motto appeared in Latin on the titlepage: "[Ut
quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur." See also O. RuFFHEAD, MINISTERIAL USURPATION DISPLAYED 51 (1760) (where the quotation was printed in both languages). The complete writ of 1285, addressed to the clergy, is printed in SFLEcr CHARTERS AND OTHER
ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 480-81 (W. Stubbs ed.) (9th ed. rev.
H. Davis 1913).
105 0. RUFFHEAD, REASONS 13, 34.
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England since the Norman Conquest and concluded that, until the
reigns of the Tudors and the Stuarts,
our wisest and greatest Princes . . .absolutely refused to conclude
Treaties of Peace, till the Parliament, upon a View of the Articles,
had given their Advice and Consent. 0 6
Ruffhead's second pamphlet, a reply to critics of his first, made
it clear that his fear was not of royal absolutism but of the increase
of executive power at the expense of legislative. Again his title was an
accurate statement of his position: Ministerial Usurpation Displayed.
The usurpation to which he referred consisted in the "transfer [of]
the Business of Parliament to the Cabinet."' 0 7 Ruffhead stated his own
view of the proper constitutional relationship between executive
prerogative and parliamentary advice and consent in a passage so
compendious that it deserves quotation in extenso:
•There are many who talk of the Prerogative, without seeming
to have a just Idea of its Nature and Extent. Thus when they say
that it is the King's Prerogative to make War and Peace, they say
right. But if they mean that, therefore it is needless for the Crown
to take the Advice of the great Council, that is, the Parliament,
perhaps they say too much.
It is undoubtedly, as it ought to be, the royal Prerogative
alone, to make War and Peace, so far as the Power is executive.-That is, it belongs to the Crown, as the executive Branch, to ratify
Treaties, and issue Proclamations of War and Peace: and such
Proclamations have the Force and Effect of a Law.
But it does not follow therefore, that the Great Council have
not the Right of giving their Advice upon, and their Consent to,
the Terms of such Treaty. It should be remembered that the executing an Instrument, and the framing of that Instrument, are
distinct Points of Consideration.
All Acts of Parliament are executed by the Sovereign, and
they are the Acts of the Crown, as appears from the enacting
Clause, which always runs thus-"Be it ENACTED by the King's
most excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, that, &c."
Yet no one sure will argue from hence that the Crown has the
sole Prerogative of framing such Statutes. No. They are the Acts of
the Crown; but framed by Parliament: And the Authority for
executing such Acts, is the Advice and Consent of Parliament.
In like Manner with respect to Treaties, though they are Acts

206 Id. at 32-33 (emphasis in original). See id. at 22-31 for the author's review of historic instances.
107 0. RUFFHEAD, MINISTEIAL USURPATION DIsPLAYm 47-48 (1760).
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of Prerogative, yet the Authority for executing such.Acts, has been,
and we trust will be again, the Advice and Consent of Parliament.
Execution is the proper Prerogative of the Head of the Commonwealth, Deliberation and Advice is the Priviledge of the Body.108

Though writers like Davenant and Ruffhead-to say nothing of
the parliamentary leaders of the mid-seventeenth century-used the
phrase "advice and consent" to characterize the process of legislative
deliberation and decision, and though they applied this concept to the
domain of foreign affairs, it was not from them that the framers of
the American Constitution borrowed the idea of transferring the
powers of war and peace from executive to legislative hands. In fact,
the framers did not initiate this transfer; they validated a transfer that
had taken place a dozen years earlier and which they sought to modify
in only a very limited way. The makers of the American Constitution
were not rejecting history in favor of untested theory. To the contrary,
they were consulting their own history, building on the precedents it
furnished, and taking care to insure continuity with the institutions
that had evolved out of their own struggle for independence.
VIII.

THE MAKING OF WAR AND PEACE BY
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

When the Constitutional Convention assembled in Philadelphia
in 1787, the treaty that ended the War of American Independence lay
only four years in the past. The victory, both military and diplomatic,
had been achieved by a federal government that consisted of a legislative body only, with executive functions performed by its own committees or by officers responsible to it. This was the pattern from the
very first stirrings of the American Revolution. Resistance to British
measures, in so far as existing governmental agencies were employed,
could only be legislative resistance, for executive authority in the
colonies was always British authority. Town meetings in New England
became forums of revolutionary activity, as did county courts in the
South. Colonial assemblies (the lower houses of colonial legislatures)
converted themselves into Provincial Congresses and used previously
existent machinery of government, so far as possible, to organize the
militia, collect taxes, and carry on the public business. In 1774, the
Continental Congress came into existence to direct intercolonial ac108 Id. at 49-50 (emphasis in original). Ruffhead considered it quite clear "that War,
in Effect, cannot be declared without the Consent of Parliament" because "the Supplies
to carry it on must be drawn from Parliament," and he therefore asked, "Why then should
Peace be concluded without such Authority?" Id. at 50-51 (emphasis in original).
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tions. If at the onset it resembled a conference of ambassadors, it
quickly developed the corporate sense that made it a legislative body.
As such it constituted the legislature of the Union--de facto and then
de jure-from 1774 until superseded in 1789 by the first Congress
under the new Constitution.
As the sole government of the Union for a decade and a half, this
legislative body conducted an ultimately successful war for independence and scored a notable diplomatic victory in the peace negotiations
that ended it, securing for the new nation a western boundary at the
Mississippi River instead of at the crest of the Appalachian Mountains.
During this formative decade and a half, Congress constantly debated
the issues of war and peace. On the military side it appointed a commander in chief responsible to it. On the diplomatic side it made decisions binding on its Secretary for Foreign Affairs; formulated instructions to and considered the dispatches from American ministers
abroad; and drew up projets for treaties, thereby giving mandatory
advice to the negotiators, while insisting that any concessions made by
the latter would have to receive its final consent.
The Declaration of Independence was obviously the most momentous of the acts of this legislative assembly, and it was an international
act of the most solemn character, for it announced that the United
States of America had decided "to assume among the powers of the
earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and
of Nature's God entitle them." The resolution that committed the
nation to independence was actually a tri-partite one, and the second
element of it was likewise international in character, for it authorized
"effectual measures for forming foreign Alliances." 109 The third provision called for a formalization of the governmental system that had
gradually evolved at the federal level. 110 In response to this part of the
resolution, a committee of Congress reported, on the 12th of July 1776,
the first draft of permanent Articles of Confederation. The document
had to be considered by fits and starts, for Congress was preoccupied
with the exigencies of war; hence, a completed version was not submitted to the member states until the 15th of November 1777, and
was not finally ratified by all until the Ist of March 1781.111 In
109 5 U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGREss 1774-1789, at
425 (W. Ford ed. 1906) [hereinafter cited as JCC] (resolution introduced by Richard Henry
Lee, June 7, 1776).
110 See id.
111 Three principal stages in the evolution of the text of the Articles of Confederation
can be recognized: (1) the first draft, reported to Congress by its committee under the
chairmanship of John Dickinson on July 12, 1776. Id. at 546-54; (2) the version that
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reality, however, the procedures and understandings embodied in the
Articles were essentially those already in effect. Thus the Articles
summed up the principles of government that operated throughout
the period of the Revolution and its immediate aftermath. Accordingly, when revision was finally decided on in 1787, the Articles of
Confederation furnished the point of departure for the deliberations
of the Philadelphia Convention.

IX.

THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

The Union had been from the beginning, and under the Articles
continued to be, a government with a legislative assembly of one house,
representing the states as states, with no independent organs of executive or judicial sort. With respect to foreign affairs, the Articles of
Confederation sought to place full authority firmly in federal hands.
This meant vesting in Congress, a legislative body, most of the powers
that were regarded in England as executive and therefore wielded by
the Crown. Indeed, many of the characteristic phrases used by Blackstone in describing the royal prerogative reappeared in the Articles,
but among the grants of authority to "the United States in Congress
assembled." 112 Furthermore, most of these same phrases were carried
over into the United States Constitution of 1787, frequently in the list
of legislative powers, but sometimes, in crucial instances, in the clauses
that distributed responsibility for foreign policy among the several
branches of government. Because this shifting about of authority is significant, the exact wording of the pivotal Article IX of the Confederation should be quoted and (as footnotes hereunder will do) compared
with subsequent and antecedent constitutional formulations: 113
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole
emerged from the debates of July and August 1776 in a committee of the whole and that
was reported on August 20, 1776. Id. at 674-89; and (3)the text finally adopted by Congress
on November 15, 1777, and eventually ratified by the last of the states on March 1, 1781.

9 id. at 907-25 (1907); 19 id. at 214-23 (G. Hunt ed. 1912).
112 E.g., 9 JCC 915. This, the official name of the body, echoes the English formula:
"the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons, in this present Parliament assembled." See text accompanying note 42 supra. The term Continental Congress, often ap-

plied to the "old" Congress from 1774 to 1789, ceased to be used after 1776 and is completely inappropriate for the period after the ratification of the Articles in 1781. For a full
discussion of the point by the present writer, see Bestor, Constitutionalism and the Settlement of the West: The Attainment of Consensus, 1754-1784, in THE AMERICAN TERI-

TORIAL SYSTEM 33-34 n.3 (J. Bloom ed. 1973).
113 9 JCC 915-23 (final version adopted November 15, 1777). In the notes immediately
following, excerpts are given for- purposes of comparison with (1) the United States Constitution (1787); and (2) Blackstone's Commentaries (1765) or some equivalent.
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and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and
wart 14] .. . of sending and-receiving ambassadors;[ 15] [of] enter6
... of establishing rules for
ing into treaties and alliancest 11"
deciding, in all cases, "what captures on land or water shall be
legal, and in what manner prizes, taken by land or naval forces
. . . shall be divided or appropriated;[ 1 7] of granting letters of
marque and reprisal in times of peace;s118] [of] appointing courts
for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high

seas

. .

[119]

[of] appointing all officers of the land forces in the service
of the United States, excepting regimental officers; appointing all
the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers
whatever in the service of the United States;[ 201 [of] making rules
...

114 "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o declare War." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8,
cl.11. "[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties." Id. art. II, § 2, cl.2. "[T]he king has . . . the sole prerogative
of making war and peace." 1. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARLES 0257.

115 "[The President] . . .shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, [and] other public Ministers and Consuls." US.
CoNsr. art. II, § 2, ci. 2. "[The President] . . . shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers." Id. § 3. "The king ... has the sole power of sending ambassadors to foreign
states, and receiving ambassadors at home." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0253.
116 "[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties." US. CONSr. art. II, § 2, cl.2. "It is . . . the king's prerogative
to make treaties, leagues, and alliances with foreign states and princes." I W. BLACKSTONE,
COMmENTARS 0257.

[to make Rules concerning Captures on
117 "The Congress shall have Power".
Land and Water." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.11. "The judicial Power shall extend ... to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." Id. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1. Blackstone dis.
cussed prize cases simply as a part of immemorial admiralty law, without reference either
to the King or Parliament. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 108.
118 "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o . . . grant Letters of Marque and Re-

prisal." US. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl.11.
[O]ur laws have in some respects armed the subject with powers to impel the
prerogative; by directing the ministers of the crown to issue letters of marque and
reprisal upon due demand ....
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0258.
119 "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations." US. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, c. 10. Blackstone treats piracy as a crime, for the punishment of which "the statute law
of England interposes to aid and enforce the law of nations, as a part of the common law."
See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIS *71-73.
120 The Congress shall have Power

To provide for organizing . . . the Militia, and for governing such Part of
them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers ....
U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, ci. 16.
The President ....
... shall -nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for ....
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for the government and regulation of the
said land and naval
[ 221

forces,[ 1211 and directing their operations.
'. . to build and equip a navy; 1 231 [and] to agree upon the

number of land forces ....

124

These positive grants of power by the Confederation to the Congress were made exclusive by the device-later employed in the Constitution of 1787--of prohibiting to the individual states the exercise
of like powers. 125 The Articles allowed only certain precisely specified
exceptions. Thus, a state might "engage" in war if "actually invaded
by enemies" or if it received intelligence, which it considered "certain," of a planned attack by Indians "so imminent as not to admit of
a delay."' 126 A state might also fit out vessels of war to deal with pirates
if "infested" by them.127 For the rest, however, no state might "engage
in any war" without the consent of Congress, or issue letters of marque
and reprisal "except it be after a declaration of war by the United
States, in Congress assembled."' 128 Further, to protect the nation
Id. art. H, § 2, cl. 2. "[The President] . . . shall Commission all the officers of the United
States." Id. § 3. "Officers, in all branches of the forces, are appointed by the Queen's commission." E. WADE & G. Psums, supra note 10, at 390.
121 "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make Rules for the Government and

Regulation of the land and naval Forces." US. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. "[The king has
sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies ...
[and] the prerogative of enlisting and of governing them." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS 0262.
122 The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the

United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States ....
US. CONsr. art. H, § 2, cl. 1. "The king is ...
the generalissimo, or the first in military
command, within the kingdom." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARImS
262. "[The sole supreme government and command of the militia within all his majesty's realms and dominions ... is the undoubted right of his majesty." Id. (quoting from An Act declaring
the sole Right of the Militia to be in the King, and for the present ordering and disposing
the same, 13 Car. 2, c. 6 (1661)).
128 "The Congress shall have Power . .. [to provide and maintain a Navy." US.
CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 13. "mhe king has the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and
armies . . . [and] the prerogative of enlisting and of governing them." 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 262.
124 "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o raise and

support Armies...

[and]

[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia." US. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 12 & 15. "Ihe raising
or keeping a Standing Army within the Kingdom in Time of Peace, unless it be with
Consent of Parliament, is against Law." An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the
Subject, and settling the Succession of the Crown, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2 (1689).
125 US. CONsr. art. I, § 10. The restrictions placed upon the statis by Article 6 of
.the Articles of Confederation were almost the same as those imposed by the Constitution,
so far as matters of war and diplomacy are concerned. See 9 JCC 911-13.
126 9 JCC 912 (Article 6).
127 Id. at 915 (Article 6).
128 Id. at 912-13 (Article 6).
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against hasty and ill-considered actions in foreign affairs, the Articles
imposed severe limits on Congress itself. That body might
never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque and reprisal in
times of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances . . . nor
appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy, unless nine
states assent to the same .... 129
This meant approval by two-thirds of all the states of the Union, not
two-thirds of those that might at the moment be present in the person
of their delegates.
.Every crucial decision of foreign policy was thus to be arrived at
through legislative deliberation-the very antithesis of the idea of vesting the power of war and peace in executive hands. That some kind of
executive machinery would be necessary to carry out the resolves of
Congress was, of course, recognized. The committee that prepared the
first draft of the Articles of Confederation proposed the creation of a
"Council of State" to perform a number of executive functions, not in
any sense as an independent executive branch, but simply as an executive committee of Congress. Its most extensive powers would have
been in military matters. The first draft of the Articles included, in
its enumeration of the powers of Congress, the power of "directing
the Marches, Cruises and operations of ... land and naval Forces,"lm0
but then assigned to the Council of State the actual exercise of much
of this power, using carefully guarded language:
This Council shall have Power . . . [t]o give Counsel to the
Commanding Officers, and to direct military Operations by Sea and
Land, not changing any Objects or Expeditions determined on by
the United States assembled, unless an Alteration of Circumstances
which shall come to the Knowledge of the Council after the Recess
of the States, shall make such Change absolutely necessary-To
attend to the Defence and Preservation of Forts and strong Posts,
and to prevent the Enemy from acquiring new Holds-To procure Intelligence of the Condition and Designs of the EnemyTo expedite the Execution of such Measures as may be resolved
on by the United States assembled, in Pursuance of the Powers
hereby given to them . . . -To superintend and controul or suspend all Officers civil and military, acting under the Authority of
3
the United States.' '
129

Id. at 921-22 (Article 9).

130 5 JCC 551 (Article 18). Changes, however, were made on the draft itself, so that

in later versions, the phrase read simply "directing their operations." Id. at 682 (Article
14, version of August 20, 1776); 9 id. at 919 (_Article 9, final version of November 15, 1777).
181 5 JCC 553 (Article 19). This article remained unchanged in the version reported
by the committee of the whole on August 20, 1776, though it was renumbered Article 15.
See id. at 686-88.
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This extensive delegation to the Council of State of power in
military matters was not matched by a corresponding delegation of
power in the diplomatic realm. Here its role was to be that of a mere
secretariat:
This Council shall have Power to receive and open all Letters
directed to the United States, and to return proper Answers; but
not to make any Engagements that shall be binding on the United
States .... 132
Even these cautiously circumscribed delegations of power to a
mere executive committee went too far for the delegates who were
considering the proposed Articles of Confederation. The idea of a
Council of State was dropped, 188 and its place was taken by a "committee of the states," which was to act only during the recess of Congress, which would exercise only such powers as the parent body, by
vote of nine states, might, "from time to time, think expedient to vest
them with," and which was expressly forbidden to exercise any power
to which the vote of nine states had been made requisite.3 4 At the
head of the list of powers thus denied were, as we have seen, the
authority to "engage in a war" and to "enter into any treaties or alliances."' 5 Congress thus kept firmly in its own legislative hands the
powers that it had claimed and drawn up for itself in the Articles of
Confederation, namely "the sole and exclusive right and power of
determining on peace and war."13 6
X.

PRE-CONVENTION

DISCUSSIONS,

1786-1787

This was the base from which the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 necessarily took their start as they felt their
way toward a more effective government. The problem confronting
them was not how great a share in the conduct of foreign affairs they.
should allow to the legislative branch. The questions-there were
really three of them-ran quite the opposite way. In the first place,
which particular segments of the authority over foreign policy, hitherto wholly monopolized by Congress, ought to be considered purely
executive in character and therefore transferred outright to the newly
132 Id.

at 553.

188 9 JCC 848.
184 Id. at 923-24 (final version of Article 10). The entire Article 15 that had been reported by the committee of the whole on August 20, 1776 was struck out by Congress on
November 7, 1777. Id. at 879-80.
185 See text accompanying note 129 supra.
186 See text accompanying note 114 supra.
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created executive branch? Secondly, which other functions seemed to
call for such continuous consultation between those who made policy
and those who carried it out that machinery should be provided
whereby the legislative and executive branches could achieve consensus? Finally, which aspects of foreign affairs involved questions of
policy so fundamental that the power of decision ought to be retained
firmly in legislative hands, subject only to the check of a presidential
veto (a device being incorporated for the first time in the federal constitutional system)?
The purpose of the Philadelphia Convention, according to the
resolution that authorized it, was to "render the federal constitution
adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preservation of the
Union."' 1 7 Among the defects calling for correction were those that
weakened the international position of the United States, depriving
it of power, in Washington's words, "to meet European nations upon
decisive & equal ground." 188 The assertion is often made, especially by
those who read present-day conceptions back into history, that the
framers of the Constitution attributed the new nation's weakness in
foreign affairs to the lack of an independent and forceful executive;
that they therefore "found it proper to place the power of external
affairs in a single person," and that the Constitution they drafted must
therefore be construed as having "invested the Chief Executive with
189
the foreign policy-making powers."' Contemporary evidence provides
no substantial support for this contention.
The defects of the Confederation as they affected foreign affairs
were discussed time after time in the letters and memoranda that
passed between American leaders in the twelve months before the
Convention. With almost complete unanimity, they blamed the weakness not upon the lack of an independent executive, but upon the
failure of the States to honor their federal obligations. Congressional
measures, Washington complained, "are a perfect nihility, where
thirteen sovereign, independent disunited States are in the habit of
18T 3 THE REcoRus oF Tma FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 14 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
(resolution of Congress, February 21, 1787) [hereinafter cited as REcoms].
188 U.S. BUREAU OF ROLLS AND LIRARY, Dm'r OF STATE, BuuL. No. 11, Pr. 1, 4 DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIcA

1786-1870, at

13 (1905) (letter from George Washington to the Marquis de la Fayette, May 10, 1786)
[hereinafter cited as 4 DocumENTARY HIsToRY].
189 See, e.g., Goldwater, The President's Constitutional Primacy in Foreign Relations
and-NationalDefense, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 463, 465.66 (1973). For a look at the development
of this line of thought, see note 190 infra.
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discussing 8: refusing compliance with them -at their option. 140 Contemporaries emphasized three adverse international consequences for
the United States. In the first place, an exhausted treasury imperilled
defense, and (as the congressional delegation from Rhode Island
warned) "an enemy on our frontiers stands prepared to take every advantage of our prostrate situation." 141 Secondly, without a power to
regulate foreign commerce, Congress had no leverage in bargaining for
favorable trade agreements-no means, as Edmund Randolph put it,
of "counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations." 142
Finally-and this point loomed largest in many contemporary discussions-the Union could not prevent a state from violating treaties
made in the name of the United States, which meant (to quote Randolph again) "that particular states might by their conduct provoke
148
war without controul."
The important thing to note is that none of these three defects
would be removed by a mere augmentation of executive power. The
remedy for the first two defects was obviously an enlargement and
strengthening of legislative authority, and this the Constitution ultimately provided through its grant to Congress of adequate powers of
taxation and of plenary authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." 144 With respect to the third defect-inability to secure state
compliance with treaty obligations-a remedy based on judicial rather
than executive action had been under consideration for at least nine
months prior to the opening of the Convention. This judicial approach
to the problem was the one finally written into the Constitution as
145
the so-called supremacy clause.
This concern with the enforcement rather than the negotiation
of treaties, and the consequent concern with strengthening judicial
rather than executive power, was so significant a feature of pre-Convention discussion that it deserves greater attention than has ordinarily
been given it in evaluating the original intent of the Constitution. As
140 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 20 (letter from Washington to
141 8 LErRns oF MsaMRS OF THE CONTImNTrAL CONcRESS

John Jay, August 1, 1786).
471 (E. Burnett ed. 1936)

(letter to John Collins, Governor of Rhode Island, September 28, 1786) [hereinafter cited

as 8 LzrrnEs oF MEMERS].
142 1 REcoRDs 19 (Madison's notes, May 29, 1787) (Randolph's own summary of the
speech in which he "opened the main business" of the Federal Convention).

148 Id.
144 U.S. CoNsr. art. I,
145 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.

§ 8, cls.
1 & 3.
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early as the 7th of August 1786, a special committee of the old Congress reported to that body a set of proposed amendments to the
Articles of Confederation. One of these called for the creation of a
Federal Judicial Court, with jurisdiction to hear appeals
from the Judicial Courts of the several States in all Causes wherein
questions shall arise on the meaning and construction of Treaties
entered into by the United States with any foreign power, or on
the Law of Nations ....146
Some two months later, on the 13th of October 1786, Congress
received from John Jay, secretary of its Department of Foreign Affairs, a report detailing, state by state, the measures enacted in deliberate disregard of treaty obligations. 147 Like the earlier committee, Jay
proposed a judicial solution, using language even closer to that which
the Constitutional Convention finally adopted. "When . . .a treaty
is constitutionally made, ratified and published by Congress," Jay
argued, "it immediately becomes binding on the whole nation, and
super-added to the laws of the land, without the intervention, consent
or fiat of State legislatures." He continued:
All doubts, in cases between private individuals, respecting
the meaning of a treaty, like all doubts respecting the meaning of a
.148
law, are in the first instance mere judicial questions
In these words, Jay, who was to become the first Chief Justice of the
United States under the new Constitution, was adumbrating the doctrine of judicial review which his great successor John Marshall would
make the cornerstone of American constitutional law. In 1786, however, Jay could see no possibility as yet of creating a federal judiciary
powerful enough'to hold state legislatures in check. In the end, therefore, he proposed only that Congress declare by resolution that treaties
are "part of the law of the land" and therefore "binding and obligatory" on the states. Leaving further action to the states, it was "recommended" that each of them pass an act ordering its own courts of law
and equity to decide cases "according to the true intent and meaning"
of national treaties, "any thing in the said Acts or parts of Acts [i.e.,
in state legislation] to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding."1 49 Jay's report made a strong impression, 150 and on the 21st of
146

31 JCC 497 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1934) (proposed Article 19).

Id. at 781-874.
Id. at 798.
149 Id. at 870.
150 See, e.g., 8 LErEs
147

148

oF MEMBERS

542, 545, 560, 565 (letters of James Madison, Feb-
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March 1787, Congress, taking cognizance of the report, resolved that
the states could not "of right pass any act or acts. for interpreting, explaining or construing a national treaty or any part or clause of it," and
15 1
that all such acts already existing "ought to be forthwith repealed."
These resolutions, with their emphasis on the role of the judiciary,
six weeks before the
were officially transmitted to the states some
15 2
work.
its
Federal Convention actually began
The creation of an executive branch was, of course, one of the
purposes and one of the achievements of the Federal Convention.
Surprisingly little interest in or attention to the matter was manifested,
however, in the pre-Convention correspondence of those most concerned with constitutional revision. The need for strengthening the
existing government was repeatedly stressed, but rarely in terms of a
strengthening of executive power per se. Thus General Henry Knox,
Secretary of War to Congress and the most alarmist of all Washington's correspondents, wrote the latter on the 23rd of October 1786 that
men of reflection, & principle [desired] a government which shall
have the power to protect them in their lawful pursuits, and which
will be efficient in all cases of internal commotions or foreign invasions.153
In diagnosing the situation, however, Knox said nothing at this time
about the lack of an executive branch but maintained simply that
"[t]he powers of Congress are utterly inadequate."' 54 The most specific
argument for differentiating executive from legislative powers came,
in these closing weeks of 1786, not from proponents of "high-toned"
government like Knox, but from Thomas Jefferson, then in Paris as
American minister to France. In his eyes the objective was simply administrative efficiency. After urging that the federal government be
organized like the states "into Legislative, Executive & Judiciary,"
Jefferson recalled, in a letter of the 16th of December 1786, his unsuccessful efforts in the past to induce Congress "to appoint a Committee to receive & dispatch all executive business, so that Congress
55
itself should meddle only with what should be legislative."'
In the early months of the new year, the idea of separating the
ruary and March, 1787). See also id. at 502-03 (address of Nathan Dane to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, November 9, 1786).
151 32 JCC 124-25 (R. Hill ed. 1936).
152 Id. at 177-84 (letter to the States, April 13, 1787).
158 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 32.

154 Id. at 30.
155 Id. at 43 (Jefferson to Madison).
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powers of government into three branches began to figure more frequently in the discussions of constitutional reform. On the 7th of January 1787, Jay mentioned the matter to Washington, saying: "Let
congress legislate, let others execute, let others judge."'15 About the
same time, Knox proposed, in another letter to Washington, that
there be an "executive under the title of Governor General," to be
chosen by the federal legislature for a seven-year term and to be subject to impeachment. 157 None of these writers said much concerning
the specific functions of the executive, least of all about any role for
him in the conduct of foreign relations. This was true even of Madison, who gave more concentrated study than anyone else in this
period to the details of constitutional reform. In the middle of the
month preceding the Convention, he summed up for Washington his
views on what was needed. "A national Executive must also be provided," he wrote in his definitive letter of the 16th of April 1787. But
he added immediately:
I have scarcely ventured as yet to form my own opinion either of
the manner in which it ought to be constituted or of the authorities with which it ought to be cloathed.15 8
The only allusion to a specifically executive function was Madison's
remark that "[t]he national supremacy in the Executive departments
is liable to some difficulty," but "[t]he Militia ought certainly to be
placed in some form or other under the authority which is intrusted
with the general protection and defence.' 159

XI.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: INITiAL Two

MoNTHS,

MAY 25-JULY 26, 1787

When the Federal Convention finally got under way in Philadelphia on the 25th of May 1787, no delegate came forward with any
sort of proposal to put a powerful chief executive in charge of the
foreign affairs of the nation. The so-called Virginia Plan, which was
the subject of the first fourteen-day round of debates, proposed that
"a National Executive be instituted," but was almost as vague as
Madison had been about its functions. "[B]esides a general authority
to execute the National laws," said the resolution, the executive "ought
to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confedera156 Id. at 56. See id. at 73 (letter from Jay to John Adams, February 21, 1787).
157 Id. at 61 (January 4, 1787).
158 Id. at 119.
159 Id. at 118.
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tion."160 What these "Executive rights" might be was an unanswered

question. The only reference in the Virginia Plan to military affairs
was a provision empowering the legislature "to call forth the force of
the Union ag[ain]st any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty
under the articles."' 18 1 The only reference in the Plan to external affairs was in connection with the proposed national judiciary, which
would have jurisdiction over piracies, captures from the enemy, and
"cases in which foreigners . . . may be interested." 162
The First Debate on the Power of War and Peace
Whether "Executive rights" should be construed to include any
part of that "sole and exclusive right and power of determining on
peace and war" previously belonging to Congress was vigorously discussed as soon as the resolution dealing with the executive came up
for debate in the Convention. This occurred on the 1st of June. No
state dissented from the first of the two phrases that the Virginia
Plan had used as a definition of executive power, namely, "a general
authority to execute the National Laws."'" 0 To the second phrase,
however, there was general objection,'" and the Convention promptly
rejected the idea of delegating to the executive so vaguely defined an
aggregate as "the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation." If interpreted in such a way as to "extend to peace & war &c,"
said Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, the proposed phrase would
"render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, towit an elective one."1615
Four delegates in all addressed themselves to this specific point
in the debate of the 1st of June, and every one of them emphatically
rejected, as Pinckney did, the idea of including the power of peace
and war in any constitutional definition of executive power. James
Wilson of Pennsylvania, a future member of the Supreme Court
did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a
proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war &
peace &c.166
160 1 REcoRns 21 (Madison's notes) (resolution 7 of the Virginia Plan proposed by Edmund Randolph, May 29).
161 Id. (resolution 6).
162 Id. at 22 (resolution 9).
1683 Id. at 63 (Journal of the Convention), 67 (Madison's notes).
104 See id. at 64-67 (Madison's notes).
165 Id. at 64-65 (Madison's notes).

166 Id. at 65-66 (Madison's notes).
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Looking beyond English precedents to the political theorists of the
Continent, Wilson asserted that "[m]aking peace and war are generally
determined by Writers on the Laws of Nations to be legislative
powers."' 1 67 James Madison of Virginia agreed with Wilson, explaining
that "executive powers ex vi termini, do not include the Rights of
war & peace &c."'16 1 John Rutledge, a colleague of Pinckney's from
South Carolina, "was for vesting the Executive power in a single
person, tho' he was not for giving him the power of war and peace."' 169
Not a single delegate spoke to the opposite effect.
As a substitute for the alarmingly ambiguous clause of the Virginia Plan, Madison proposed to specify more exactly the powers to be
regarded as executive. One of his proposals-to empower the executive
"to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for"-was
adopted. The other would have given the executive merely the authority "to execute such powers, not legislative or judiciary in their
nature, as may from time to time be delegated by the national legislature." Carefully hedged though it was, this proposal of Madison's
170
was rejected.
The question of the appropriate functions of the executive was
allowed to remain unsettled during the two ensuing months of debate. Finally, on the 26th of July 1787, the Convention turned over to
a Committee of Detail the task of converting into a draft constitution
the various resolutions that had been agreed upon thus far.'7 ' With
respect to the scope of executive authority, the only mandate that the
Committee thereby received was embodied in the two resolutions
adopted at the beginning of June, which defined executive authority
as the power "to carry into execution the national Laws" and "to
172
appoint to Offices in cases not otherwise provided for."'
167 Id. at 78-74 (William Pierce's notes).
168 Id. at 70 (Rufus King's notes). The Latin phrase can be translated as: "By the
force of the term; by definition."
169 Id. at 65 (Madison's notes).
170 Id. at 63-64 (Journal), 67 (Madison's notes). The phrase "not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature" was inserted in response to the wariness expressed by General Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, who felt that "improper powers might otherwise
be delegated." Id. at 67. But with these precautionary words inserted, his kinsman and
fellow South Carolinian, Charles Pinckney, then moved to delete the entire proposal-and
the motion passed seven to three. Id.
171 2 REcoRws 117 (Journal), 128 (Madison's notes).
172 Id. at 134 (resolutions turned over to the Committee of Detail). On the creation
of this committee, see text accompanying note 232 infra.

1974]

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The Judiciary and the Enforcement of Treaties
During the initial. period of two months, moreover, the Convention adopted only one resolution dealing in any explicit way with
foreign affairs, and this involved the judiciary, not the executive.
What this resolution did was incorporate in the embryo constitutional
system the idea of judicial enforcement of treaties, as proposed by
John Jay the preyious year and as already endorsed by the old Congress. This judicial approach was ignored in the Virginia Plan, which
proposed to make enforcement a legislative matter by giving Congress
a veto upon all state legislation, including but not confined to enactments in violation of treaty obligations.17 3 The judiciary was, however,
brought back into the picture by the New Jersey Plan, which delegates from several smaller states presented on the 15th of June as an
alternative to the plan of the largest of the states, namely Virginia. In
this new context the idea of, a determination by the judiciary was
pushed a stage beyond pre-Convention ideas. The concept of a supreme
law was extended to include federal statutes as well as treaties, thereby
making judicial review the basic device for removing state obstructions
to any type of federal measure. The New Jersey resolutions provided
that acts of Congress, if "made by virtue & in pursuance of

. .

. powers

. . . vested in them," and treaties, if "made & ratified under the authority of the U[nited] States," were to be "the supreme law of the
respective States," and the judiciaries of the states would "be bound
thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the In74
dividual States to the contrary notwithstanding.'
Though the New Jersey Plan as a package was rejected, this particular provision was resurrected a month later and adopted by the
Convention without dissent on the 17th of July.175 The Committee
of Detail then took over, and in its draft of the 6th of August it reinforced the measure by subordinating the constitutions as well as the
173 According to resolution 6 of the Virginia Plan, the national legislature would be
empowered "to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion
of the National Legislature the articles of Union." I REcoRDs 21. That state acts in violation
of treaties would be subject to this legislative veto was made explicit on May 31, the
second day of debate on the plan, when the Convention voted, on motion of Benjamin
Franklin, to add after the words "articles of Union" the phrase "or any Treaties subsisting
under the authority of the union." Id. at 47, 54 (Madison's notes), 61 (James McHenry's
notes).
174 Id. at 245 (Madison's notes) (resolution 6). The New Jersey Plan was voted down
on June 19. Id. at 312-13 (Journal), 322 (Madison's notes), 327 (Robert Yates' notes).
175 2 RECoRDs 22 Uournal), 28-29 (Madison's notes).
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statutes of the states to the supreme law composed of federal acts and
treaties. 176 An even more significant enlargement occurred on the 23rd
of August, when the Convention voted to include the Constitution of
the United States as part-and, indeed, the first part-of "the supreme
17
law of the several States, and of their Citizens and inhabitants."
Finally, five days before the end of the Convention, the Committee
of Style restored the felicitious phrasing that Jay had originally used,
which spoke not of a supreme law for each separate state but of "the
supreme law of the land." 178 Emphasis was thereby placed not only on
national unity but also upon the historic tradition of the supremacy
179
of law, for the phrase itself comes from the Magna Carta. The resulting provision of the finished Constitution-the so-called supremacy clause-is too important to go unquoted:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
or
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.1 8 0
This clause, which originated as a device for securing state compliance
with federal treaties, became the linch-pin of the American federal
system,"" establishing the judiciary as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution itself.
Infrequent Discussion of Executive Powers
No comparable exaltation of executive power in the realm of
foreign afffairs-indeed, no assignment to the executive of a specific
role of any sort in the making of either war or peace-was contained
in any resolution adopted by the Convention during its first two
Id. at 183 (Article 8).
Id. at 381-82 (Journal), 389 (Madison's notes).
178 Id. at 603 (Committee of Style) (Article 6). For Jay's original proposal, see text
,accompanying note 149 supra.
179 Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta reads as follows:
No freeman shall be captured or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we [the King] go against him or send against
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
1 Souacrs OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 121 (C. Stephenson & F. Marcham rev. ed.
transl. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
180 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
181 See, e.g., A. McLAUcHUN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNTED STATES 183-85
(student's ed. 1935).
176
177
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months. Particularly surprising is the fact that'no motion was made
and no vote was passed vesting in the President the-command of the
military forces in time of war, surely the most unmistakably executive
in nature of all the various types of authority belonging to the vaguelydefined category of "war powers." Although the Convention was modifying or supplanting one provision after another of the old Articles
of Confederation, no one proposed to replace or even to alter the provision of the earlier document which vested in Congress "the sole and
exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war" and of
"entering into treaties and alliances."' 18 2 This omission could not
possibly be construed as repeal through inaction, for the instructions
of the Convention contained in the resolutions referred to the Committee of Detail were quite clear. In the new Constitution, "the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative Rights
188
vested in Congress by the Confederation."'
To be sure, certain kinds of authority vested in the old Congress
could, on theoretical grounds, be classified as executive rather than
as "legislative Rights." In the debate of the 1st of June, however, the
Convention refused to reclassify as executive any of the powers connected with foreign affairs.8 4 Moreover, on only a few occasions during
the initial two months was there any discussion on the floor concerning
the command of the armed forces or the possible role of the executive
in the negotiation of treaties. These instnces, though few, must of
course be examined.
On the same day that the Virginia Plan was presented,
Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina offered a plan of his own, which proposed,
among other things, that the President should "by Virtue of his Office,
be Commander in chief of the Land Forces of U.S. and Admiral of
their Navy."'185 It was the New Jersey Plan in mid-June that next called
182 See the text accompanying notes 114 & 116 supra for the relevant parts of the
Articles of Confederation.
183 2 RacoRms 131 (resolutions turned over to the Committee of Detail).
184 See the text accompanying notes 163-72 supra for details of the debate over the
scope of executive power and rights.
185 2 REooRos 158 (fragment of the Pinckney Plan of May 29, 1787, a two-page manuscript in the handwriting of James Wilson, preserved among the papers of the Committee
of Detail). The reconstruction of the lost Pinckney Plan is one of the triumphs of historical criticism and detection. On May 29, Edmund Randolph "opened the main business"
of the Convention with a speech presenting and explaining the so-called Virginia Plan. I
id. at 18 (Madison's notes), 24 (McHenry's notes). Thereafter:
Mr. Charles Pinckney,. one of the Deputies of South Carolina, laid before the
House for their consideration, the draught of a foederal [sic] government to be
agreed upon between the free and independent States of America.
Id. at 16 (Journal). Though four delegates took private notes that day, only one, Robert
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the. attention of the delegates to the question of military command.
The proposal, however, reflected more of trepidation than of enthusiasm for placing any sort of miltary force under executive control.
The New Jersey resolutions proposed a multi-membered rather than
a single executive, one of the powers of which would be "to direct all
military operations." There was, though, an important proviso:
Yates of New York, recorded the fact that Pinckney spoke. Id. at 24. Madison later copied
the Journal entry into his notes. Id. at 23 n.13. John Lansing, Jr., of New York, who did
not arrive until June 2, copied into his own notes the record that his colleague Yates had
made. J. LANSING, TnE DELEGATE FRoM NEW YORK 10, 23-24 (J. Strayer ed. 1939). No delegate seems to have made a summary, let alone a copy, of Pinckney's plan. The document
was presumably filed with the secretary, and the Convention voted to refer it to the Committee of the Whole. 1 REcoRDs 16 (Journal), 23 (Madison's notes, copied from Journal), 24
(Yates' Secret Proceedings). The plan was never taken up either in Committee of the
Whole or on the floor of the Convention, and on July 24 it was referred to the Committee
of Detail, along with the resolutions that the Convention had adopted and the New Jersey
plan that it had rejected. 2 id. at 98 (Journal). The original plan, which presumably was
turned over to the committee by the secretary of the Convention, has never been found.
Shortly after the Convention ended Pinckney published a pamphlet with the rather ambiguous title: Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal Convention, in Philadelphia,on the 28th of May, 1787, by Mr. Charles Pinckney, Delegate from
the State of South-Carolina.Delivered at different Times in the course of their Discussions.
The pamphlet is reprinted in 3 REcoiws 106-23. The fact that the observations were admittedly "[d]elivered at different Times" means that subsequent proposals are included
along with provisions of the plan originally presented. Even so, the pamphlet comes far
closer to embodying Pinckney's initial ideas than does the purported draft of his original
plan that he furnished in 1818 tothe secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, when the
latter was engaged in editing for official publication the original Journal of the Convention, then in his custody. See id. at 425 (resolution of Congress authorizing publication,
March 27, 1818), 427-28 (letter from Pinckney to Adams, Dec. 30, 1818), enclosing plan
purportedly as he first presented it), 431 (Adams' diary, May 16, 1819). The Journal was
published in 1819 and included the document furnished by Pinckney, which is reprinted
in id. at 595-601. James Madison and Rufus King, delegates who were still alive, quickly
recognized that the printed text could not have been the plan presented by Pinckney at
the outset of the Convention. See id. at 481-82 (Appendix A). In the early 1830's Madison
carefully compiled from the published sources and his own notes massive evidence of the
discrepancies involved, particularly elements in the purported plan that Pinckney was on
record as opposing in the debates, and provisions that had never been proposed by anyone
until late in the Convention. See id. at 479-82, 501-15, 531-32, 534-37 (Appendix A).
Historical scholarship has sustained Madison's conclusion that the purported- text is spurious. Working from all the available evidence, the historian J. Franklin Jameson determined
the points that must have been in the authentic Pinckney plan. Having done so he was
able to identify as a set of extracts from that plan the two-page manuscript cited here,
which was preserved among the papers of James Wilson and is in his handwriting. This
portion is printed in 2 id. at 158-59; see id. at 157 n.15. On the basis of the same evidence
it was possible also to identify a second document in the same collection as an outline of
the complete Pinckney plan, which is printed in id. at 134-37. A reconstructed text of the
original plan, embodying direct quotations from the two documents in the Wilson papers
and from Pinckney's pamphlet, Observations, is in 3 id. at 604-09. See Farrand's summary
of this sequence of historical investigation in 1 id. at xii, xxii; 3 id. at 595-609.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

1974]

[T]hat none of the persons composing the federal Executive shall
on any occasion take command of any troops, so as personally to
conduct any enterprise as General, or in other capacity.18 6
The proviso created some lingering interest,18 7 though the entire New
Jersey Plan itself was, as we have seen, quickly rejected. 88
Hamilton's Plan of June 18, 1787
Only one plan presented to the Convention during its first two
months dealt explicitly and fully with the allocation of power between
the executive and legislative branches in both aspects of foreign relations, the making of war and the negotiation of treaties. The plan
deserves careful examination, not only because of its content but because it represented the views of the Convention's most outspoken advocate of a highly centralized government and a puissant executive,
namely Alexander Hamilton. His attitude being what it was, the most
unexpected and striking fact about his plan and the accompanying
speech is the complete absence of anything like a belief in "the unrestricted authority of the Executive to take the initial role in setting
America's course in world matters"-a concept that is sometimes alleged to have "prevailed" among the framers of the Constitution.18 9
To support this last-mentioned interpretation of the framers' intentions, which is held by many legal authorities and political scientists,190 it is necessary to construe every contemporary statement fa186 1

RacoRDs

244 (Madison's notes, June 15) (resolution 4).

Luther Martin, in his report to the Maryland legislature published under the
title Genuine Information, complained that though some members wished the power of
the President as Commander in Chief "to be so far restrained, that he should not command
187

in person," the desired restriction "could not be obtained." 3 REcoRDs 217-18.
188 See note 174 supra.
189 Goldwater, supra note 139, at 466. See also note 190 infra.
190 The doctrine that the Constitution vests in the President virtually plenary power
over foreign relations has a long history, even though (as the present study points out) it
was not countenanced in the Federal Convention or in the ratification debates that followed.
It was first propounded by Hamilton in his "Pacificus" essays of 1793, wherein (as Madison
had quickly pointed out) he contradicted many of the statements he had made five years
earlier in The Federalist, particularly Nos. 69 and 75. See notes 254 & 259 infra. For a
further discussion of Hamilton's views as set out in The Federalist,see the discussion in the
text accompanying notes 508-14 infra.
The great constitutional commentators of the next generation were not impressed by
Hamilton's innovation of 1793. Joseph Story, in his discussion of the treaty in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, copied into his text almost verbatim
long passages from the Federalist papers of Hamilton and Jay, including the former's
warning that "it would be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust" to the President "the
entire power of making treaties." 3 J. STORY, COMMENTAReS ON THE CONSTrUTION OF THE
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voring greater authority for the federal government in the handling
of foreign affairs as somehow constituting an argument for vesting that
authority in executive hands, whether anything was actually said on
361-62 (1833) (quoting from THE FEDERALr No. 75, at 467 (A. Hamilton))
[hereinafter cited as 3 J. STORY]. But though Story discussed various early differences of
opinion concerning the extent of the Senate's role, particularly whether it should advise the
President on the instructions to be issued to ministers (3 J. STORY 370-72), no approval
was given-indeed no reference was made-to Hamilton's views in the "Pacificus" essays.
Instead, borrowing the very phrases that Hamilton had used in No. 75 of The Federalist,
Story wrote that the "joint possession" of the treaty power by President and Senate "affords
a greater security for its just exercise, than the separate possession of it by either." 3
J. STORY 360 (quoting from THE FEnaaALIsr No. 75, at 468 (A. Hamilton)).
Chancellor James Kent of New York had taken the same position in his Commentaries
on American Law, writing as follows:
As treaties are declared by the constitution to be the supreme law of the land
it might seem to be more consonant to the principles of republican government,
to consider the right of concluding specific terms of peace as of legislative jurisdiction. This has generally been the case in free governments. ... On the other
hand, the preliminary negotiations which may be required, the secrecy and despatch proper to take advantage of the sudden and favourable turn of public
affairs, seem to render it expedient to place this power in the hands of the executive department. The constitution of the United States has been influenced by
the latter, more than by the former considerations, for it has placed this power
with the president, under the advice and control of the senate, who are to be
considered for this purpose in the light of an executive council.
1 J. KENT,COMMENTARIES ON AmmucAN LAw 266-67 (1826).
In Philadelphia during these same decades, several of the leading commentators on
the American Constitution brought to the task a European background or European legal
training, which seemingly inclined them to accept the idea that treaty-making, regardless
of theory, would turn out in practice to be an executive function. Thus William Rawle,
Philadelphia-born but trained in England at the Inns of Court while in voluntary exile
as a loyalist during the Revolution, remarked in his View of the Constitution of the
United States (first published in 1826) that though the words of the document
would imply that a treaty, like an act of congress, should in its progress be the
subject of joint deliberation . .. the practice has necessarily been otherwise.
Negotiations, he pointed out, are conducted, whether abroad or at home, "under instructions from the president," and "[t]he senate is not consulted in the first process." Finally,
"when the treaty is agreed on, the president submits it to the senate." W. RAWLz, A VIEW
OF THE CONSTruTioN OF THE UNrrE STATES OF AMERICA 63 (2d ed. 1829). A quarter of a
UNrn STATES

century later this same point of view was stated, tersely and without qualifications, by
John Bouvier, a French-born Philadelphia lawyer. In his Institutes of American Law he
described treaty-making as a process whereby "the president acts, in the first place, independently and alone," with ministers abroad and the secretary of state at home operating
"under the instructions of the president." "Until the treaty has been agreed upon," Bouvier asered flatly, "the senate is not consulted." I J. BouvIE, INSITUTES OF AMERICAN
LAW 30 (1851).
By diminishing the role of the Senate, mid-century commentators necessarily enhanced
that of the President. It was the post-Civil War commentators, however, who first exalted
the power of the President in foreign affairs to imperial dimensions. The following excerpts, from John Norton Pomeroy's An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the
United States, first published in 1868, exhibit the radically new' point of view:

.

The President is the sole organ of communication between our own and all
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the latter point. It is also necessary to presume that anyone who advocated the establishment of a powerful executive branch was intending that power to be used to the full in diplomatic and military
other governments. ... Our own ministers are nominated by the President....
Instructions are sent to them, despatches forwarded, demands made, claims insisted
on, principles adopted and enforced, as the President deems proper....
Over all these proceedings the Congress has absolutely no control.. . . Congress may pass resolves in relation to questions of an international character; but
these can only have a certain moral weight; they have no legal effect; they cannot
bind the Executive. . . . The President has thus intrusted to him a most momentous power .... The magnitude of this function may be easily illustrated. The
President cannot declare war; Congress alone possesses this attribute. But the
President may, without any possibility of hindrance from the legislature, so conduct . . . the diplomatic negotiations with other governments, as to force a war,
as to compel another nation to take the initiative; and that step once taken, the
challenge cannot be refused....
I repeat that the Executive Department, by means of this branch of its power
over foreign relations, holds in its keeping the safety, welfare, and even permanence of our internal and domestic institutions. And in wielding this power, it is
untrammelled by any other department of the government; no other influence
than a moral one can control or curb it ....
But the other branch of this executive function-the treaty-making poweris even more important. . . . The President must, of course, take the initiative in
making all treaties. Congress, as such, has nothing to say in the matter. As a treaty
is necessarily the result of negotiation, and as such negotiation is exclusively within
the province of the President, the Senate having not the least authority to communicate with a foreign government, it is absolutely impossible for that body to
dictate a treaty, or to force the Chief Magistrate into any particular line of action.
He must negotiate the treaty, make all the stipulations, determine all the subjectmatter, and then submit the perfected convention to the Senate for ratification or
rejection. They must take his finished work and approve or disapprove.
J. PomERoy, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 446-48

(1868).
Pomeroy was the authority quoted at greatest length in the 1906 speech of Senator
John Coit Spooner, discussed at length below. See text accompanying note 505 infra for
excerpts from that speech. Spooner added a grace-note to the argument by asserting that
the doctrine propounded in Pomeroy's thirty-eight-year-old treatise had been the theory
accepted "[flrom the foundation of the Government." 40 CONG. REc. 1418 (1906).
A recent article by Senator Barry M. Goldwater places even greater emphasis on the
contention that these ideas motivated the framers of the Constitution. Goldwater writes:
The Framers of the Constitution invested the Chief Executive with the foreign
policy-making powers because of a realization that a single individual with these
powers would not be disturbed by politics of the moment. He would look to the
long course of history and use his powers more wisely than a Congress which is
constantly looking toward the political results. It is my thought that the Founding
Fathers understood that a Congress divided amongst different minority interests
might in some crucial moment of history be loath to give proper direction to a
single necessary American course. Thus they found it proper to place the power of
external affairs in a single person where the probability of minority weight would
be much less likely to have this effect.
The emphasis of the Framers upon planning a government which would be
guided by a leader who would act on behalf of a single people with a single purpose appears both in the writings of the Federalist Papers and the debates of the
First Congress....
Though the debate centered on the Executive power to remove officers who

would be appointed with the consent of the Senate, the concept which prevailed
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affairs, even though the discussion in its original context had to do
solely with the efficient administration of internal affairs and the
vigorous execution of domestic laws.
The question is one of evidence. What in fact was said about the
conduct of foreign relations, and how much emphasis was actually
placed on the matter, during the discussions that led to the establishment of an independent and forceful presidency? Hamilton's speech
and plan provide an excellent test case, for he advocated both a powerful central government and a powerful executive. Did he therefore
propose "to place the power of external affairs in a single person" as
the framers are said to have "found it proper" to do. 191 Tedious
though it may be to sift and winnow every detail of his speech, only
such a procedure can make clear what Hamilton was not saying as well
as what he was. Fortunately, Hamilton's own outline, detailed although
skeletonized, has been preserved; there also exist four extensive reports of his speech, taken down at the time by four different members
of the Convention, 19 2 two of whom were political antagonists of his,
eager for damaging evidence of monarchical or aristocratic heresies
on his part. Under the circumstances, there is no likelihood whatever
that a vigorous advocacy of "the unrestricted authority of the Executive to take the initial role in setting America's course in world matters" 19 3 would have escaped notice.
Hamilton brought his plan forward on the 18th of June, three
days after Paterson presented the New Jersey proposals. 19 His speech,
one of the most important of his entire career, was a forthright statement of his basic political philosophy, with no attempt to disguise its
unpopular features. He deplored what he felt to be the half-way measures proposed not only in the newly-submitted New Jersey Plan but
also in the earlier resolutions of the Virignia delegation. 195 With respect to the latter, he exclaimed: "[W]hat even is the Virginia plan,
in the debates and votes that day is the same concept which supports the unrestricted authority of the Executive to take the initial role in setting America's
course in world matters.
Goldwater, supra note 139, at 465-66 (footnotes omitted).
191 Goldwater, supra note 139, at 465-66.
192 All five documents are reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 178211 (H. Syrett ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as HAMILTON]. In addition to Hamilton's own
document, the other reports were provided by James Madison, Robert Yates, John Lansing,
and Rufus King.
193 Goldwater, supra note 139, at 465.
194 4 HAMILTON
195

178.

Id. at 195-202 (Yates).
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but pork still, with a little change of the sauce."196 A loosely-knit
confederation, like that which the existing Articles provided, was
bound to be "weak and distracted." The remedy, Hamilton insisted,
was to "establish a general and national government, completely sov' ' 1 97
ereign, and annihilate the state distinctions and state operations.
He spoke of turning the states into "something like limitted Corporations,"' 98 and he even mentioned favorably their ultimate extinction,
though announcing that he would not "shock the public opinion by
proposing such a measure."' 199 No stronger plea for centralization was
ever spoken on the floor of the convention.
Equally strong was Hamilton's plea for a forceful executive. The
powers necessary for an effective central government could not, he
argued, be safely delegated to the old Congress, organized as it was
without adequate checks and balances. To give it additional powers
would be to "establish a sovereignty of the worst kind, consisting of
a single body. ' 200 Especially needed was an effective executive. "[C]an
there," Hamilton asked, "be a good Gov[ernmen]t without a good
Executive[?]" ' 2 0 1 Announcing his opinion that "the British government

forms the best model the world ever produced,"20 2 he alluded so freely
to the advantages of monarchy2 0 3 that it was easy for his critics 2to
04
accuse him of wishing to give up republican principles entirely. 20 5
What he specifically proposed was life tenure for the chief executive,
and he believed that by making him impeachable (a provision that he
insisted on), Americans could prevent their chief executive from be198 Id. at 202 (Yates) (emphasis in original).

Id. at 198 (Yates); see id. at 179 (Hamilton), 190 (Madison), 206 (King).
198 Id. at 204 (Lansing); see id. at 199 (Yates).
199 Id. at 191 (Madison); see id. at 204 (Lansing).
at 181 (Hamilton).
200 Id. at 199 (Yates) (emphasis in original); see id.
201 Id. at 193 (Madison); cf. id. at 186 (Hamilton).
202 Id. at 200 (Yates); see id. at 184 (Hamilton), 192 (Madison), 204 (Lansing); cf. id. at
207 (King).
208 See id. at 186 (Hamilton), 192-94 (Madison). Two versions stressed that the proposed system would be an elective monarchy which would have built-in safeguards against
the problems that befell elective monarchies in the past. See id. at 201 (Yates), 204 (Lansing).
204 See, e.g., 3 REcoRDs 418 (letter from Gouverneur Morris to Robert Walsh, February
5, 1811). Much was written and spoken in response to the accusation. See id. at 395-96
(Hamilton), 397 (Timothy Pickering to Hamilton, April 5, 1803), 397-98. (Hamilton to
Pickering, September 16, 1803), 409-10 (Governor Lewis to unknown correspondent), 417-18
(John W. Eppes to Madison, November 1, 1810), 432-33 (memoirs of John Quincy Adams).
466 (T. H. Benton), 480-81 (journal of Jared Sparks).
205 See 4 HAMILTON 193 (Madison), 201 (Yates), 204 (Lansing), 207 (King).
197
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coming the equivalent of a British king. 206 Nevertheless, Hamilton was
by no means afraid of executive power itself. He summed up his views
in a telling sentence: "Let one executive be appointed who dares
execute his powers." 207
Hamilton was concerned, as were many of his colleagues and
contemporaries, about the weakness or potential weakness of the new
United States in foreign affairs. Under which of the two main headings
of his discourse-the need for strengthening the central government or
the need for creating a powerful executive-did he deal with the
problems of war and peace? To the extent that he discussed them at
all, he treated them, as had the leaders who corresponded with one'
another in the pre-Convention period, as problems resulting from the
inadequacy of the powers granted by the states to the Confederation.
Under the rubric of "Objections to the present confederation,"
Hamilton's outline listed two shortcomings affecting foreign relations:
"Power of treaty without power of execution," and "Common defence
20
without power to raise troops-[or] have a fleet-[or) raise money.1
In his speech he noted that "[d]oubts have been entertained whether
the United States have a Right to build a Ship or raise a Reg(imen)t in
Time of Peace." 20 9 He himself believed the power had not been delegated, and that the government under the Confederation "cannot therefore take any preparatory measure before an enemy is at your
door." 210 Finally, Hamilton reminded his hearers that the government
must "protect your rights against Canada on the north, Spain on the
south, and your western frontier against the savages," 211 and he asked:
"How is the expense of supporting. .. these important matters to be
defrayed?" and "How are forces to be raised?" 212 The answers, it was
obvious, were not to be obtained by creating a powerful executive
but by broadening the legislative powers of Congress.
When he did discuss the importance of a powerful executive,
Hamilton's emphasis was on the need for internal stability-for that
union of "public strength with individual security" which he as206 Id. at 201 (Yates), 204 (Lansing). See also THE FEDERALIS
No. 69 (A. HAMILTON)
for a comparison of the positions of the American President and the British King.
207 4 HAMILTON 201 (Yates).
208 Id. at 179 (Hamilton).
209 Id. at 203 (Lansing); see id. at 191 (Madison). Yates' version included even more
positive language. "Examine the present confederation, and it is evident they can raise no
troops nor equip vessels before war is actually declared." Id. at 199.
210 Id. at 199 (Yates).
211 Id. at 198 (Yates).
212 Id. at 198, 199 (Yates).
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cribed to the English system. 218 His own outline states in staccato
phrases the essence of this particular argument:
Effect of the British government.
A vigorous execution of the laws-and a vigorous
defence of the people, will result.
Better chance for a good administration.
It is said a republican government does
not admit a vigorous execution.
It is therefore bad; 214
for the goodness of a government consists
in a vigorous execution.
Another of Hamilton's arguments for a powerful executive, an
argument likewise unconnected with foreign affairs, is arranged almost
as a syllogism in his outline:
Society naturally divides itself into
two political divisions-the few and the many,
who have distinct interests.
If government in the hands of the few,
they will tyrannize over the many.
If (in) the hands of the many, they will
tyrannize over the few. It ought to be in
the hands of both; and they should be separated.
This separation must be permanent.
And if separated, they will need a mutual
check.
215
This check is a monarch.
Hamilton's argument, in short, was that a powerful executive is
needed for two principal reasons, both of them domestic-to provide
an efficient administration, and to protect the rights of the public and
the contestantsin the unending struggle, basically economic in character, between the few and the many. When Hamilton turned his attention to the role of the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs, the
remarks in his speech were off-hand and vague. There were, in fact,
only two clear allusions to the matter. The first was simply the contention that an executive for life is the most reliable representative of
the nation in its dealings with foreign powers. Hamilton's outline
stated:
The advantage of a monarch is this-he is above corruptionhe must always intend, in respect to foreign nations, the true interest and glory of the people.216
213
214
215
216

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

192 (Madison); see id. at 200 (Yates), 204 (Lansing), 207 (King).
186 (Hamilton).
185 (Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
186 (Hamilton).
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As an historical generalization this was dubious to begin with, but it
became more so as Hamilton elaborated it in his speech. "[O]ne of the
weak sides of Republics," he asserted, "was their being liable to foreign
influence & corruption.1217 By way of contrast, Hamilton offered an
observation that can only be labelled astonishing:
The Hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that
of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that21he
was
8
placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad.
One wonders if Hamilton had ever read of the secret Treaty of Dover
of 1670 and the £741,985 that Charles II received from Louis XIV
in the next eight years, part of the quid pro quo being English parti219
cipation in Louis' war against the Dutch.

Hamilton's other comment on the role of the executive in foreign
affairs can hardly have been reassuring to his auditors. Urging again
the desirability of life tenure for the chief executive, Hamilton argued
that a term as short as seven years would make the executive so dangerous that he "ought to have but little power." His reasoning was
as follows:
He [the executive] would be ambitious . . . and as the object of

his ambition w[oul]d be to prolong his power, it is probable that
in case of a war, he would avail himself of the emergence [sic],
to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. 220
Far more enlightening than these somewhat odd remarks were
the provisions of the plan of government that Hamilton sketched out
in the latter part of his speech. 221 Centralization, for example, was
217 Id. at 193(Madison).
218 Id; see id. at 200 (Yates); cf. id. at 204 (Lansing).
219 See G. C.ARK, supra note 81, at 75-76.

a

220 4 HAMILTON 194 (Madison).
221 Hamilton's plan was copied by Madison into his notes, and this version, printed at
I RscoRs 291-93 (June 18), is the one quoted herein, unless otherwise stated. Hamilton
examined Madison's records shortly after giving the speech and acknowledged its correctness, suggesting only a few minor verbal changes which Madison duly incorporated. See id.
at 293 n.9. At least nine versions exist, one being Hamilton's own manuscript, printed at
4 HAMuTON 207-11. Hamilton, however, made a few minor alterations in his own copy
after reading it; hence Madison's version is a better historical record.
J. Franklin Jameson, early in the twentieth century, carefully collated the eight texts
known to him, and published the results. See Jameson, Studies in the History of the
Federal Convention of 1787, 1 AM. Htssr. Ass'N ANN. REP. 87, 144-49 (1902). Five of the
versions are reprinted together for easy comparison in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATiVE OF THE
FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERUCAN STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
979-88 (C. TansiU ed. 1927). One additional version, that of John Lansing, Jr., came to
light subsequent to those compilations, and is printed in J. LANSIc, THE Dm,cA' FROM
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pushed to the extreme of providing for the governors of the several
states to "be appointed by the General Government. 222 Executive
authority was exalted by giving the chief executive not only life tenure
but also a veto that could not be overridden. 223 Finally, Hamilton assigned specific roles to the executive and to legislative bodies respectively in the conduct of foreign affairs. Much as he admired the English
scheme of government, however, he did not propose for a moment to
import its doctrine that the powers of peace and war were executive
prerogatives. On the contrary, Hamilton took great care in his plan to
prevent either the war power or the treaty power from being wielded
wholly by one official or one body. The Senate was given "the sole
power of declaring war." 224 The chief executive (styled the Governour)
would "have the direction of war," but only "when authorized or
begun." 225 Finally the Legislature as a whole would, it went without
NEW YORK 119-22 (J. Strayer ed. 1939). The variants among these versions affect only two
of the passages dealing with foreign affairs. See notes 224-25 infra and accompanying text.
One delegate to the Convention, Robert Yates, included a summary of the plan in his
report of Hamilton's speech. 4 HAMILTON 201. It is possible that he incorporated certain
"explanatory observations" that Hamilton offered at the end of his speech and that went
unreported in other sources, but it is more likely that his variant readings are simply the
result of hasty note-taking, as compared with the other members' leisurely copying.
One other version of Hamilton's plan represented his own subsequent elaboration. At
a time "near the close of the Convention," Hamilton handed to Madison a draft delineating the Constitution that he would like to have seen the Convention adopt. See 3 RacoRns
619 (Appendix F). Besides his own further thoughts, Hamilton incorporated various provisions which the Convention had already adopted and of which he approved. See 4 HAMILTON 253-74 for the complete text of this draft. The changes affecting foreign-policy-making
are noted below as "Hamilton's subsequent draft."
222 1 REcoRDs 293 (Article 10).
223 Id. at 292 (Article 4).
224 Id. (Article 6). Yates' summary reads differently: "The executive to have the
power . . . to make war or peace, with the advice of the senate." 4 HAMILTON 201. Hamilton's subsequent draft, however, gives the Senate sole power in terms which reaffirm those
of the original: "The Senate shall exclusively possess the power of declaring war." Id. at
258 (Article 3. section 8).
225 1 REcoRns 292 (Article 4). Several of the other copies (but not Hamilton's manuscript) insert the word "entire" before the phrase "direction of war." DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, supra note 221, at 981, 983,
987; 4 HAMILTON 208 & 210 n.ll. Hamilton's manuscript does include the clause "to be the
Commander in Chief of the land and naval forces and of the Militia of the United States."
Id. at 208 & 210 n.10. His subsequent draft revives the proviso originally suggested in the
New Jersey Plan and states the whole matter as follows:
He shall be the commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States
and of the Militia within the several states and shall have the direction of war
when commenced; but he shall not take the actual command in the field of an
army, without the consent of the Senate and Assembly.
Id. at 263 (Article 4, section 10). See the text accompanying note 186 supra for the original
proviso.
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saying, control the power of the purse. So far as other international
dealings were concerned, the Governour was "to have with the advice
and approbation of the Senate the power of making all treaties."' 26 To
make sure that the role of the Senate would not be overlooked or
downgraded, Hamilton stated the matter twice-the first time (just
quoted) as a limitation on the executive, the second time as a positive
grant to the Senate of "the power of advising and approving all
Treaties." 27 Finally to make clear that ambassadors would not be
looked upon as agents and subordinates of the executive alone, appointment procedures were carefully differentiated. The Governour
could appoint without any legislative approval the heads of the principal executive departments-Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, where "other officers" were concerned, "Ambassadors to
foreign Nations" being specifically named, his was a power of nomination only. Reserved to the Senate was "the power of approving or re228
jecting all appointments" of the sort.
Hamilton frankly conceded that neither the delegates nor the
people "out of doors" were ready to adopt such a plan, and therefore
he did not "mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a proposition." 229 Accordingly no vote was taken on any of his suggestions. Six
days before all matters were turned over to the Committee of Detail,
one delegate pointed out that no answer had yet been given to the
question whether the chief executive would have a military force "to
carry the laws into effect," or whether he would "have the command of
the Militia," and he felt that the Committee of Detail ought to have
"determinate directions on this great point." 230 Though at least one
other member agreed, no resolution on the matter was in fact
231
adopted.
This lack of interest in defining a role for the executive in military and diplomatic matters amounts, in itself, to a refutation of the
view that the framers were determined to create a powerful presidency
226 1 REcoRDs 292 (Article 4).
227 Id. (Article 6). Hamilton's subsequent draft states the matter even more force.

fully: "No treaty shall be made without their advice and consent." 4 HAMILTON 258 (Artide 3, section 8).
228 1 RECORDs 292 (Articles 4 & 6). Yates' summary gives the executive power "to send
ambassadors," without any qualifications. 4 HAMILTON 201. Hamilton's subsequent draft no
longer singles out ambassadors for special mention, but otherwise deals with appointments as before. See id. at 258 (Article 3, section 8), 263-64 (Article 4, section 10).
229 4 HAMILTON 194-95 (Madison).
230 2 REcoRDs 69 (Madison's notes, July 20) (speech of James McClurg).
231 Id. at 70 (Madison's notes) (remarks of James Wilson). Rufus King nonetheless felt
that the matter could be left to the "discretionary power" of the Committee of Detail. Id.
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for the purpose of giving it primary responsibility for foreign affairs.
The colloquy just quoted took place half way through the proceedings
of the Convention, at a time when the major constitutional proposals
had been worked over twice-first in committee of the whole for three
weeks, then for five weeks in formal convention. In every area of concern except foreign affairs, the great points at issue had been fully debated, and on many crucial questions compromises had been hammered
out. By the 26th of July more than a score of specific resolutions had
been adopted, providing a tolerably clear outline of the kind of federal
system that the Convention had decided to establish, so far, at least, as
domestic functioning was concerned. On that date matters were turned
over to a Committee of Detail, whose five members were charged with
"reporting a Constitution conformably to the Proceedings" of the
Convention thus far.2 2 The Convention then adjourned for ten days
to permit the committee to do its work. Finally on the 6th of August
the delegates received from the committee a printed draft of 23 articles
in which the resolutions adopted during the preceding two months
were arrayed for the first time in the format of an actual constitu2 3
tion. 8
232 Id. at 85 (Journal, July 23). See note 151 supra. This original resolution, which set
up the Committee of Detail, reserved for further consideration by the Convention everything that "respects the Supreme Executive." 2 REcoRDs 85. There were three additional
days of debate which concentrated on the manner of choosing the President. See id. at 97128. But this problem was turned over to the Committee of Detail along with all others on
July 26. See id. at 117 (Journal), 128 (Madison's notes). The committee was deliberately
kept small. A motion that it consist of one member from each state was defeated, as was
another for a committee of seven. Id. at 77 (Madison's notes, July 21).
Men of a judicious and conciliatory temper were chosen for the Committee. Three
were future members of the United States Supreme Court (two of them serving as Chief
Justice): John Rutledge of South Carolina, chairman of the committee; Oliver Ellsworth
of Connecticut; and James Wilson of Pennsylvania. The other two were Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia, who had introduced the original Virginia Plan; and Nathaniel
Gorham of Massachusetts, who had served both as president of Congress and as chairman
of the Committee of the Whole at the Convention. See id. at 106 (Madison's notes, July
24).
283 2 REcoRDs 177-89.
The resolutions that were turned over to the committee by the Convention are compiled in id. at 129-34 (Committee of Detail). Three drafts that circulated within the committee, plus miscellaneous papers, are printed in full or in part in id. at 134-75 (Committee
of Detail); 4 id. at 37-51 (rev. ed. 1937) [all subsequent citations to volume 4 involve revisions in the original manuscripts made or discovered subsequent to the publication of the
first edition in 1911].
The resolutions adopted by the Convention provided, of course, the primary mandate
of the committee, but the committee was also expected to take from the old Articles of
Confederation such provisions possessing continuing relevance which had not been altered
or repudiated by action of ,the Convention. Furthermore, both the Pinckney Plan and the
New Jersey Plan were officially referred to the -committee for whatever use it might choose
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CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL,

JUNE

18, 1787

Though a multitude of specific points had to be settled by the
Committee of Detail-its title was no misnomer-the major task confronting it was to define with precision the expanded powers being
conferred on the federal government and to allocate these powers
among. the three branches of the reorganized constitutional system.
The Convention had indicated quite clearly how these various agencies were to be set up and how their members were to be chosen. Yet
the Convention failed to agree on any satisfactory listing of the authority and functions of the new executive branch, and it had dealt in
broad generalities when describing the new powers to be conferred on
the federal government as a whole. Whereas the Articles of Confederation had carefully enumerated the powers delegated to Congress, the
resolution adopted by the Convention took the form of a blanket
authorization resolving
[t]hat the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the
legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and
moreover to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the
Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately
incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may
be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation. 234
In some ways the resolution was ambiguous. Its first clause seemed
to suggest enumeration, and the remaining two-thirds of the resolution
could therefore be interpreted as furnishing the guide-lines for an expanded enumeration. On the other hand, when the question of enumeration had been put to the Convention on the 16th of July, a tie
vote resulted. Five states voted in favor of sending this particular resolution to committee "to the end that a specification of the powers
comprised in the general terms, might be reported." Five states voted
against committal, which therefore lost. 235 The negative vote, however,
to make of them. 2 id. at 128 (Madison's notes, July 26). Hamilton's Plan, though not
officially of record, clearly had some influence. And the two preceding months of debate
were, of course, in the minds of the five committee members.
234 2 REcoRDs 131-32 (Committee of Detail). This resolution originated as Article 6 of
the Virginia Plan of May 29. See I id. at 21 (Madison's notes). The clause reading "to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union" was, however, added on July 17,
on a motion made by Gunning Bedford of Delaware, seconded by Gouverneur Morris of
Pennsylvania, and adopted by a vote of six states to four. 2 id. at 21 (Journal), 26-27
(Madison's notes).
235 2 REcoRwS 17 (Madison's notes). The New Jersey Plan, offered on June 15 as an alternative to the Virginia Plan, had carefully enumerated the additional powers to be given
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was not necessarily a vote against the principle of enumeration. Nathaniel Gorham, who became one of the five members of the Committee of Detail, opposed the motion for referral on the ground that the
Convention was "now establishing general principles, to be extended
hereafter into details which will be precise & explicit.' 2 8 6 Such, indeed,
was the procedure which the Committee of Detail adopted. This course
might well have been foreseen when the Convention elected Rutledge
chairman of the committee, for it was he who had made the referral
motion of the 16th of July for the sake of bringing about "a specifi'
cation of the powers comprised in the general terms.

237

This decision for enumeration obliged the committee not only to
spell out in specific detail the new powers that the federal government
would receive, but also to take a fresh and searching look at each of
the powers already granted to the Confederation by the existing Articles. On the basis of this careful scrutiny, moreover, the committee
could proceed to make the kind of decision that the Convention had
been reluctant to make-to wit, whether a power possessed by the
old Congress was truly a legislative power or whether, being of some
other nature, it ought rather to be vested in the newly created executive branch or in the judiciary. Subjected to analysis like this, many
existing grants of authority were seen to be conglomerations, and the
committee accordingly dissected them into their component parts and
distributed the fragments to different bodies. In a few complex and
delicate areas legislative and executive elements were so inextricably
intertwined that the committee had to make provision for certain
powers to be exercised jointly.
These problems arose with particular acuteness in connection with
the allocation of authority in the conduct of foreign relations-the
realm with which, of course, we are here primarily concerned. The
Articles of Confederation had vested in Congress-on paper at leastthe federal government. See 1 id. at 243-44 (Madison's notes) (Articles 2 & 3). In the roll
call on July 16, however, New Jersey's vote was cast against referral, while Virginia's
was cast in favor of referral and hence of enumeration. The four other states that voted
with Virginia were Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina and Georgia. 2 id. at 15 (Journal), 17 (Madison's notes). The next day, four of the five voted against Bedford's expansive
grant of power. Id. at 24 (Journal), 27 (Madison's notes). But the resolution was adopted
six to four when Maryland defected from this group. See note 208 supra.
236 2 RacoRms 17 (Madison's notes).
237 Id. Three of the five members of the Committee of Detail, it should be noted,
came from states that had voted for enumeration on July 16. See notes 232 & 235 supra.
Moreover, Randolph, a committee member, had vehemently opposed Bedford's proposal,
exclaiming that "[i]t involves the power of violating all the laws and constitutions of the
States." 2 RPcosws 26 (Madison's notes, July 17).
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so complete a .monopoly of the powers of war and peace that the
Committee of Detail was not faced with the task of working out precise definitions of new powers in this realm to be delegated to the
federal government. Its task was to quarry out from the mass of powers
already possessed by Congress: those that might appropriately be made
the building stones of the new executive and judicial edifices.
It will be well to.look at a few of the powers that the Articles had
delegated to the old Congress and to note what disposition was made
of them in the draft constitution reported by the Committee of Detail
on the 6th of August 1787. The ninth article of the Confederationthe provision enumerating the powers of the old Congress-had begun
by vesting in it "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining
on peace and war." 23s5 This treatment of the so-called power of peace
and war as if it were in reality a single indivisible type of authority
instead of a pair of related but easily distinguishable powers, was
characteristic of English thinking on the matter, as we have observed
in Blackstone's Commentaries.239 At the beginning of the Convention,
delegates still bracketed the two powers, while at the same time insisting (in opposition to English precedent but in accord with the
precedent of the American Articles) that both types of authority were
legislative in nature.240 What the Committee of Detail recognized was
that the two elements traditionally linked in a single phrase were in
fact perfectly separable, and it therefore proceeded to separate them.
The Legislature of the United States-that is to say, the two houses
acting concurrently, with final approval by the President-was empowered to "make war," whereas the power to "make treaties" was
241
vested exclusively in the upper house, the Senate.
The Committee of Detail, though it separated the war power from
the treaty-making power, continued to look upon both as essentially
legislative. It was obvious, however, that certain aspects of each partook
of an executive character, and that even the judiciary might be given
some responsibility. Accordingly the Committee of Detail carried even
further its process of subdividing the traditional delegations of power
238 See text accompanying note 114 supra.

2 9 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
240 See text accompanying notes 163-69 supra (debate of June 1).
241 2 REcoRDs 182, 183 (draft constitution reported by the Committee, Article 7, section 1,clause 14, and: Article 9, section 1). The committee also eliminated a tautology that
was present in the traditional English analysis and in the Articles, both of which listed
the power of making or entering into treaties assomething quite different from the power
of making peace..See text accompanying notes 19, 20, 114 & 116 supra. The Committee of
Detail simply eliminated the redundant power of determining on peace.
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and redistributing the components among different agencies of government; One illustration of this carefully considered fragmentation is
worth citing. English tradition had. recognized as a royal (and thus an
executive) prerogative "the sole .power of sending ambassadors to
foreign states, and receiving ambassadors at home." 242 The Articles of
Confederation transferred this power intact to Congress.2 43 The Committee of Detail, however, split it in two. Recognizing that the envoys
appointed by the United States, not the envoys accredited to it, were
the ones who would speak for the nation and should therefore be responsible to the treaty-making authority, the committee vested in the
Senate the power "to appoint Ambassadors," while assigning to the
President the rather more ceremonial function of receiving them. 24
Of crucial importance, of course, were the decisions of the Committee of Detail that allocated among the several branches the powers
connected with war and those connected with treaty-making. With respect to the former, the committee continued to use the vaguely inclusive phrase "make war" to describe the authority of the federal legislature, but it carefully eliminated the clause of the Confederation that
had given the old Congress the power of "directing [the] operations"
of the land and naval forces of the union. 245 The Continental Congress
had recognized the need for unified command when it unanimousl)
appointed George Washington commander in chief on the 15th of June
1775, less than two months after the beginning of hostilities at Lexington and Concord. When the Articles of Confederation were drawn up
more than a year later, the power to make such an appointment was
explicitly vested in Congress; but authority was divided by the ambiguous, if not outright contradictory, provision just quoted, which
seemed to give Congress rather than the commander the responsibility
of "directing" military operations. The Committee of Detail eradicated
such past and potential conflicts of authority by making the President
ex officio commander in chief of all the armed forces, including the
militia of the several states. It also transferred to him the authority
(previously vested in Congress) not only to "commission all the officers
of the United States" but also to "appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution. ' 246 The President as com242 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
243 See text accompanying note 115 supra.
244 2 RxcoRws 188, 185 (Article 9, section 1; Article 10, section 2). See note 254 infra

.
and accompanying text.
245 See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
246 2 REcoRDs 185 (Article 10, section 2).
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mander in chief was thereby empowered both to appoint and to commission all military and naval officers under his command, there being
in the draft constitution no specified procedures for the appointment
of any officer other than the President himself, a treasurer, the judges
of the Supreme Court, and ambassadors. 247 Though the clause concerning "directing" military operations was not transferred to the executive
article, its elimination from the legislative one made the authority of
the commander in chief unambiguous. By permanently annexing to
the presidency the title and functions of commander in chief, the Committee of Detail seems clearly to have intended exactly what Hamilton
intended when in his plan of the 18th of June he proposed that the
chief executive should "have the direction of war when authorized or
begun." 248
Everything necessary to secure unity of command over the armed
forces and unhampered direction of military operations in wartime was
vested in the President by the draft constitution-indeed more unreservedly than by the Constitution finally adopted.249 At the same time,
everything connected with determining the size of the armed forces,
with actually raising the troops and providing money and material, and
with deciding Whether and when' war should be waged-in short,
everything necessary to guarantee that the armed forces would be used
to serve the purposes of the nation rather than the will of the commander-was vested by the Committee of Detail clearly and unequivocally in legislative hands. This vital control was spelled out, succinctly
but comprehensively, in the form of a cluster of specific grants to the
federal legislature, comprising the power:
To make war;
To raise armies;
To build and equip fleets;
To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the
laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions .... 250
The first of these clauses-"To make war"-was broader and more in247 See id. at 182, 185, 185 (Article 7,. section 1, clause 9; Article 9, section 1; Article 10,
sections I & 2).
248 See text accompanying note 225 supra.
249 The Constitution as adopted gives the President command of the militia only
"when called into the actual Service of the United States." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
The draft of the Committee of Detail, by comparison, put no such limitation on the President. See 2 Rxcowms 185 (Article 10, section 2). Furthermore, the President's power to appoint officers was modified in the finished Constitution so as to require Senate confirmation.
U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
250 2 REcoiws 182 (Article 7, section 1, clauses 14-17).
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clusive than the corresponding clause of the Articles of Confederation,
which spoke of the "power of determining on . . .war." 251 Whatever
else it might mean, therefore, the power to "make war" must at the
very least have included the power of "determining on" war. The
Committee of Detail, one may safely say, was attempting to make sure
that the nation would embark on war only for purposes clearly understood and openly approved by the legislative representatives of the
people.
Treaty-making, the other crucial aspect of foreign affairs, was dealt
with in the draft constitution as a special case, neither wholly legislative nor wholly executive. In the first place, it was divorced completely
from the power to make war. In the catalogue of powers vested in the
legislature as a whole (and thus requiring concurrent action by both
houses), a wide range of matters relating to war and to offenses of an
international character were specifically mentioned, but there was not
a single word bearing on the negotiation of treaties. 252 In the executive article ample powers of military command were vested in the
President, but no such copious authority was bestowed upon him in
connection with peaceable negotiations. 213 The only diplomatic function that the President was authorized to perform on his sole responsibility was that of receiving ambassadors. This power was separated
completely from the power to appoint foreign envoys, while at the same
time being linked (as part of the same sentence) with the power to "correspond with the supreme Executives of the several States. ' 254 Thus,
See text accompanying note 114 supra.
See 2 REcoRws 181-82 (Article 7, section 1).
253 See id. at 185-86 (Article 10, section 2).
254 Id. at 185 (Article 10, section 2). The reference to domestic communications with
state governors was subsequently deleted as unnecessary. Id. at 411 (journal, August 25),
419 (Madison's notes). The completed Constitution reads: "[He shall receive Ambassadors
and other public Ministers." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The year following the convention,
Hamilton described this function as "more a matter of dignity than of authority," insisting
that it would be "without consequence in the administration of the government." THE
FEDERALisr No. 69, at 433 (A. Hamilton). He also defended the arrangement on the grounds
of convenience, pointing out that it eliminated the "necessity of convening the legislature,
or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister." Id. Reversing himself five
years later, Hamilton cited that clause as one foundation for an argument that the Constitution vested in the President major discretionary powers in the area of foreign affairs.
15 HAMILTON 39, 41, 42 (1969) ("Pacificus" No. 1). See note 259 infra. In a detailed rebuttal, Madison quoted with telling effect Hamilton's earlier views as expounded in The
Federalist,and proceeded to give his own interpretation of the clause in question. It had,
said Madison, little purpose beyond "pointing out the department of the government most
proper for the ceremony of admitting public ministers, [and] of examining their credentials;" hence "it would be highly improper to magnify the function into an important
prerogative." 1 LErrERs AND OTHER WrrINCS OF JAMES MADISON 631 (1865) ("Helvidius" No.
251
252
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in the realm of diplomacy, the President was in effect made the
secretary-general of the union, handling official communications, foreign and domestic.
The power to make treaties, together with the power to appoint
the ambassadors who would be. essential agents in the negotiation of
those treaties, was unhesitatingly classified by the Committee of Detail
as a legislative power, but not, however, as a legislative power to be
wielded by Congress as a whole. As one of the preliminary memoranda
of the committee makes clear, its procedure was to first identify all the
powers that could be considered legislative and then to pick out from
the entire mass certain "powers belonging peculiarly to the [house of]
representatives" and certain others "destined for the senate peculiarly."
Among the latter were the powers of making treaties and of appointing ambassadors. 255 The Senate was entrusted with these high powers
because its small size would make secrecy easier to preserve and because
its members (thanks to the indirect mode of their election and the
long tenure of office allowed them) could be expected to resist popular
hysteria and improper pressure by special interests. Accordingly the
first section of the article detailing the powers of the -Senate read as follows in the draft constitution reported by the committee: "The Senate
of the United States shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint
Ambassadors, and Judges of the supreme Court. '256 The President was
3) [hereinafter cited as 1 MADISON]. Under the Confederation, Congress had received foreign
envoys with an elaborate ceremonial that was exceedingly wasteful of time. See, e.g.,

3 U.S.

Dm'r oF STATE, THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

OF THE UNITED STATES OF
1783,

AMERICA, FROM THE SIGNING OF THE DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE, 10"m SEPTEMBER,

To THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTrrUTION, MARCH 4, 1789, at 145-46, 148-49, 150-52 (1837)
(John Jay's report on ceremonial etiquette for the arrival of the Spanish envoy Don Diego
de Gardoqui in 1785, and subsequent documents on the same subject).
It should be noted that the authority granted to the President in the draft constitution
of the Committee of Detail was virtually identical with the executive power that would
have been delegated to a Council of State, had the initial draft of the Articles of Confederation been adopted in 1776. The provision in question, subsequently rejected, treated
the direction of military operations as an executive function and therefore bestowed extensive military authority on the Council, but in the diplomatic realm gave it purely
secretarial functions, authorizing it to open and answer official letters "but not to make
any Engagements that shall be binding on the United States." See notes 131-34 supra and
accompanying text.
255 4 RECoRDs 45-46 (Committee of Detail) (preliminary draft in the handwriting of
Edmund Randolph, with emendations by John Rutledge). Randolph originally listed as
"powers destined for the senate peculiarly" the following: "1. Mo make treaties of commerce. 2. to make peace. 3. to appoint the judiciary." Rutledge amended the second to
read "to make Treaties of peace. & Alliance," and he added a fourth: "to send Embassadors."
256 2 REcoRDs 183 (Article 9, section 1). Since officers were in! general to be appointed

by the President on his own authority, the vesting elsewhere of the appointment of.am-

.1974]

SEPARATION OF POWERS

not so much as mentioned. Though he was to be the channel of communication with foreign powers, he was not even called upon to nominate, let alone to appoint, the ambassadors to be sent abroad. Even the
President's veto power over congressional legislation was not extended
to senatorially negotiated treaties. 257
One final point about the committee's draft constitution bears
remark. In the Constitution of the United States as finally adopted,
Article II begins: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States." 258 It is frequently argued that the phrase "executive Power" was designed to convey, through its own intrinsic force
and without any additional specific grant, the power to conduct the
foreign relations of the United States. 259 The English definition of
bassadors and Supreme Court judges signified that these two classes of officials were not to
be considered agents of or dependent on the President. The same independence was provided for the Treasurer, who was to be appointed by ballot of the two legislative houses
and thus made responsible to the appropriating rather than to the expending branch of
government. Id. at 182 (Article 7, section 1. clause 9). This special provision respecting a
Treasurer was struck out only three days before the end of the Convention. Id. at 614
(Madison's notes, September 14).
257 The veto power applied to "[e]very bill, which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate." Id. at 181 (Article 6, section 13). Treaties obviously do
not fit that description. As pointed out below, it took subsequent action by the Convention
to give the President a role in treaty-making and to make his approval indispensable.
258 U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
259 The first fully-developed argument along these lines would appear to have been
that which Hamilton offered six years after the Convention in the "Pacificus" essays. See
note 254 supra. He took the position there (foreshadowed neither in his speeches to the
Convention nor in The Federalist)that the vesting of the "executive Power" in the President constituted a "comprehensive grant," which included not only the powers explicitly
mentioned, but major powers connected with foreign affairs. See 15 HAMLTON 38-39
("Pacificus" No. 1). The executive department, commented Hamilton, was
the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign Nations . .' the interpreter of the National Treaties in those cases in which the Judiciary is not competent, that is in the cases between Government and Government . . . that Power,
which is charged with the Execution of the Laws, of which Treaties form a part
[and] that Power which is charged with the command and application of the
Public Force.
Id. at 38 (emphasis in original). These powers were "subject only to the exceptions and
qu[a]lificationswhich are expressed in the instrument," namely the participation of the
Senate in appointments, its participation in treaty-making, and the power of Congress to
declare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal. Id. at 39 (emphasis in original). "With
these exceptions," he wrote, "the EXECUTIVE POWER of the Union is completely lodged
in the President." Id. at 40 (emphasis in original).
Though the grants of power to the executive could properly be derived by implication
from general terms and were to be construed broadly, any grants to legislative bodies of
war and treaty-making powers-the "exceptions" to executive authority-were to be limited
to those expressly mentioned and were to be construed with the utmost strictness. Hamilton's language is worth quoting exactly:
It deserves to be remarked, that as the participation of the senate in the
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executive power is often cited as proof of this contention. But a quite
different conception of executive power prevailed in the Convention,
as can be seen by a careful scrutiny of the draft constitution of the
making of Treaties and the power of the Legislature to declare war are exceptions
out of the general "Executive Power" vested in the President, they are to be construed strictly-and ought to be extended no further than is essential to their
execution.
Id. at 42. Hamilton, it is true, was defending Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of
April 22, 1793, which was designed to keep the United States from involvement in the war
that had resulted from the French Revolution. He could, therefore, suggest a beguiling
antithesis:
It is the province and duty of the Executive to preserve to the Nation the blessing of peace. The Legislature alone can interrupt those blessings, by placing the
Nation in a state of War.
Id. In developing this notion of the essentially pacific nature of executive power, Hamilton came close to denying to the President the authority to initiate any sort of belligerent
action. It is, he wrote, "the duty of the Executive to preserve Peace till war is declared." Id.
at 40. In reality, however, his argument would permit the President on his own authority
to put the nation into a position that would make war inescapable. Thus he wrote:
[T]he right of the Executive, in certain cases, to determine the condition of the
Nation . . . may consequentially affect the proper or improper exercise of the
Power of the Legislature to declare war..... [by] establish[ing] an antecedent
state of things which ought to weigh in the legislative decisions.
Id. at 41-42. He asserted unequivocally that the power to declare war "naturally includes
the right of judg[ing] whether the Nation is under obligations to rn[ake] war or
not," and that since "the Legislature can alone declare war," it "can alone actually transfer the nation from a state of Peace to a state of War." Id. at 40, 42.
In refuting Hamilton, Madison quoted The Federalist Nos. 69 & 75, both written by
Hamilton and both contradicting his new doctrine. In the first of the "Helvidius" letters,
Madison examined Hamilton's contention that "'the participation of the senate in the
making of treaties'" is one of the " 'exceptions out of the general executive power, vested
in the president."' Such an assertion implied (as Madison pointed out with impeccable
logic) that in the absence of such an exception the treaty-making power would belong exclusively to the executive. I MADISON 613 ("Helvidius" No. 1) (quoting from 15 HAMILTON
42 ("Pacificus" No. 1))(emphasis added by Madison). In refutation Madison quoted Hamilton's statement in The Federalistthat the treaty-making power
"will be found to partake more of the legislative than of the executive character,
though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of either of them."
1 MADISON 620 ("Helvidius" No. 1) (quoting from THE FEDERALST No. 75, at 466 (A. Hamilton)) (emphasis added by Madison). On a second point, Hamilton's inflation of the clause
empowering the President to receive ambassadors into a wholesale grant of authority over
the conduct of foreign relations, Madison quoted from the 69th number of The Federalist,
Hamilton's assurance that this power was "'more a matter of dignity than of authority"'
and would "'be without consequence in the administration of the government."' I MADISON 632 ("Helvidius" No. 3) (quoting from THE FE ALIgr No. 69, at 433 (A. Hamilton))
(emphasis added by Madison). Finally, Hamilton's general argument for comprehensive
presidential authority in negotiating treaties was met by Madison by quoting from Hamilton's 75th Federalist the paragraph concluding:
"The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human
virtue, which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate
and momentous a kind as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the
world to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be
a president of the United States."
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Committee of Detail. Article X of that draft, employing the same general phraseology as Article II of the completed Constitution, announced: "The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested
in a single person" to be styled the President. 26 0 In this document, the
immediate ancestor of the Constitution finally adopted, "executive
power" did not include, and could not have been supposed by any
member of the Convention to include, the crucial powers to "make
War" or to "make treaties" or to "appoint ambassadors," for these particular powers were expressly delegated to legislative bodies. Historically speaking, the American constitutional term "executive power"
cannot be defined by reference to English or other foreign usage. In
employing the phrase, as they did throughout the Convention and in
the completed Constitution, the framers consistently rejected many of
its traditional connotations. They did so by the simple act of explicitly
assigning to the legislative branch many of the powers which other systems labelled "executive." The original intent of the Constitution with
respect to the meaning of "executive power" can only be ascertained
by noting the kinds of authority that the framers withheld from the
executive as well as those they vouchsafed to it.
XIII.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION:

FINAL SIX WEEKS

OF COMPROMISE AND DECISION, AUGUST 6-SEPTEMBER

17, 1787

The report of the Committee of Detail came at a point some threefifths of the way through the labors of the Convention. Deliberations
had begun ten weeks and a half earlier, and exactly six weeks remained
before the Convention would wind up its work and submit the finished
Constitution to public consideration and ultimate ratification. During
this final period of debate every clause-one might almost say, every
word-came under scrutiny. Some important provisions were added,
but for the most part the Convention was engaged in examining and
either approving or modifying the specific details of the draft constitution which the Committee of Detail had prepared. 26' Thus, an objec1 MADIsoN 644-45 ("Helvidius" No. 4) (quoting from Tm FEDERALtsr No. 75, at 467-68
(A. Hamilton)) (emphasis added by Madison).
260 2 REcoRDs 185 (Article 10, section 1).
261 In general, the procedure was to take up each clause in order, but when controversy developed, the clause in question was likely to be postponed or referred to a committee for possible compromise. Moreover, topics were often brought forward in other
than their expected order because one subject could easily lead to another. Thus the
provision giving Congress the power to "make war" (Article 7, section 1, clause 14 of the
committee draft) came before the Convention in the regular course of the proceedings
on the 17th of August, and the one crucial decision, to change the wording to "declare

602

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:527

tive and accurate assessment of the amendments adopted during these
six final weeks of debate is absolutely essential if one is to understand
the intent of the framers. The crucial historical question is whether
the changes indicated an intention on the part of the Convention to
alter fundamentally the distribution of authority in foreign affairs
which the Committee of Detail had proposed in its original draft of
the 6th of August, or whether the changes represented mere modifications of detail, leaving essentially unaltered the balance between legislative and executive power which the committee had sought to establish.
The Power of Congress to "Make" or to "Declare" War
The first of the decisive debates occurred on the 17th of August,
eleven days after the Committee of Detail presented its report. At this
time the provision delegating to Congress the power to "make war"
came up for discussion. 262 The first issue raised was whether Congress

as a whole was the proper body to decide on war. Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina favored vesting the war power in the Senate alone, because, as he explained, that body would be responsible for making
war," was reached that day. See notes 262-71 infra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the day's proceedings. However the point had been touched upon briefly four days
earlier in connection with another issue. See 2 REcoRDs 279 (Madison's notes). For another
example the crucial debate on the treaty-making power (Article 9, section 1) took place on
three separate occasions: first on the 15th of August when general relations between
Senate and House were under discussion, then on the 23rd of August when the treaty
clause was actually reached, and finally on the 7th and 8th of September when the Convention considered the report of a committee to which the controversial issues had been
referred. Id. at 297-98 (Madison's notes, August 15), 382-83 (Journal, August 23), 392-94
(Madison's notes), 395 (McHenry's notes), 533-34 (Journal, September 7), 53841, 543 (Madison's notes), 544 (Journal, September 8), 547-50 (Madison's notes). The so-called Brearley
committee, which revised the treaty clause, reported on September 4. Id. at 495 (Journal,
September 4), 498-99 (Madison's notes). See notes 414-20 infra and accompanying text.
262 The proceedings are reported in three sources: (1) the Journal, which records
five votes three of them by roll call), but no speeches; (2) Madison's notes, which summarize
remarks and motions by seven delegates, and report three votes; and (3) McHenry's notes,
which provide a 24-word summary, without speakers' names. 2 REcoRDs 313-14 (Journal),
318-19 (Madison's notes), 320 (McHenry's notes). Two distinct questions were debated, and
in Madison's notes, the speeches overlap, perhaps because they have not been set down in
the order in which they were actually delivered. In the account in the text above, the
two sets of speeches are separately analyzed. On the question whether the legislature as
a whole was the proper repository for the power to make war, speeches were made
by Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler, Elbridge Gerry, Oliver Ellsworth, and George Mason.
Though Gerry's exclamation on this-point would seem to have been an immediate reaction to Butler's proposal vesting the war-making power in the President, Madison interpolates between them not only the motion of Madison and Gerry to change "make" to
"declare,".but also Roger Sherman's comment thereon.
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treaties and.wouldtherefore be "more-acqUainted with foreign affairs."
Furthermore, said Pinckney; action by both houses would make the
proceedings "too slow," particularly since the entire Congress "w[oul]d
meet but once a year." His colleague from the same state, Pierce Butler,
went further and favored "vesting the power in the President," who,
he was sure, "will not make war but when the Nation will support it."
Immediately an indignant New Englander, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, exclaimed that he "never expected to hear in a republic a
motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war."263 And a liberal Virginian, George Mason, author of that state's precedent-setting
Bill of Rights, chimed in, saying that he
was ag[ain]st giving the power of war to the Executive, because
not safely to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so
constructed as to be entitled to it.264
He said he "was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace." Arguing the same point, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut considered it an advantage, not a disadvantage, that declarations
of war might be slow in coming should action by the whole Congress
be required. The secrecy and dispatch that could be expected from a
smaller body like the Senate was valuable where "intricate & secret
negociations" were involved. But, argued Ellsworth, "[ilt sh[oul]d be
more easy to get out of war, than into it."' 26 5 No one appears to have
spoken in support of the position either of Pinckney or of Butler, and
the former's motion to strike out the whole clause was defeated with266
out a roll-call vote.
The power "to make war" having thus been emphatically denied
to the executive, the question arose whether a grant to Congress of an
exclusive power couched in such extremely comprehensive language
might not tie the President's hands as commander in chief in the event
of a surprise attack. Madison and Gerry therefore moved to alter the
word "make" to "declare," for the clearly announced purpose of "leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." Roger Sherman of Connecticut, however, took the position that a commander in
chief was empowered to resist an unexpected attack without further
authorization, and that there was danger in "narrowing" the exclusive
263
264

Id.
Id.

at 318.
at 319.

Id.
The Journal indicates that Pinckney's motion was rejected after the first vote of
the Convention on the proposed change from "make" to "declare" and before the second
vote, when the change was accepted. See id. at 313. See also note 268 infra.
265

266
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power of Congress to "make" war, because of the loophole it might
leave for the President to "commence" war. "The Executive," said
26 7
Sherman, "sh[oul]d be able to repel and not to commence war."
At this point in the discussion the Convention rejected the change
from "make" to "declare" by a vote of four states in favor to five
against. Immediately afterwards, however, a new argument was advanced by Rufus King of Massachusetts, who feared that the original
wording might encourage encroachments by Congress on the President's exclusive power of military command. His point was that the
phrase "make war" might be interpreted to mean that Congress had
power "to 'conduct' it," which was clearly "an Executive function."
King's argument convinced the Connecticut delegates and undoubtedly changed the votes of three other states as well, so that the motion
was reconsidered and the alteration to "declare" was adopted by a vote
26 8
of eight states to one.

The discussion ended with a reprise. Pinckney and Butler had
begun the debate by proposing to vest the war power elsewhere than
in the legislature as a whole. They returned to the fray with a pair of
motions. Pinckney moved to strike out the entire clause, but his motion was rejected without a roll call of the states. 269 Butler's proposition
was something of an about-face. The Convention having decided,
against his wishes, to allow Congress to declare war, Butler now moved
that the "power of peace" be placed there also. Gerry who had reacted
violently against Butler's first motion supported his second one. Even
so, a roll call brought negative votes from ten states and an affirmative
from none.270 Though the Journal recorded a final vote (but not a
267 Id. at

318.

The Journal records two separate votes on the question, both by roll call. The
change was first rejected, with the five states of New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland,
South Carolina, and Georgia making up the majority for the negative. When the same
question was repeated, only New Hampshire remained in opposition. Id. at 313-14. Madison reports only a single roll call, the eight to one vote, but with a change of a state in the
middle of the vote. According to him, the only negative votes at the beginning Were
those of New Hampshire and Connecticut, and the latter was the one that reversed its
stand. Madison interpolated a note at this point which read as follows:
On the remark by Mr. King that "make" war might be understood to
"conduct" it which was an Executive function, Mr. Elseworth [sic] gave up his
objection and the vote of Con[necticu]t was changed to-ay.
Id. at 319 (emphasis in original). Undoubtedly this was the remark that led to the second
vote as recorded in the Journal. Though the secretary was often careless, it is hardly
conceivable that he would have invented for the Journal a second complete roll call if
there had been only one.
269 Id. at 313, 319.
270 Id. at 313, 314. 319.
268
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roll-call one) for adoption of the clause as amended, James McHenry
reported that the day's session was "adjourned without a question on
the clause" and that final action took place the next day.2 71 Whichever the time, the matter was settled for good and all.
Rarely if ever has the alteration of a single word assumed so momentous a significance for constitutional interpretation. That it represented a deliberate and wholesale transfer from legislative to executive
hands of the power to involve the nation in war is the contention of
those who uphold the legitimacy of what Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
has labelled "The Imperial Presidency." 272 According to this interpretation, the Convention, on the 17th of August 1787, voted to divest
Congress of the power which the Articles of Confederation had described as the "right and power of determining on peace and war,"
and which the Committee of Detail had described as the power to
"make war." What it left in the hands of the legislature was little more
than an empty husk-the largely ceremonial function of declaring to
the world (should it appear desirable to do so) the existence of a war
to which the President had already committed the nation by exercising
his allegedly plenary control of diplomatic negotiations and his power
as commander in chief of the armed forces.
Such a sweeping interpretation will not hold water for a moment
if attention is paid to what was actually said and if the brief debate is
examined in proper perspective. Its brevity is worth noting. The entire
debate that resulted in altering "make war" to "declare war" occupied
the attention of the Convention for only a fraction of a day. It was the
last of four issues discussed on the 17th, and Madison's report of it
fills slightly less than a quarter of the space that he devoted in his notes
to that day's proceedings. By comparison, one of the other discussions
occupies close to a third of the space in Madison's record, and two of
the others involved a greater number of speakers than participated in
the war-power debate. 273 Though eight different members offered mo271 Id. at 313, 320. See id. at 333 (McHenry's notes, August 18). Madison's notes are
silent on the matter. See id. at 319.
272 A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
273 A detailed analysis follows. Quantitative data represents the inches of space in the
literal reprint of Madison's notes published by the Department of State in 3 U.S. BUREAU
OF ROLLS AND LIBRARY, DEP'T OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1786-1870, H.R. DOc. No. 529, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. (1900).
For reference, it should be noted that in this edition, the entire corpus of Madison's
notes (exclusive of introductions and appendices) occupies 765 pages; the portion following the report of the Committee of Detail on August 6 occupies 314 pages; and the proceedings of August 17 occupy 6 pages, amounting to 45-1/2 inches. The four debates of that
day were as follows: (1) on the method of appointing a treasurer, 6 different speakers, 2
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tions or comments on the making. of war,. ten felt impelled to speak on
the clause empowering the federal legislature to "subdue a rebellion
in any State." On the far more technical question of punishing felonies
on the high seas and other offenses of a specialized character, nine different delegates stated their views. This particular discussion was, in
fact, the longest of the day, and its outcome-like the outcome of the
war-power debate-was a change of wording. The draft of the Committee of Detail had empowered Congress to "declare the law and punishment" of these various offenses. After a discussion of the meaning
of various alternative terms-"declare," "designate," and "define"-and
after two roll-call votes, the provision emerged as a grant of power to
"define and punish" the same group of enumerated offenses. This concern with subtle shades of meaning, this careful refinement of language
in the interest of precision, furnished the context in which, later the
same day, the Convention voted to change "make war" to "declare
war."
Only by disregarding the statements made in the Convention and
looking instead at definitions offered in quite different contexts, at
other times and places, and for dissimilar purposes, is it possible to
construct an argument reducing to a mere formality the power to
"declare war," which the Convention continued to vest in Congress.
European writers on the law of nations pointed out how the Romans
had punctiliously announced to a future enemy their intention to
engage in war if their demands were not met, and these authors also
referred with approval to the custom, once widely respected, of sending heralds to an enemy's capital to declare war.274 A declaration of
war in this sense was obviously a mere announcement or proclamation, notifying an enemy of a decision reached elsewhere, by constitutional processes that were none of his affair. The purpose of such a
roll calls, totalling 6-1/4 inches, or 13.7% of the space for the day; (2) on the punishment
of offenses on the high seas, etc., 9 speakers, 2 roll calls, totalling 14-3/4 inches, or 32.4%;
(3) on subduing rebellion in a state, 10 speakers, 2 roll calls, totalling 11-1/2 inches, or
25.3%;- and, (4) on the war power, 7 speakers, 3 roll calls, totalling 13 inches, or 28.6%.
In addition, two provisions of the draft were adopted without debate. See id. at 548-54.
274 See, e.g., E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 473 (1792). In a meticulously documented article, Charles A. Lofgren has reviewed the statements on a declaration of war
contained in the writings of seven leading 17th and 18th century authorities on the law
of nations, namely: Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, Burlamaqui, Thomas Rutherforth, Richard
Lee, and Bynkershoek. See Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 689-93 (1972). It is interesting to note that in the index
to Farrand's collection of the records of the Federal Convention, there are four page-references to Vattel, but none to such towering figures as Grotius, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui. Montesquieu was quoted far more often, of course, but he is not usually classified
among the technical writers on the law of nations.
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declaration'was simply to give legality to:the hostile acts that would
follow. Writers on the law of nations were concerned with declarations
of war primarily as they figured in the relations between sovereign
states. In this context, therefore, a declaration of war was by very definition a formality, whether regarded as essential to the proper conduct
of international relations or recognized (as it was beginning to be) as
a custom that had fallen into desuetude.
The status in international law of a declaration of war, and the
question whether such a declaration was still required, were not, however, the issues before the Federal Convention on the 17th of August
1787. The delegates had in mind the impact domestically of a declaration of war, and they were being called upon to decide a question of
internal constitutional authority-namely, the, proper location of the
authority to decide whether to commit the nation, its people, and its
resources to the direful hazards of war. In terms of its international
implications a declaration of war might be viewed as a pure formality,
more or less optional. In terms of its domestic implications, however,
a declaration of war constituted a decision of momentous importance.
To make that decision was to put the whole country on a wartime footing and to impose heavy added responsibilities and stringent new restrictions on every citizen.
Writers on the law of nations recognized this fact, despite their
primary concern with the relations between states. The Swiss authority
Emeric de Vattel wrote about the formalities used by one sovereign in
declaring war on another, but before he turned to such technical matters he had this to say:
A right of so great moment, the right of judging whether a nation
has a real cause of complaint; whether its case allows of using
force, and having recourse to arms; whether prudence admits,
and whether the welfare of the state demands it; this right, I say,
can belong only to the body of the nation, or to the sovereign, its
representative ...
Thus the sovereign power has alone authority to make war.
But as the different rights which constitute this power, originally
resident in the body of the nation, may be separated or limited
according to the will of the nation .. .we are to seek the power
of making war in the partictilar constitution of each state.27 5
Even more directly to the point was the statement of Chancellor James
Kent of New York, whose Commentaries on American Law (first published in 1826-30 but an outgrowth of lectures delivered as early as
275 E. DE VATrEL,

supra note 274, at 439 (citation omitted).
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1794) were rivalled in authority only by those of Joseph Story. In the
opening part of the work, treating "Of the Law of Nations," Kent described, as Vattel had done, the traditional practice of communicating
a public declaration of war to the enemy, and he noted its growing
disuse:
But, though a solemn declaration, of previous notice to the
enemy, be now laid aside, it is essential that some formal public
act, proceeding directly from the competent source, should announce to the people at home their new relations and duties growing out of a state of war .

.

. As war cannot lawfully be com-

menced on the part of the United States, without an act of Congress, such an act is, of course, a formal official notice2 7 to
all the
world, and equivalent to the most solemn declaration. 6
Even though Alexander Hamilton by 1793 was constructing a theory
of the Presidency that purported to endow that officer with a vast inherent power in foreign affairs, over and above those expressly delegated to him, he continued (even in the essay that broached his new
doctrine) to interpret the exclusive congressional power to declare war
as signifying that "the Legislature . . . can alone actually transfer the
nation from a state of Peace to a state of War.

'277

As in these examples, so throughout the discussions in the Convention and afterwards, the phrase "declare war" was universally understood as synonymous with what the Articles of Confederation had
described as "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining
on . . . war.

'278

No contemporary commentator or pamphleteer, so

far as I can discover, suggested that there was any significant difference
between "declaring" war and making the "determination" to engage
in it.279 Indeed, it would have been inconsistent and absurd to bestow
upon Congress the power to "declare" war, if "declare" meant the act
1 J, KENT, supra note 190, at 52-53.
15 HAMILTON 42 ("Pacificus" No. 1).
278 See text accompanying note 114 supra.
279 Charles Lofgren cites a number of contemporary statements in which such men
as Hamilton, Madison, Wilson, Jay, and Gerry used the word "declare" in the sense of
making the decision for war. See Lofgren, supra note 274, at 680-81 & nn.30-31, 684-85 &
nn.48 & 50. He comments that the words were used in a "loose sense" and constituted
a "deviation from international usage." Id. at 680 n.31, 695. In the absence of statements
by the framers showing that any of them believed that the word "declare" had to be
understood in a narrower or stricter sense, applicable only to the- formalities involved
in announcing a state of war, then this evidence from contemporary usage would seem to
establish the meaning of the term in the Constitution, regardless of technical definitions
found only in treatises on international law. Accordingly Lofgren's conclusion that a
contemporary would find it merely "plausible" to equate "declare" with "commence"
strikes me as over-cautious and consequently somewhat unhistorical. See id. at 695.
276

277
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of communicating a warning or a notice to the enemy. Communicating
with foreign powers was an executive function not a legislative one, as
the framers saw it.280 Only if the power to "declare" war meant the
authority to decide whether and when the United States should engage
in war would there have been any point in listing it in the catalogue
of congressional functions alongside the power to "raise and support
28
Armies." '
The alteration from "make" to "declare" was, in fact, simply one
example of a process of textual refinement that was going forward continuously during the final weeks of the Convention-one aspect of the
unremitting quest for words that would convey exactly the intended
shades of meaning. The phrase "make war" was marred by two types
of ambiguity. It was possible to interpret it as an implied limitation
on the President's power to act in the emergency of a sudden attack.
Fear of such enshacklement prompted the motion to change the wording, as the movers themselves made clear. But the phrase might also be
interpreted in such a way as to encourage Congress to usurp the President's power of military command in wartime. Fear of this, expressed
by Rufus King, tipped the balance, and the change was made. Both
ambiguities were thus removed. Only in the eyes of much later generations of interpreters, not (so far as the records show) in the eyes of
contemporaries, was a new ambiguity introduced-the possibility that
"declare war" might be interpreted simply as the performance of an
obsolete ritual of international intercourse, and nothing more.
Any assumption that the Convention intended to transfer the
power to "make war" from legislative to executive hands is completely
untenable. No transfer took place. The phrase "make war" was simply
eliminated, outright and forever. Not a single phrase in the executive
article was altered by the vote taken on the 17th of August. Furthermore no new authority of a military character was added thereafter to
the catalogue of executive powers furnished by the Committee of Detail. The changes that were made were all in an opposite direction.
Three new restrictions were in fact placed on presidential military
authority as a result of the same continuing process of textual refinement that produced the change from "make" to "declare."
The Articles of Confederation had given Congress the power "of
granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace" 2S2-something that Blackstone described as the authorization of "an incomplete
280
281
282

See note 254 supra.
See US. CONST. art. I,§ 8,cls.
11 & 12.
See text accompanying note 118 supra.
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*state of hostilities' 28 - and that- hetreated as part of the royal prerogative. In its draft constitution the Committee of Detail forbade the individual states to grant such letters284 but failed to indicate where the
power should reside. Thus it might conceivably be regarded as a mere
adjunct to the power of the commander in chief. To forestall the possibility of such an interpretation, Elbridge Gerry, who had spoken out
on the 17th of August against empowering "the Executive alone to
declare war," brought forward the very next day a proposition to add
to the list of legislative powers that of granting letters of marque and
reprisal.2

1

5

On the 5th of September the Convention voted without a

dissenting voice to make this new phrase part of the clause dealing
28 6
with a declaration of war.

A second change was made in the provision of the draft constitution which had designated the President as commander in chief not
only of the forces raised by the federal government but also, without
restriction, of "the Militia of the Several States." 287 On the 27th of
August the Convention voted, six states to two, to restrict the President's command of the state militia to occasions when it was "called
into the actual service of the United States,"2 8 the principle having
already been established that the authority "[t]o call forth the aid of
2 89
the militia" was a legislative not an executive power.
In the third place, the Convention, as far back as the 1st of June,
had decided that the executive should make appointments "to offices in
cases not otherwise provided for." 290 That this would apply to military
officers became clear in the report of the Committee of Detail, which
made the President commander in chief, altered the wording of the appointments provision slightly so that he was empowered to "appoint
officers in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution,"
and included no specific constitutional provision for the appointment
of military and naval officers. 291 On the 7th of September, after a heated
debate on the appointing power, the Convention adopted a committee
report which made the appointment of "all other officers" (except "in283

See text accompanying note 21 supra.

284 2 REcoRDs 187 (Article 12).
285 Id. at 322 (Journal), 326, 328 (Madison's notes).
286 Id. at 505 (Journal), 508, 509 (Madison's notes).
287 Id. at 185 (Article 10, section 2).
288 Id. at 422, 426 (Journal), 426-27 (Madison's notes).
289 Id. at 182 (Article 7,-sectiOn 1, clause 17).

290 See text accompanying note 170 supra.
291 See 2 REcoRDs 185 (Article 10, section 2).
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.-ferior" ones): contingent on .senatorial advice and coisent; "2 .The commander in chief was thus obliged to submit for senatorial scrutiny-the
names of those whom he proposed to appoint as officers to carry out his
military commands.
These several decisions imposing additional limitations on the
executive make it clear that the Convention was not disposed casually
and lightly to enlarge the war powers of the President. To be sure,
some additional authority did accrue to him-or at least some implied
powers of his were validated-by the action of the Convention in altering "make war" to "declare war." Precisely what power was thereby
recognized as belonging to the commander in chief? The answer is perfectly clear from the record of the debate. The change was proposed
for the sole purpose of "leaving to the Executive the power to repel
293
sudden attacks."
Now a strictly analogous power had been left in the hands of the
indiVidual states, despite the delegation to the federal Congress of "the
sole and exclusive right and power of determining on . . . war." This
reserved power of a state to take military action in an emergency was
not left to mere implication (as was the President's emergency power),
but was spelled out in an express constitutional provision. Such an
exception was contained in the original Articles of Confederation,
which forbade any state to engage in war without congressional consent
unless such state be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have
received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such state, and the danger is so imminent
as not to admit of a delay till the united states in congress assembled can be consulted ....294
In its draft constitution of the 6th of August 1787, the Committee of
Detail took over this clause from the Articles, merely striking out the
reference to the Indians and broadening the permission so as to cover
imminent danger of invasion from any source. 295 At the next to the last
day's session of the Convention the clause was "remoulded" into the
slightly more concise form in which it appears at the very end Of Article I of the finished Constitution: "No State shall, without the Con292 See id. at 495 (Journal, September 4) (section 4 of Committee Report), 539-40
(Madison's notes, September 7).
293 Id. at 318 (Madison's notes, August 17). This is Madison's explanation of the motion he made himself.
294 19 JCC 216 (final draft, Article 6).
295 See 2 REcoRDs 187 (Article 13).
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sent of Congress . . . engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."29 6
The power of the President "to repel sudden attacks" was a similar
exception to the otherwise plenary authority of Congress to declare
war. In his case the exception was implicitly acknowledged rather than
expressly granted, and was thus less firmly grounded than the power
that a state might claim. In any case, there is nothing in the records
of the Convention to indicate that the President's implied power was
so different from a state's expressed power that it would extend to situations less exigent than actual invasion or the "imminent Danger"
thereof.
Only if a surprise attack should force war upon the nation would
there be any diminution of the intended power of Congress to weigh
and decide the question of a resort to war. But the act of repelling such
an attack would not signify that the power of decision had passed from
Congress to the President; it would mean that the enemy had taken the
decision out of the hands of both. If foreign danger merely threatened
and time for deliberation still remained, contemporaries never
doubted that the power to determine on war belonged to Congress as
it had from the beginning of the Revolution. Indeed the placement
of this power firmly in legislative hands represented one crucial point
of difference between the American republic and the British monarchy, according to such advocates of the new Constitution as Hamilton2 97 and James Wilson. The latter, indeed, offered the quaint argument that the Americans were restoring to its original purity the
Anglo-Saxon constitution that had existed before the Norman Conquest. In his Lectures on Law, delivered some three years after the
Convention, Wilson remarked:
As the law is now received in England, the king has the sole
prerogative of making war. On this very interesting power, the
constitution of the United States renews the principles of government, known in England before the conquest. This indeed ...
may be accounted the chief difference between the Anglo-Saxon
and the Anglo-Norman government. In the former, the power of
making peace and war was invariably possessed by the wittenagemote .... In the latter, it was transferred to the sovereign ....
There is a pleasure in reflecting on such important renovations of the ancient constitution of England. We have found, and
we shall find, that our national government is recommended by the
296 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. See 2 REcoRDs 626 (Madison's notes, September 15).
297 See TuE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 430-31 (A. Hamilton).
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antiquity, as well as by the excellence, of some of its leading

principles.2 98

The Treaty Power, Sectionalism, and the Two-Thirds Rule
The counterpart of the power to "make war" (or to "declare" it)
was the power to "make peace." The Articles of Confederation had
linked the two powers in the single phrase that granted Congress the
"right and power of determining on peace and war."29 9 The Committee of Detail, however, not only separated the two kinds of power, but
also used different language for the latter, speaking instead of a "power
to make treaties."3 00 This was not a narrower but a more inclusive
phrasing of the matter, for the new clause comprised commercial treaties and alliances as well as agreements ending a war. The kind of
treaty most needed by the United States in the years following the
acknowledgment of independence was the kind that would open up
trade with other nations, especially with the one-time mother country,
Britain. When treaty-making was debated in the Convention, therefore, treaties of commerce were clearly the prime concern of most delegates-not only of those who felt that such agreements were vital to
the economic welfare of the nation, but also of those who feared an
adverse impact on the economic interests of their own state or section.
The priority of trade agreements in the thinking of the Convention
was reflected in one of the earliest memoranda drawn up within the
Committee of Detail-a memorandum that dealt first of all with "treaties of commerce," and then, separately and thereafter, with "treaties
' 30
of peace or alliance. '
This preoccupation with the effect of treaties upon domestic economic interests underlay all discussions of the treaty power in the final
weeks of the Convention, rendering these debates quite different in
character and motivation from those over the war power, and pushing
far off to the periphery of attention the question of the role that the
President might properly play in the process of treaty-making. This
relative indifference to the latter question can be demonstrated in
quantitative terms. Durifig the three debates that took place on the
treaty clause--on the 23rd of August and the 7th and 8th of September
-a total of fifty speeches were delivered, by sixteen different members.
298 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 433-34 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967) (footnote omitted).
299 See text accompanying note 114 supra.
300 2 R coRns 183 (Article 9, section 1).
301 4 REcoRDs 44, 45-46 (memorandum in handwriting of Edmund Randolph, with
emendations by John Rutledge).
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In only eight of these speeches on .treaty-making, delivered by only five
of the sixteen speakers, was the President mentioned in anyway whatever. By contrast, more than two-thirds of all the speeches (thirty-six
out of fifty), by three-fourths of all the speakers (twelve out of sixteen),
dealt with two interrelated issues affecting the balance of power within
the legislative body engaged in- treaty-making. 302 One question was
whether responsibility for treaties ought not to be vested in both houses
of Congress jointly, rather than in the Senate alone. The other was
whether a simple majority could be entrusted with treaty-making
or whether a two-thirds vote should be required. Abstract though these
questions may appear, they were vitally significant to the members of
the Convention because of their economic and sectional implications.
The way that voting was managed would determine the weight that
each section could expect to have in determining trade policies that
could directly affect its economic welfare.
The treaty clause took final shape in this context of sectional economic conflict. Only by recognizing the nature of the controversies
with which the question of treaty-making became inescapably intertwined can one correctly assess the significance of the various modifications made by the Convention in the draft it received from the Committee of Detail.
A Background o Suspicion: The Spanish Negotiations of 1786
The dangerous height to which sectional animosity might be raised
as a result of disagreements over treaty negotiations was dramatically
illustrated in the summer of 1786, a year before the meeting of the
Constitutional Convention. Under way were negotiations with Spain
involving two unsettled problems of long standing, together with the
possibility (essentially a new possibility) of a trade agreement. The
unsettled issues were of vital concern to the southern states. One was
the conflicting territorial claims of the two countries in the area between the Appalachians and the Mississippi, and between the 31st
parallel, which the United States claimed as its southern boundary,
and the mouth of the Ohio River, which represented Spain's northernmost claim.30 8 This was the area into which southerners expected popu802 See 2 RECORDs 392-94, 538, 540-41, 543, 547-50 (Madison's notes). The total of fifty
speeches comprised a certain number of seconding speeches which did not include actual
comment, but which did indicate the speaker's stand on the issue.
308 See maps showing various boundary claims and proposals for adjusting them opposite pages 41, 77, and 118, in S. BEMIS, PINCKNEY'S TREATY (1926). The first five chapters
of this-work provide a lucid historical account of the boundary and navigation questions
from the Peace of Paris of 1763 through the negotiations of 1786 that are discussed below.
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lation to flow, carrying their institutions, their ideas, and their agricultural way of life with them. "The people & strength of America,"
boasted Pierce Butler of South Carolina in the Convention, "are evidently bearing Southwardly & S[outh]westw[ar]dy.3' 0 4 Now the economic imperative for "men of the western waters" was freedom to export their products down the Mississippi River to the open sea. But
the lower course. of that river flowed through exclusively Spanish territory, and Spain refused to allow it to be treated as an international
waterway. The second outstanding conflict, therefore, involved the free
navigation of the Mississippi, and southerners considered it the sine
qua non of any agreement with Spain. Neither of these issues mattered
much to the merchants and shipowners of New England and the Middle States, some of whom were quite ready to let the West go its separate way, 05 and all of whom were anxious for an expansion of trade
across the Atlantic.
Exercising the authority that it had exercised since the beginning
of the Revolution, the Congress of the Confederation drew up the instructions to the American negotiator, John Jay, its Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In their original form, adopted on the 20th of July 1785,
these required Jay to communicate in advance every proposition he
was disposed to offer the Spanish envoy.30 6 Recognizing that such a
requirement would impede negotiation, Congress modified the instructions on the 25th of August, specifying the provisions that it regarded
as indispensable but allowing the Secretary flexibility in negotiating
other points. Whatever else might be agreed to, Jay was instructed
particularly to stipulate the right of the United States to their
territorial bounds, and the free Navigation of the Mississippi, from
07
the source to the Ocean.8
The Spanish envoy's instructions were equally strict; he was not
to concede the right to navigate the Mississippi. After almost a year
of futile negotiation, Jay began casting about for a way of obtaining
some modification of his instructions. On the 29th of May 1786, he
suggested that Congress appoint a secret committee "with power to
instruct and direct me on every point and subject relative to the proposed treaty with Spain."3 08 From Jay's point of view this would trans1 REcoRws 605 (Madison's notes, July 13).
LErra OF MEMBERS 458 (letter from Rufus King to Jonathan Jackson,
September 3, 1786).
804

805 See, e.g., 8

806

29 JCC 562 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1933).

Id. at 658.
•
808 30 JCC 323 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1934).
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fer to a committee the onus for any contravention of Congress' instructions. From Congress' point of view it meant surrendering to a
committee its constitutional responsibility for determining the foreign
policy of the United States. This Congress declined to do. Instead it
called upon Jay to explain the problems in a full meeting of the entire
Congress. This he did on the 3rd of August 1786, expatiating on the
advantages of a commercial treaty with Spain and proposing, as the
price to be paid, that the United States should agree to "forbear" navigation of the Mississippi during the 25 or 30-year life of the treaty. 809
A week later, on the 10th of August, the Massachusetts delegation filed
a motion to repeal the earlier instructions to Jay regarding the navigation of the Mississippi.3 1 0 This move precipitated the gravest sectional
crisis in the history of the Confederation-a crisis that led both sides
to ponder the possibility of separation into regional confederations. 811
The sectional alignment was unmistakably clear, and it held firm
through a succession of more than a dozen roll calls on the matter in
the late summer of 1786.312 Various amendments having been rejected,
Congress finally voted on the 29th of August to rescind the instruction
requiring Jay to insist on free navigation of the Mississippi. The crucial vote, like those on related questions that preceded or followed, was
seven states to five, Delaware being absent. The five states from Maryland southward through Virginia and the two Carolinas to Georgia
held firm on the original instructions. The seven states north of Mason
and Dixon's line voted with equal solidarity to allow Jay to "forbear"
the right to navigation in order to obtain a favorable trade agreement. 13
As often happens when struggles over policy mount to an irreconcilable level, the economic conflict was metamorphosed into a consti31 JCC 467-84. Jay's specific proposal is at id. at 480.
310 Id. at 510. The motion was made in committee of the whole, which was considering Jay's communication of August 3. The committee made its report on August 23,
recommending the repeal of the earlier instructions, but reinstating the requirement that
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs insist on a recognition.of American boundary claims in
the southwest. Id. at 566, 567. The dispute therefore involved the committee's recommendation that Jay be allowed to consent to "a forbearance of the use of the . . . river Mississippi" for an undetermined period of years. Id. at 566.
811 See, e.g., 8 Lrrr.ss OF MEMBERS 415-16, 421-25, 460-62 (letters from Theodore
Sedgwick to Caleb Strong, August 6, 1786; James Monroe to Patrick Henry, August 12,
1786; Monroe to Madison, September 3, 1786).
812 See 31 JCC 569, 570, 594, 595, 600, 601, 603, 604, 607, 609, 613, 621, 697 (August 28September 28). On a few of these votes there were absences, and occasionally a state delegation split its vote; but there was no actual switching of sides by any state.
309

83s

Id. at 595.
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tutional one. 1 4 The Articles of Confederation had prescribed that
Congress "shall never . . . enter into any treaties or alliances . . . un-

less nine states assent to the same." 315 The original instructions to Jay
had been voted when nine states were present; hence Congress would
be morally obligated to ratify any treaty that conformed to these instructions. Had Congress rescinded its instructions in order to break
off negotiations completely, then a simple majority would have sufficed,
for it would have indicated that nine states no longer supported the
plan. But Congress had not voted this kind of repeal. Instead it had
determined, with only seven states concurring, to abrogate not Jay's
authority to negotiate, but the restrictions on that authority. In effect
it had given him new and positive instructions to reach an agreement
on terms quite different from those originally sanctioned.
In the eyes of southern delegates this action was flagrantly unconstitutional. The point was fully argued in a resolution presented on
the last day of August by Charles Pinckney, who would sit in the next
year's Federal Convention. The repeal, Pinckney's proposed resolution
asserted,
has the effect of enlarging the powers of the .

.

. negotiator, and

granting him an Authority he did not possess under the former
instructions to which the assent of nine States is alone constitutionally competent under the Confederation .... 316
The right to make a treaty, however, "cannot be exercised by seven
states;" hence instructions voted by seven states have no standing as
"instructions constitutionally sanctioned by the authority required
under the confederation." 317 The proposed resolution ended by warning the Secretary for Foreign Affairs that any treaty he might negotiate
under the new instructions would be met by a refusal "to ratify and
confirm a compact formed under powers thus unconstitutional and incompetent."3 18 Though the resolution was defeated by the familiar vote
314 For a look at, in another context, the process by which conflicts over policy are
transformed under the pressure of crisis into constitutional issues, see the present author's
discussion in Bestor, The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 AM. HSsr.
REv. 327, 327-28 (1964).
315 19 JCC 220 (Article 9).
816 31 JCC 611.
817 Id. at 611, 612.
318 Id. at 612. The same resolution had been offered the preceding day, and an excised passage in Pinckney's manuscript shows that it had been drawn up while the motion
to alter the instructions was still pending. See id. at 598. Two different procedures were
used to defeat'the resolution on the two successive days, and additional parliamentary maneuvers were subsequently employed to prevent its being brought up again. See id. at 600.
613, 621, 696 (votes taken August 30 & 31, September 1 & 28). On September 28, Congress
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of seven states to five, the warning lost none of its potency, for the five
protesting states could always refuse to ratify, whatever the fate of their
resolution. And their refusal would make it impossible to muster the
requisite nine affirmative votes.
.
• The memory of this bitter controversy colored all discussions of
the treaty-making clause in the Federal Constitutional Convention of
the following year. A two-thirds rule-that is to say, a rule requiring
approval by a two-thirds vote instead of a simple majority-became
the central issue. 319 Such a rule had been applied to all major questions
under the Articles of Confederation, and in the most extreme of its
possible forms. Required were the affirmative votes of nine states-two-thirds of all those in the Union, not two-thirds of those whose
delegates might happen to be present and voting on a particular occasion. In the Constitutional Convention of 1787 an equally iron-clad
rule was desired by most southern delegates, still distrustful of the
bloc of seven northern and eastern states that had been prepared to
bargain away the vital interest of the south and west in the free
navigation of the Mississippi. On the other hand, the commercial states
were convinced that a two-thirds rule would permit a minority to
extort concessions from the majority by threatening to block some
measure regarded by the latter as vital. In the end a compromise was
reached. The finished Constitution applies a two-thirds rule to treatymaking, but in the form least capable of operating as an automatic and
even refused to lift the injunction of secrecy on the Spanish negotiations to permit
delegates to communicate information to their state legislatures and executives. Id. at 697.
The Convention, of course, was fully aware of what had gone on, for many of its
members had been in Congress at the time. The ratifying conventions of the states,
however, still had to be briefed in 1788. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVEAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTUTION 333-66, 499-516 (2d ed. J.
Elliot 1836) (discussion in the Virginia convention, June 13-18, 1788) [hereinafter cited as
DEBATES].

319 In the midst-of the discussion of ratification in the summer of 1788, Hugh Williamson, one of the delegates from North Carolina, pointed out
that there is a Proviso in the new Sistem [sic] which was inserted for the express
purpose of preventing a majority of the Senate . . . from giving up the Mississippi.
It is provided that two thirds of the Members present in the senate shall be
required to concur in making Treaties and if the southern states attend to their
Duty, this will imply 2/3. of the States in the Union together with the President,
a security rather better than the present 9 States especially as Vermont & the
Province of Main[e] may be added to the Eastern Interest .
$ R~coRws 306-07 (letter from Williamson to Madison, June 2, 1788). This private letterreminded Madison of a. point which he might make in meeting the rumor then circulating in Kentucky (still part of. Virginia) to .the effect that "in case ofa new Gov[ernmenlt;
the Navigation, of the. Mississippi 'would infallibly be given up."' Id. at 306.
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absolute bar to action, the concurrence required being that of two0
thirds of the Senators present.82
The crisis of 1786 over negotiations with Spain made the twothirds rule the bone of contention whenever the :treaty-making power
was discussed during the final six weeks of the Federal Convention of
1787. It all but crowded out any discussion of the role of the executive in treaty-making. But the crisis of 1786 affected the discussion of
the latter question in an even more important way. Had there been
any disposition to transfer to the executive branch the authority to
determine the main lines of foreign policy and to leave to a legislative
body merely the power to approve or reject a treaty once made, such
an arrangement was rendered quite unthinkable by the events of 1786.
The five southern states distrusted Jay, a New Yorker, for having suggested a change in his instructions with respect to the navigation of
the Mississippi. That they would have consented to vest in an independent executive the power to write his own instructions is inconceivable. For their part, the commercial states had used their
majority for the purpose of rewriting the instructions, because the
policy involved was one which they favored. But they did not propose
that the power to determine that policy should be taken from the
hands of the legislature and handed over, with no strings attached, to
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The majority and minority were in
agreement on one point-that foreign policy should be determined
by legislative deliberation and that the executor of that policy should
be the agent of the legislature, bound by the instructions it formulated.
Views of John Jay on Legislative Participationin Foreign Affairs
Nor did the Secretary himself, John Jay, hold a different view. He
had been many times frustrated by the fluctuations of opinion in
Congress 3 21 by its frequent periods of paralyzing inaction, and by the
parochialism that put national interests at the mercy of sectional
rivalry. If anyone, Jay might have been expected to favor a transfer of
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
321 Congress was fully as inconsistent as Jay in its changing views on the question
of free navigation of the Mississippi. When Jay went to Spain as envoy in 1780, he took
with him instructions to insist on the right of navigation. In 1781, over his objections, he
was instructed to waive the demand if necessary to .obtain an alliance. See S. BEMIS, supra
note 303, at 29-34. The uproar in 1786, when he.felt it necessary to recommend.a 'forbearance" of the right, was hardly fair, given this ambiguous record..... .
. .
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the power of decision on foreign policy to an executive officer charged
with conducting foreign relations on his own authority rather than in
accord with instructions from Congress. Jay, however, advocated no
such thing. In the pre-Convention discussions of constitutional reform, as we have seen, his major concern was to secure state compliance with federal treaty obligations, and he sought the answer (as
the Convention finally did also) through a strengthening of judicial
3 22
not of executive power.
Jay was, of course, profoundly interested in measures that would
improve the conduct of foreign affairs. His own views concerning
what was desirable were expressed most clearly in 1788 in the 64th
number of The Federalist,where he not only gave his own interpretation of the relationship that the new Constitution intended to establish between the Senate and the President in the conduct of foreign
affairs, but also indicated clearly that the arrangement accorded with
his own view of what the situation required. At bottom, what he
favored and what he looked for was not some by-passing of legislative
deliberation and decision-making, but some reorganization that would
insure better informed, less mutable, and more responsible judgments
from the body charged with determining policy.
Jay's answer could, in classical terminology, be termed aristocratic, but not, in any legitimate sense, monarchical. He believed that
decisions on foreign policy should not be entrusted to "a popular assembly, composed of members constantly coming and going in quick
succession," but should be vested in a body made up of "those who
best understand our national interests," whose "reputation for integrity inspires and merits confidence," and who would be chosen for
terms long enough to "give them an opportunity of greatly extending
their political information and of rendering their accumulating experience more and more beneficial to their country." Under such
auspices, foreign policy-including "the affairs of trade and navigation"
-would "be regulated by a system cautiously formed and steadily
23
pursued."
Jay spoke always in the plural of the men with whom "the power
of making treaties may be safely lodged." 324 The President and the
Senators were all alike included. Within this partnership Jay recognized certain special tasks that the President would necessarily perform alone, but always as his part of a collective enterprise. In the
822 See text accompanying notes 147-52 supra.
823 THE FajELnusT No. 64, at 401-02 (J.
Jay).
324 Id. at 401.
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first place, Jay pointed out, information can often be obtained from
those who would not confide in even a small body like the Senate
but who would "rely on the secrecy of the President." Therefore, said
Jay,
although the President must, in forming [treaties] act by the advice
and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the3 25business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest.
In the second place, Jay pointed out, unexpected events-"[t]he loss
of a battle, the death of a prince, the removal of a minister"-may
suddenly "change the present posture and aspect of affairs," and require immediate action.
I

As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized
as they pass, and they who preside in either should be left in
326
capacity to improve them.

Fortunately, Jay went on,
[t]hose matters which in negotiations usually require the most
secrecy and the most dispatch, are those preparatory and auxiliary
measures which are not otherwise important in a national view,
than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the
negotiation.8 27
The power of the President to take care of details, in other words,
did not imply that he was to make the great decisions or in general
to conduct on his own authority the foreign relations of the nation.
Jay's carefully worded conclusion on the matter of ultimate responsibility in foreign affairs should be quoted in full:
Thus we see that the Constitution provides that our negotiations
for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from
talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on
the one hand, and from secrecy and dispatch, on the other.328
In this contribution to The Federalist Jay was of course examining the completed Constitution, not offering suggestions to those about
to frame it. As an interpretation of the original intent of the document, Jay's essay is of the highest importance. His diplomatic experience--commencing with his appointment as minister to Spain in 1779;
followed by his participation, as one of the commissioners, in the
negotiation of peace with Great Britain; and continuing, from 1784
325

Id. at 405.

826

Id.

827

Id. at 403-04.
Id. at 404.
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on, with his service as Secretary of the United States for the Department of Foreign Affairs829 -fitted him better than anyone else to judge
the intended effect of the new Constitution both on the actual process
of negotiation and on the character of the relationship that would have
to be maintained between executive and legislative authorities.
But the 64th number of The Federalist is also relevant for the
light it throws on attitudes prior to the Convention, in the aftermath
of the bitter treaty dispute of 1786. Jay was, by implication at least,
discussing that crisis and indicating his own answer to the problem of
reconciling sectional interests and assuaging sectional animosities. The
most important point was a negative one. Jay did not say in his essay
-and in the pre-Convention period he had never said-that matters
should be removed from the arena of congressional debate and decided
by firm executive fiat. Jay can be labelled a conservative, but his
brand of conservatism did not involve the exaltation of executive
power and the denigration of legislative debate. Jay concluded his
essay in The Federalist not by prescribing a set of procedures for
resolving conflicts over foreign policy, but by voicing his faith that
the unhampered deliberations of a body of reasonable men will produce acceptable, because reasonable, policies. Commenting on the
fear "that the President and Senate may make treaties without an equal
eye to the interests of all the States," Jay wrote as follows:
As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by
men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests
of their constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially while they continue to be careful
in appointing proper persons .... In proportion as the United

States assume a national form and a national character, so will the
good of the whole be more and more an object of attention ....
[A]s the Constitution has taken the utmost care that they
[the President and the Senators] shall be men of talents and integrity, we have reason to be persuaded that. the treaties they make
will be as advantageous as, all circumstances considered, could be
made .... 830

The Articles of Confederation had vested in Congress "the sole
and exclusive right and power of determining on peace," together
with the related powers of "sending and receiving ambassadors" and
of "entering into treaties and alliances."3'3 Though the crisis of 1786
329 This is the title used in his report of October 13, 1786, mentioned in the text
accompanying notes 147-49 supra. See 31 JCC 781.
830 TaE FxbEAx ,sT No. 64, at 405-06 U. Jay).
831 See text accompanying notes 115-16 supra.
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over negotiations with Spain had revealed how dangerous to the
effective conduct of foreign affairs the divisive force of sectionalism in
Congress could be, no important contemporary leader took the view
that some twentieth-century commentators on the Constitution ascribe to the framers-the view, namely, that because "a Congress
divided amongst different minority interests might . . . be loath to
give proper direction to a single necessary American course," it would
therefore be
proper to place the power of external affairs in a single person
where the probability of32minority weight would be much less
3
likely to have this effect.

No such idea was hinted at in the opening stages of the Convention.
On the contrary, in the debate of the 1st of June 1787, where the issue
was the power of making both war and peace, four speakers vehemently opposed granting either power to the executive, and no member took the other side.38 3 That treaty-making might be the peculiar
province of the upper house was perhaps implicit in the decision to
establish a bicameral legislature, and on the 26th of June, James Wilson
remarked in an off-hand way that since "[t]he Senate will probably be
the depositary of the powers" needed to avoid war and to obtain
treaties, that body ought "to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign
nations."334
The Committee of Detail and the Treaty Power
Without any evidence of doubt or hesitation, the Committee of
Detail accepted what it apparently conceived to be the double mandate
of the Convention-that treaties were to be made by a legislative body,
and that the appropriate body was the Senate. To make the control of
the latter perfectly clear, the committee draft also gave to'the Senate
the power to appoint ambassadors. It specified no role for the President
in diplomatic negotiations, save the ceremonial one of receiving
835
ambassadors.
The assignment of the treaty-making power exclusively to the
832 Goldwater, supra note 139, at 465-66.

333 See text accompanying notes 163-69 supra.
834 1 REcoRDs 426 (Madison's notes). Wilson's words were that every nation "has
wars to avoid & treaties to obtain from abroad." He was not, therefore, referring to the
power to make war (which he presumably would place in both houses), but the power
to conduct negotiations aimed at avoiding war (which he would place in the Senate).
835 2 REcoRDs 183, 185 (Article 9, section 1; Article 10, section 2). On the ceremonial
nature of this function, see note 254 supra.
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Senate-and even the omission of any reference to the President in
this connection--created no difference of opinion within the Committee of Detail. The truly controversial issue there (and afterwards
on the Convention ifloor) was whether treaties should require a twothirds vote of approval, as had been the case under the Articles of
Confederation, or whether a simple majority would suffice. This question was an integral part of a far more inclusive one: What kind of
balance should be struck, and how could it be upheld, between the
principle of majority rule and the legitimate demand of particular
economic interests and particular geographic regions (each, by definition, a minority of the whole) for protection of what they deemed
their vital interests?
In broad terms, some five principal devices can be incorporated
in a constitutional system to impose limits on the power of a majority.
An authority external to the legislature may be empowered to invalidate the oppressive acts of an overweening majority; judicial review and the presidential veto are examples of such devices. The
checks may, however, be built into the legislature itself. Thus bicameralism requires a given measure to run the gauntlet twice, in bodies
where interest groups are differently weighted. Alternatively one or the
other house can be excluded from participation in certain mattersfor example, money bills or treaties-thereby favoring one kind of
majority over another. More powerful as a check is a two-thirds rule,
which places a veto power in the hands of any minority that is able
to command a single vote more than one-third of the total. This check,
moreover, can vary in stringency, depending on whether the approval
of two-thirds of all the members is required (as under the old Articles),
or two-thirds of those present (which means that abstentions count
against the measure), or two-thirds of those voting. The most absolute
of all the possible checks is an outright prohibition of certain kinds
of enactments-that is to say, a ban on the use for specified purposes
of powers otherwise granted.
Under the Articles of Confederation certain of these checks were
completely unavailable, for there was no second chamber and no independent executive. Furthermore the delegated powers were so narrowly defined that it was hardly necessary to prohibit specific kinds
of enactments. Accordingly a two-thirds rule was the major check
built into the structure of the Confederation, and it was applied in
36
blanket fashion to every kind of major decision.
30 In one of its final paragraphs, Article 9 of the Confederation catalogued the things
that Congress "shall never" do "unless nine states assent to the same." 19 JCC 220.
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To end the paralyzing effect of this blanket rule was one of the
objectives of those who brought about the meeting of the Convention.
The prompt decision of that body to create a bicameral legislature
and an independent executive armed with a veto brought two new
checks into operation, lessening the need for so drastic a one as the
two-thirds rule. In the resolutions turned over to the Committee of
Detail on the 26th of July, which summed up the work of the first
two months of the Convention, a two-thirds vote was required only
for the overriding of a presidential veto. 837
The Convention had decided, however, to vest in Congress for
the first time a broad sweep of powers in the economic realm, notably
taxing and other financial powers and the power to regulate foreign
and interstate commerce 38 When, therefore, the Committee of Detail commenced to spell out the particulars of these grants it was
obliged to decide what restrictions, if any, should be placed on the
right of a majority to wield powers that could so easily be used to
the detriment and even the ruin of minority economic and sectional
concerns. The central problem of the final six weeks of the Convention
was to achieve a balance, satisfactory to all competing groups, between
the powers needed to advance national purposes and the restraints
needed to prevent injury to regional interests.
Within the Committee of Detail various memoranda and tentative drafts circulated, two being of particular importance. The earliest
was a document in the handwriting of Edmund Randolph of Virginia,
with emendations by John Rutledge of South Carolina-the two southern members of the five-man committee. 3 9 The southern states had
found themselves a minority of five in the bitter struggle of 1786 over
337 2 REcoRDs 132 (Committee of Detail). The way was left open for some such requirement in connection with the admission of new states. See id. at 133. It was also
expected that amendments to the Constitution would require more than a simple majority,
though the resolutions did not spell out the procedure. Id.
338 The resolution turned over to the Committee of Detail was actually phrased in
even more sweeping terms. Congress would be empowered
to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in
those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the
Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual
Legislation.
Id. at 131-32. It was perfectly clear that this included (and transcended) the specific grant
of powers to tax and to "pass Acts for the regulation of trade & commerce as well with
foreign nations as with each other," which had been detailed in the New Jersey Plan
of June 15. 1 id. at 243 (Madison's notes). The Committee of Detail give these two powers
first place in the enumeration of legislative powers in the draft constitution. See 2 id. at 181
(Article 7, section 1, clauses I & 2).
339 4 REcoRDs 37-51 (Committee of Detail).
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the Spanish negotiations, and in other controversies as well. As might
be expected, therefore, the Randolph/Rutledge draft applied the various available checks on majority action to a wide range of powers
having economic and regional implications. It proposed an absolute
constitutional ban on the levying of export duties34 -a form of taxation that would fall almost exclusively on the staples produced on
southern plantations and sold on a world market. Likewise prohibited
outright was any federal measure that might interfere with the continued importation of slaves, 8 41 this being an uncompromisable demand of South Carolina and Georgia.8 42 What particularly characterized the Randolph/Rutledge draft, however, was its rigorous application of a two-thirds rule to every measure with a potential economic
impact, whether a statute or a treaty. Cross-references, indeed, tied
these seemingly disparate matters together. To start with, a two-thirds
rule was applied to navigation acts, 8 43 which, if and when adopted,

would undoubtedly give preference to American ships, thus increasing freight rates for southern exporters by excluding foreign competition. Recognizing that navigation acts were not the only form that
potentially discriminatory commercial legislation might take, Randolph and Rutledge went on to say that "this rule [i.e., the two-thirds
requirement] shall prevail, whensoever the subject shall occur in any
act. '3 44 Their attention next turned to "treaties of commerce," and
the draft provided that these were to be made "[u]nder the foregoing
restrictions" 345-that is, under a two-thirds rule. Next came "treaties
of peace or alliance," to which were applied not only "the foregoing
restrictions," but also the requirement that any "surrender of territory"
should be "for an equivalent."3 46 Finally the two-thirds rule was applied to the admission of new states.3 47
The other significant draft that circulated within the Committee
340 Id. at 43 (the restriction is mentioned twice).
341 Id. at 44. Randolph originally wrote: "[N]o prohibition on such Importations of

inhabitants." Rutledge altered this to read: "[N]o prohibition on ye Importations of such
inhabitants or People as the sev[era]l States think proper to admit."
842 See, e.g., the remarks of Charles Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and John
Rutledge, delegates from South Carolina, and Abraham Baldwin, delegate from Georgia,
in 2 REcoans 364-65, 371-73 (Madison's notes, August 21 & 22).
843 4 REcoans 44. Randolph originally proposed an even more restrictive rule: "A navi, gation act shall not be passed but with the consent of eleven states in the senate and 10 in
the house of representatives." Rutledge changed this to "2/3ds. of the Members present of
the senate and the like No. of the house of representatives."
344 Id.
345 Id.
846 Id.
847 Id.

at 48-49.
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of Detail was in the handwriting of James Wilson of PennsylVania*,
and it likewise bore emendations by Rutledge,348 who, as chairman of
the committee, was appropriately concerned. Wilson's version was.
probably the last to be circulated before the writing of the final report,
and it is a carefully finished draft, not a memorandum of points to
be covered (as the Randolph/Rutledge document in part had been).
Thus Wilson carefully inserted, whereas the other draft had. merely
alluded to, the important check that the Convention had adopted as
part of the "great" compromise on representation. As rephrased by
Wilson this read:
All Bills for raising or appropriating Money, and for fixing
the Salaries of the Officers of Government, shall originate in the
House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by
49
the Senate.3
The Wilson draft tended to reflect the views of the three northern
members-a majority-of the committee. But the' intention, quite
evidently, was to present not an opposition document, but a compromise; and Rutledge furthered this purpose by reviewing, emending,
and then presumably supporting the draft. That it was a compromise
is evident from the fact that it included all the restrictive provisions
of the Randolph/Rutledge draft (many of which were unfavorable
to northern interests), with but one sole exception. Wilson's version
eliminated the two-thirds requirement for approval of treaties. 850 On
all the points in question, the final report of the Committee of Detail
followed Wilson's draft, and thus, in all but the treaty clause, the
wishes of the southern minority on the committee.3 51
Six Issues in Search of a Compromise

In the contest over economic and sectional issues that dominated
most of the debates of the final month and a half of the Convention,
six particular matters were crucial. The report of the Committee of
348 2 REcoRDs 163-75.

849 Id. at 164. For the original proposal, as part of the compromise on representation,
see I id. at 524 (Journal, July 5). It was included among the resolutions turned over to tile
Committee of Detail. 2 id. at 131 (Committee of Detail). In the Randolph/Rutledge memorandum, there was merely a descriptive sentence: "The powers belonging peculiarly to the
representatives are those concerning money-bills." 4 id. at 45.
350 See 2 REcoRDs 169.
351 See id. at 178 (money bills-Article 4, section 5), 183 (export taxes and importation
of slaves--Article 7, section 4; navigation acts-Article 7, section 6; treaties-Article 9, section 1), 188 (new states-Article 17).
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Detail dealt with them all, and constituted in effect the first effort at
an all-inclusive compromise. In the ensuing debates every one of the
committee's decisions was challenged and all but one were modified,
but always within a framework of compromise, whereby alterations
favorable to one interest were balanced by alterations elsewhere favorable to another. The treaty clause was one of the six that figured in
this process of economic and sectional bargaining. The other five
ought, however, to be looked at first.
The provision forbidding the Senate to originate or to amend a
money bill of any sort was, of course, a relic of the first great compromise of the Convention, which had granted each state, regardless of
size, an equal viote in the upper house, but had carefully reserved the,
exclusive power to lay taxes and make appropriations to the lower
house, the only one that was to be elected directly by the people and
in which representation was to be proportionate to population.3 52 This
provision was incorporated unchanged in the draft constitution prepared by the Committee of Detail,3 53 but it was there balanced by the
provision vesting the treaty-making power exclusively in the upper
house,35 4 a small body which not only accorded each state equal representation but also possessed a distinctly aristocratic character, thanks
to the indirect mode of election of its members and their longer
terms. In subsequent debates, members clearly recognized the deliberate balancing of interests that was implicit in the assignment of
money bills to the House and treaties to the Senate. Indeed, the very
first debate on the former question trailed off into a discussion of the
latter. 855 Eventually the clause relating to money bills became the
make-weight in a compromise involving not treaty-making, but the
machinery of presidential elections. 3 6
352 The text of the so-called "great" compromise, as proposed on July 5, is in 1
REcoRDs 524 (Journal). The provision respecting money bills was approved the next day by
a vote of five states to three, with three divided. Id. at 547 (Madison's notes). The compromise itself was finally adopted on July 16. 2 id. at 13-14 (Journal).
853 2 REcoRDs 178 (Article 4, section 5).
854 See note 241 supra and accompanying text.
855 See text accompanying note 366 infra.
356 Several veiled allusions to a compromise in the making were contained in the
speeches of the period, and Madison explained the situation in occasional footnotes to his
private record of the debates. See 2 REcoRDs 509-10 (speech of Gouverneur Morris, September 5), 514 n.0 (explanatory footnote by Madison, September 5), 552 n.0 (another explanatory footnote, September 8). The situation was as follows. The provision restricting money
bills to the House was struck out on August 8, and the decision reaffirmed on August 13.
Id. at 224-25, 263, 280 (Madison's notes, August 8, 11, 13). Discontent continued, however,
and on September 5, a compromise reported a watered-down version, which gave the House
sole power to originate money bills, but permitted the Senate to amend them. Id at 508-09
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A second issue was the absolute prohibition imposed in the committee's draft constitution upon any use whatever of Congress' taxing
power and commerce power to impede in any way the importation of
"such persons as the several States shall think proper to admit" 857a euphemism for slaves. Though the clause would be bitterly attacked
by many southern as well as northern delegates-notably by George
Mason of Virginia 8 ---the intransigence of the two southernmost
states (South Carolina and Georgia) kept it from being struck out. 859
Its retention, though with a time limit, was part of the most conspicuous of the bargains made in the final weeks of the Convention (the
other part being the elimination of the two-thirds requirement for
navigation acts). 860
This question of navigation acts was, of course, another of the
six major issues. And still another (the fourth) was the question of

taxes on exports. On both these matters the Committee of Detail acceded to the wishes of the southern bloc, imposing a two-thirds rule
on the former and an absolute prohibition on the latter.8 61 In connection with a fifth matter, the admission of new states, the Committee
of Detail likewise imposed a two-thirds rule. This was eventually
eliminated as part of a compromise involving other elements in the
committee's proposed article on the creation of new states in the
west.

362

(Madison's notes). This was tied in with a proposal made by the same committee the previous day, concerning election of the President. The committee scheme, which with modifications was finally included in the Constitution, called for electors to be chosen by the
states, but went on to provide for an election by the Senate should the electoral college
fail to produce a majority for any candidate. Id. at 497-98 (Madison's notes). It was to balance this bestowal of additional power on the Senate that the old provision barring the
Senate from originating money bills was revived. It was adopted September 8. Id. at 552
(Madison's notes). By this time, however, the Convention had transferred the reversionary
power of choosing the President from the Senate to the House, with voting to be by states.
Id. at 527 (Madison's notes, September 6).
357 Id. at 183 (Article 7, section 4).
358 See text accompanying note 385 infra. Other southerners attacking the clause were
Luther Martin of Maryland and Edmund Randolph of Virginia. See 2 RECORDS 864, 574
21 & 22).
(Madison's notes, August
359 See notes 383-84 infra and accompanying text.
860 See notes 401-11 infra and accompanying text.

2 REcoRos 183 (Article 7, sections 4 & 6 of the draft constitution).
The Articles of Confederation had promised Canada admission into the Union,
but had provided that "no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine states"-that is by a two-thirds vote of all the original states.
19 JCC 221 (Article 11). The resolutions referred by the Convention to the Committee of
Detail spoke vaguely of "the Consent of a number of Voices in the national Legislature less
than the whole." 2 REcoans 133 (Committee of Detail). In its draft, the committee provided
for decision by "two thirds of the members present in each House." Id. at 188 (Article 17).
361
862
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Four of these six :issues had markedly sectional implications: the
further importation of slaves, the taxation of exports, the adoption of
navigation acts, and the making of treaties. On the first three, the
Committee of Detail adopted the restrictions advocated by the stapleproducing southern states and opposed by the commercially oriented
northern and eastern ones. As compensation to the latter, the committee gave the Senate power to make treaties by simple majority
vote, 63 thereby rejecting the proposals of its two southern members,
who would not only have imposed a two-thirds rule but would have
forbidden cessions of territory unless "for an equivalent." 3S
The absence of a two-thirds requirement for treaty-making was
promptly criticized once the committee distributed its proposed draft.
Opposite this particular item in his copy of the printed report of the
Committee of Detail, Geotge Mason of Virginia made the following
marginal note:
As Treaties are to be the Laws of the Land & commercial Treaties may be so framed as to be partially injurious, there
seems to be some necessity for the same Security upon this Subject [as upon navigation acts]. 36 5
In other words, there was to be a two-thirds requirement. Mason had
The really controversial issues, however, were those dealt with in two other sentences
of the same article in the committee's draft:
If a new State shall arise within the limits of any of the present States, the consent
of the Legislatures of such States shall be also necessary to its admission. If the
admission be consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the same terms
with the original States.
Id. The compromise finally reached was to strike out the guarantee of equality on admission, silently eliminate the two-thirds requirement, but retain (with slightly modified
wording) the ban (for it amounted to such) on admitting a new state carved out of territory claimed by an older State unless the latter gave permission. See id. at 454-56, 461-66
(Madison's notes, August 29 & 30). The search for an acceptable wording of the last-mentioned provision reflected the clash of views that resulted from the various frontier movements to establish new states in areas claimed by the established seaboard states. At the
time of the Convention the most prominent situation involved Vermont, where a government had been established and a constitution adopted in defiance of the territorial claims
both of New York and New Hampshire. Her admission as the fourteenth state did not
come until 1791. In the Convention debate of August 30, 1787, there were frequent references not only to Vermont, but also to Maine (which remained part of Massachusetts until
1820), to "the people of Virginia beyond the Mountains" (i.e., in Kentucky, which became
a state in 1792), and to "the Western people, of N[orth] Carolina. & of Georgia" (where
settlers were struggling to maintain a separate state that they called Franklin). Id. at 46263. See R. BILLINGTON, WESTWARD EXPANSION 203-06 (2d ed. 1960); 3 R. HILDRETH, THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMEuCA 406-10 (rev. ed. 1856); 4 id. at 267-72.
863 See 2 RacoRDs 183 (Article 9, section 1).
864 See text accompanying note 346 supra.
815 4 REcoRDs 53.
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even darker fears, which he expressed on the floor of the Convention.
well before the treaty clause itself came up for discussion. Arguing
for retention of the clause restricting Senate action on money bills,
Mason charged on the 15th of August that that body "could already
sell the whole Country by means of Treaties." Challenged on the
point, Mason explained that "the Senate by means of treaty might
alienate territory &c. without legislative sanction." He had in mind
the lands in dispute with Spain in the lower Mississippi Valley, and he
voiced a warning: "If Spain should possess herself of Georgia . . . the

Senate might by treaty dismember the Union."8 66
This particular debate of the 15th of August included a speech
by John Francis Mercer of Maryland in which he spoke of the negotiation of treaties as an executive function. This being the only clearcut
statement of the kind in the records of the Convention, its significance
needs to be carefully assessed. Mercer was expressing agreement with
Mason's view that the power of the Senate was excessive and dangerous.
As Madison reported his words, Mercer
contended, (alluding to Mr. Mason's observations) that the Senate ought not to have the power of treaties. This power belonged
to the Executive department; adding that Treaties would not be
final so as to alter the laws of the land, till ratified by legislative
authority. This was the case of Treaties in Great Britain; particularly the late Treaty of Commerce with France. 36 7
Before examining his words on this occasion in the context of his other
remarks in the Convention, one should note that Mercer was not expressing thoughts that had long been circulating in the Convention.
He had taken his seat only nine days earlier, on the very day that the
Committee of Detail brought in its report.368 Far from attempting to
find out what had been happening during the ten weeks of discussion
he had missed, he announced to his colleagues in the Maryland delegation, on only his second day in the Convention, "that he did not like
the system" and that therefore "he would produce a better one since
the convention had undertaken to go radically to work." 386 9 He did not
stay long enough to do so, however. Two days after his speech describ866 2 REcoRns 297-98 (Madison's notes).
367 Id. at 297 (Madison's notes).
368 Id. at 176 (Journal, August 6). Though appointed with the rest of the Maryland
delegation on May 26 (3 id. at 586 (Appendix B)), Mercer was still in Annapolis on June
29, when he wrote the governor of the state that he did not have the personal resources
to attend unless given "assurance of a speedy restitution of my expences." 4 id. at 67 (letter from Mercer to Governor Smallwood).
869 2 RECORDS 212 (McHenry's notes, August 7).
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ing treaty-making as an executive power, he made his last recorded
remarks and left for home, there to battle against ratification. 870 He
was no longer present on the 23rd of August when the treaty clause
actually came before the Convention for debate.
Though Mercer can hardly be described as either representative
or influential, the exact character of his views should nevertheless
be ascertained. His remark on treaties would seem to make him an
advocate of a powerful executive, but in fact his first enterprise after
reaching the Convention was to compile a kind of blacklist of those
who leaned toward a "kingly," or at least a "high-toned," government.37 1 His first speech in the Convention was against allowing representatives to be chosen by popular vote, on the ground that "[t]he
people can not know & judge of the characters of Candidates." 372 On
the other hand, his most elaborate and impassioned speech was a
diatribe against aristocracy, in which he seemed to be saying that the
executive ought to be allowed to dispense patronage in order to acquire enough influence to "protect the people ag[ain]st those speculating Legislatures which are now plundering them throughout the
3 73
U[nited] States."
It is time to return to the mainstream. The remarks on the treaty
power that Mason and Mercer made on the 15th of August were actually incidental to a discussion of the clause relating to money bills. The
first regular debate on the treaty clause itself did not occur until the
23rd of August. And at this moment in time the Convention had just
reached a critical stage in the struggle over the three interrelated issues
of export duties, navigation acts, and slave importations. On the 22nd,
the day before the treaty clause was taken up, the Convention had appointed a committee to seek a compromise on these other issues, 374 and
at the end of the first day of debate on treaty-making this latter issue
also was referred to a committee. 875 Sectional economic interests were
370 Id. at 317 (Madison's notes, August 17); 3 id. at 589 (Appendix B). Mercer was a
signer of the dissenting statement of the minority at the Maryland ratifying convention.
See 2 DEBATES, supra note 318, at 547-56.

871 See 2 REcoRDS 191-92 (McHenry's notes, August 6). There was subsequent controversy over the exact nature of the charges leveled by Mercer. See 3 id. at 305-06 (letter from
Daniel Carroll to Madison, May 28, 1788), 319-24 (correspondence of delegates from Maryland).
872 2 REcoris 205 (Madison's notes, August 7).
373 Id. at 284-85, 288-89 (Madison's notes, August 14). Though denouncing speculation
in this speech, he announced himself two days later as "a friend to paper money." Id. at
309 (Madison's notes, August 16).
374 Id. at 366 (Journal), 375 (Madison's notes).
875 Id. at 383 (Journal, August 23), 394 (Madison's notes).
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at the forefront of attention in every instance, not the question of the
proper balance between executive and legislative power.
The tug-of-war on these interrelated economic and sectional issues
had begun the moment the Committee of Detail reported. In a caucus
of the Maryland delegation on the very day of the report, James McHenry urged a concerted move to change the requirement on navigation acts from a favorable vote by two-thirds of the members present
37 6
to a favorable vote by the delegations from two-thirds of the states.
Two days later, on the 8th of August, two of the other issues were
brought up on the floor of the Convention and discussed in heated
terms. Rufus King of Massachusetts opened an attack on the provision
(agreed upon early in the Convention) which allowed three-fifths of
the slaves to be counted in determining a state's representation in the
House. As he continued his speech, however, he widened the attack
by criticizing the committee's draft constitution for its denial to the
federal government of any power to control the further importation of
slaves. King concluded with a complaint that the ban on export duties
aggravated the unfairness of the proposed constitutional arrangements.
"If slaves are to be imported," King argued, "shall not the exports
produced by their labor, supply a revenue the better to enable the
Gen[era]l Gov[ernmen]t to defend their Masters?"37 7 Gouverneur
Morris of Pennsylvania delivered an even harsher attack upon slavery
and upon the economic favoritism being shown to the slaveholding
interests. 3 78 On the opposite side, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina
was goaded into retorting that he "considered the fisheries & the Western frontier as more burdensome to the U.S. than the slaves."3 79
On this occasion the flare-up was brief, but two weeks later, on
the 21st and 22nd of August, the debate was resumed with an intensity
and scope that assumed, in the eyes of one delegate, such a "threatening aspect" that he feared that the quarreling states of the Union might
"fly into a variety of shapes 8c directions, and most probably into several confederations and not without bloodshed. '8 0 This portentous
378 Id. at 191 (McHenry's notes, August 6). McHenry's actual formula was ambiguous:
"'[N]o navigation act shall be passed without the assent of two thirds of the representation
from each State.'" The meaning accorded it in the text would seem to follow from McHenry's statement of the problem the next day. Pointing out that "a quorum consisted of
a majority of the members of each house," he argued that "the dearest interest of trade
were under the controul of four States or of 17 members in one branch and 8 ini the other
branch." Id. at 211 (McHenry's notes).
877 Id. at 220 (Madison's notes).
878 See id. at 221-23 (Madison's notes).
379 Id. at 223 (Madison's notes).
380 Id. at 375 (Madison's notes, August 22) (speech of Oliver Ellsworth).
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two-day debate broke out as soon as the Convention, following its
regular progression through the provisions of the draft constitution,
reached the section which combined (rather oddly) clauses dealing
with export duties and with the importation of slaves. The first of
these questions produced a debate that was vigorous but unemotional,
at the end of which the ban on export duties was upheld by a small
majority. 38 ' Immediately after the vote, Luther Martin of Maryland
tossed in the apple of discord by proposing to strike out the restrictions that protected the foreign slave trade against federal interference
of any kind. Though from a slaveholding state, Martin denounced the
continued importation of slaves as "inconsistent with the principles
38 2
of the revolution and dishonorable to the American character."
Two delegates from South Carolina immediately declared that their
state could "never receive the plan if it prohibits the slave trade,"
and that the "true question at present is whether the South[er]n
83
States shall or shall not be parties to the Union."
The debate continued on the 22nd of August, with other disunionist threats by Georgians as well as South Carolinians, 3 4 but with
spokesmen of the upper South speaking (as Martin had done) on the
other side. It was Mason of Virginia, in fact, who delivered the most
withering attack of all, denouncing not only the "infernal trafic [sic]"
in slaves, but the institution of slavery itself.38 5 To halt the devastating
cross-fire, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina
proposed a compromise by which the importation of slaves would "be
made liable to an equal tax with other imports."3 8 6 His motion involved sending this particular clause to committee, whereupon Gouverneur Morris proposed that "the whole subject" should be so committed, and he specifically included "the clauses relating to taxes on
exports & to a navigation act." He explained with complete frankness
that he expected and hoped that "[t]hese things may form a bargain
among the Northern & Southern States." 38 7 There was vigorous opposition to reopening the question of export duties, and accordingly
See id. at 359-64 (Madison's notes, August 21).
Id. at 364 (Madison's notes).
883 Id. (speeches of Charles Pinckney and John Rutledge, respectively).
384 Abraham Baldwin of Georgia saw regulation of the slave trade as strictly a prerogative of the states, local in nature and not a fitting subject for deliberation. General
Charles Coteswoith Pinckney of South Carolina did not veil his threats, stating that he
would "consider a rejection of the clause as an exclusion of S[outh] Carol[inla from the
Union." Id. at 372 (Madison's notes).
385 Id. at 370 (Madison's notes).
386 Id. at 373 (Madison's notes).
387 Id. at 374 (Madison's notes).
381

582
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the ban on them, approved the day before, was allowed to stand.88s
The upshot was that the Convention voted to refer to an ad hoc committee consisting of a member from each state the clauses relating to
the importation of slaves and also the one dealing with navigation
889
acts.
The First Debate on the Treaty Clause, August 23, 1787
On the very next day, the 23rd of August, the Convention was
obliged to come to grips with the question of treaty-making, for the
section of the draft constitution which specified the powers of the
Senate was finally reached. The very first speech was by Madison and
it appeared for a moment that the question of executive-legislative
relationships in the conduct of foreign affairs would be fully opened
up. "Mr. Madison," said his own third-person record,
observed that the Senate represented the States alone, and that for
this as well as other obvious reasons it was proper that the President should be an agent in Treaties.89 0
If Madison's intention had been-or if his hearers had understood
his intention to have been-the wholesale transfer from legislative to
executive hands of the power of deliberating upon and deciding the
course that diplomatic negotiations should take, then some discussion
was certainly to be expected. If the proposal had been of this sort, it
would have involved a complete reversal of every principle with respect
to treaty-making which the Convention had thus far approved or
favorably considered. Those who had been outspoken in their insistence that the powers of peace and war were legislative and not executive powers would surely have reiterated their views. In fact, however,
no comment whatsoever was forthcoming. Madison made no motion,
hence no second was required. And not a single delegate spoke up
either to support or to oppose Madison's low-keyed suggestion.3 91
The obvious explanation is that Madison was proposing no
change more extensive than that implied by the literal sense of the
words he used: the President should be an "agent" in treaty-making.
Now an agent ,acts for his principal, and the principal in this matter,
388 See "id.
889 Id. at 366 (Journal), 374, 375 (Madison's notes). There were separate votes on com-

mitting the slave-trade clauses (which passed seven states to three) and then also the clause

on navigation acts (which passed'nine to two).
890 Id. at 392.
391 See id. at 392-93 (Madison's notes).
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as the report of the Committee of Detail explicitly provided, was the
Senate of the United States. The word "agent" described with substantial accuracy the position that John Jay as Secretary for Foreign
Affairs occupied vis-a-vis the old Congress. He was appointed by it,
he executed the policies it instructed him to pursue, and he was in
every political sense responsible to it. Now Madison was, in effect,
calling attention to an oversight in the draft constitution reported
by the Committee of Detail. The President would certainly be called
392
upon to execute whatever foreign policies might be decided upon.
But under the new system he would be neither appointed by nor
responsible to Congress as the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the old
Congress had been. And under the doctrine of separation of powers he
might even be denied the kind of participation in decision-making that
had been Jay's unquestioned right as a responsible officer of the old
Congress. For the new President to play the kind of role in policy-making that Jay had played called for some definition of the relationship
between the Senate and the now-independent chief executive. Madison's statement would fill this lacuna: "[T]he President should be an
agent in Treaties." The Convention apparently accepted this as the
common'sense of the matter. Madison, at least, seems to have believed
that his suggestion had been silently accepted, for by the end of the day
he was referring quite casually to the power of "the President & Senate
to make Treaties." 9 3
Since no one offered to comment on Madison's opening remark,
the discussion of the 23rd of August turned immediately thereafter
to the controversial question uppermost in the minds of most delegates
-namely, what weight each state or section could expect to have in
the negotiation of treaties, especially those having an economic or a
regional impact. Because treaties would be binding as part of the supreme law of the land, the treaty-making power was necessarily a form
892 The obvious fact that the executive branch would have many duties to perform
in connection with foreign affairs received recognition in the proposals that had been offered three days before for organizing executive departments. There was to be a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, appointed by and removable by the President. The list of his duties
represents, in a sense, a definition of what the movers, Gouverneur Morris and Charles
Pinckney, considered to be the executive (as distinguished from the legislative) component
in foreign relations. The Secretary was
to correspond with all foreign Ministers, prepare plans of Treities, & consider such
as may be transmitted from abroad; and generally to attend to the interests of the
U[nited] S[tates] in their connections with foreign powers.
Id. at 343 (Madison's notes, August 20). The proposal never came to a vote, and the organization of the executive departments was left to the First Congress.
393 Id. at 394 (Madison's notes).
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of legislative power. If vested in the Senate alone, rather than in both
houses, then the small states (over-represented there) would be in a
position to advance their own interests at the expense of the larger
(and hence wealthier) states. At the first opportunity, therefore, Gouverneur Morris, from the large state of Pennsylvania, moved a proviso
that "no Treaty shall be binding on the U.S. which is not ratified by
94
a law."3
Two delegates were quick to point out certain technical difficulties. If ambassadors were to receive their instructions from the
Senate but were to submit the results of their negotiations for approval
by both houses, then, said Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, they
"would be at a loss how to proceed." 95 And William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut
thought there was something of solecism in saying that the acts
of a Minister with plenipotentiary powers from one Body, should
depend for ratification on another Body.96
From the perspective of the present day, the most significant fact
about this argument was its underlying, uncontroverted assumption
that a legislative body rather than the executive would continue to
formulate the policy and issue the instructions which American diplomats would be expected to carry out.
Though there -was some support for Gouverneur Morris' proposal to require the concurrence of both houses in the ratification of
treaties, his motion was finally voted down with only his own state in
favor.3 97 Madison then sought a compromise. He proposed that treaties
affecting domestic interests--commercial treaties being an obvious
example-should be binding as municipal law only after action by
Congress as a whole. But he was in favor of "[a]llowing the President
& Senate to make Treaties . . . of Alliance for limited terms"-presumably because of the need for secrecy in such negotiations. 9 8 As the
394 Id. at 392 (Madison's notes).
395 See id. McHenry gives an even more lucid summary of the argument in his notes:
It was said that a minister could not then be instructed by the Senate who
were to appoint him, or if instructed there could be no certainty that the house
of representatives would agree to confirm what he might agree to under these instructions.
Id. at 395 (footnote omitted).
396 Id. at 393 (Madison's notes).
397 Id. at 383, 384 (Journal), 394 (Madison's notes).
398 Id. at 394 (Madison's notes). To understand Madison's proposed distinction between treaties that ought to receive the approval of both houses and those for which senatorial approval would suffice, one should examine not only his two speeches on the matter
on August 23 (id. at 392, 394 (Madison's notes)), but also a speech of his on September 7
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debate wore on, Randolph remarked "that almost every Speaker had
made objections to the clause as it stood."3 99 At the end of the day the
entire section dealing with the authority of the Senate in treaty-making
and appointments was sent to committee-not, however, to the elevenman compromise committee appointed the previous day to wrestle
with the questions of slave importation and navigation acts, but to the
original five-man Committee of Detail.400 Though no instructions were
given, this committee was presumably expected to reconsider the treaty
provision in the light of whatever compromises might be reached on
other economic issues.
The Sectional Compromise on the Slave Trade and Navigation Acts
The most important of the compromise proposals was in fact ready
the very next morning. After only one day and two evenings of work,
the special committee laid before the Convention on the 24th of August a double-barreled proposition respecting the importation of slaves
and the passing of navigation acts. With respect to the foreign slave
trade, the committee proposed to fix a date-the year 1800 being
specified-before which Congress might not prohibit the importation
of slaves, but after which it would be free to use both its taxing and its
commerce power for the purpose. During the interval, however, such
importation could be taxed, but only" 'at a rate not exceeding the average of the Duties laid on Imports.' "With respect to navigation acts, the
compromise committee eliminated the requirement of a two-thirds
vote for approval. 401 This victory for the commercial states was probably as much a quid pro quo for the retention of the ban on export
taxes as for the continued tolerance of the foreign slave trade. 402
Debate on this compromise began the next day, the 25th of August. The matter first discussed was the importation of slaves. Madison
(id. at 540 (Madison's notes)), a memorandum of his of the same date (4 id. at 58), a letter
of his to Jefferson on April 4, 1796 (3 id. at 372), and a speech of his before the House of
Representatives on April 6, 1796 (id. at 373-74).
899 2 REcoRDs 393 (Madison's notes).
400 Id.
at 394 (Madison's notes). The original Committee of Detail continued to be
asked to reconsider specific provisions, as in this instance. It was sometimes simply referred
to as the Committee of Five. See id. at 334 (Journal, August 20), 341, 342 (Madison's notes),
where both terms are used for the same committee.
401 See id. at 396 (journal), 400 (Madison's notes).
402 The committee, of course, had no authority to reopen the question of export duties, the ban having been voted by the Convention itself. See text accompanying notes 381
& 388 supra. The existence of the ban (which southern states desired) was, however, a factor that the committee presumably bore in mind.
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announced that he "thought it wrong-to admit in the Constitution the
idea that there could be property in men," 40 3 but efforts by anti-slavery
men to modify the clause in various ways were all rejected. The only
substantive change that was approved was of opposite tenor. At the
behest of one of the South Carolina delegates, and over the 6pposition
of Madison, the period during which the slave trade would be allowed
to continue without control was extended from 1800 to 1808. On this
question the vote was seven states in favor and only four (including
Virginia) opposed. The fact that the measure was part of a compromise
put enough northern votes in the favorable column to carry this
40 4
amendment and then to adopt the clause as amended.
On the 29th of August the Convention considered the other half
of the compromise, whereby navigation acts were to require no more
than a simple majority for passage. The sectional conflict came to the
fore immediately as Charles Pinckney of South Carolina moved not
merely to restore the two-thirds requirement but to apply it to every
enactment whatever affecting commerce, interstate or foreign. 40 5 Gouverneur Morris branded the proposal "highly injurious,". and his fellowPennsylvanian George Clymer exclaimed that "[t]he Northern .&
middle States will be ruined, if not enabled to defend themselves
against foreign regulations." 406 On the other side, Mason of Virginia
protested that the southern states could not be expected to "deliver
themselves bound hand & foot to the Eastern States." 407 And Randolph
(who had presented the Virginia Plan at the outset of the Convention)
announced that "[a] rejection of the motion would compleat the deformity of the system," already becoming "odious" to him because
403 2 REcoRDs 417 (Madison's notes).
404 See id. at 414-17 (Madison's notes). It was General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
of South Carolina who made the motion for a change of date, but it was Gorham of Massachusetts who, dramatizing the existence of a compromise, seconded the motion. Id. at
415. Three New England states joined four southern ones in passing both the amendment
and the provision itself; Virginia joined three middle states in opposition. Id. A minor
amendment fixed the maximum tax on the importation of a slave at ten dollars instead
of "the average of the Duties laid on Imports." Id. at 417.
405 Pinckney's motion read:
That no act of the Legislature for the purpose of regulating the commerce
of the United States with foreign powers or among the several States shall be
passed without the assent of 2/3rds of the Members of each House.
Id. at 446 (Journal), 449 (Madison's notes). Compare the provision in the Randolph/Rutledge draft that had circulated within the Committee of Detail. See text accompanying
notes 343-45 supra.
406 2 REcoRDs 450 (Madison's notes).
407 Id. at 451 (Madison's notes).
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of "an accumulation of obnoxious ingredients."' 0 8 Disunionist sentiments rose dangerously close to. the surface in Gorham's reply:
If the Government is to be so fettered as to be unable to relieve the Eastern States what motive can they have to join in it, and
thereby tie their own hands
from measures which they could other40 9
wise take for themselves.
Two South Carolina delegates, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
and Pierce Butler, came to the rescue of the compromise, opposing the
motion of their colleague Charles Pinckney, and reminding the Convention (implicitly at least) that the commercial states had already
kept their part of the sectional bargain by voting to leave the slave
trade open for twenty-one years.4 10 By throwing the vote of South Carolina against the motion to restore the two-thirds requirement, these
two delegates helped bring about the defeat of the proposal.411 Butler
was able to collect an extra dividend for the slaveholding section by
securing unanimous consent for a fugitive-slave clause that he had
4 12
proposed the day before.

The passage of the compromise involving the slave trade and
navigation acts did not end the conflict among the states and sections
over possible misuse (or non-use) of the commercial powers about to be
bestowed on Congress. On the 31st of August there was a good deal of
wrangling over a proposal that in a less tense situation might have been
regarded as self-evidently just. The provision in question said merely
that no law regulating commerce or tariffs should" 'oblige vessels bound
to or from any State to enter clear or pay duties in another.' " The
clause was finally adopted by a vote of eight states to two,4 13 but the

debate revealed a depth of suspicion and acrimony among the states
that could only be mitigated by an unremitting attention to'the balancing of one economic interest against another.
Throughout this period of debating and bargaining on the regu408 Id. at 452-53 (Madison's notes).

409 Id. at 453 (Madison's notes).
410 Id. at 449-50, 451 (Madison's notes). Madison pointed out in a footnote the underlying significance of General Pinckney's seemingly bland remarks. Id. at 449 n.o.
411 Id. at 446, 447 (Journal), 453 (Madison's notes). On the crucial vote, South Carolina joined the six states north of Maryland in rejecting the two-thirds requirement. The
other four southern states voted on the opposite side.
412 Id. at 443 (Madison's notes, August 28), 446 (Journal, August 29), 453-54 (Madison's
notes).
418 Id. at 480-81 (Madison's notes). New Hampshire and South Carolina voted in the
negative. According to McHenry, Massachusetts did also, making the vote eight to three. Id.
at 482. Neither the Journal nor Madison's notes, however, record any vote by Massachusetts.
Id. at 474 (Journal), 481 (Madison's notes).
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lation of foreign and domestic commerce, the article relating to the
Senate, with its crucial treaty-making clause, remained quietly in the
hands of the Committee of Detail to which it had been referred on
the 23rd of August. It was, of course, obvious that the two-thirds rule,
which had been debated so vehemently in connection with navigation
acts, would be equally relevant if applied to commercial treaties, which
dealt with the same subject-matter, or even, by extension, to all
treaties, since few were without some economic or regional impact. It
is hardly surprising, therefore, that no attempt was made to reach a
decision on the treaty clause until the outcome was known of the struggle over navigation acts and related matters. And when a committee
report finally came, it recommended inserting into the treaty clause the
two-thirds requirement that had just been scrapped in connection with
navigation acts.
The Brearley Committee's Revision of the Treaty Clause
This particular compromise was not proposed by the Committee
of Detail, for it had been superseded. On the 31st of August the Convention voted
to refer such parts of the Constitution as have been postponed,
and such parts of Reports as have not
been acted on to a Com414
mittee of a Member from each State.
David Brearley of New Jersey became chairman, and the eleven-man
committee made three successive reports. The first, a relatively minor
one, was presented the very next day, a Saturday, whereupon the Convention immediately adjourned so that the committee could deliberate. 415 Only a small amount of business was done by the Convention on
the following Monday, and by Tuesday, the 4th of September, the
Brearley committee was ready with one of the most significant reports
of the entire Convention, 416 leaving only a few details to be cleared up
41 7
in its final report on the following day.
414

Id. at 473 (Journal).

See id. at 483-85.
See id. at 486-92.
417 Id. at 508-09 (Madison's notes). Among the provisions proposed in the third report,
two'should be noted at this juncture:
(1) To add to the clause "to declare war" the Words "and grant letters of
marue .and reprisal" .-...........................(2) To add to the clause "to raise and support armies" the words "bin no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years ..
Id. at 508.
415
416
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The second report (that of Tuesday, the 4th of September) proposed the system of electing the President that was (with modifications)
finally written into the Constitution, created the office of vice-president, and dealt with impeachment. 41

Hardly less significant, how-

ever, was the provision with which we are particularly concerned, that
which dealt with treaty-making, with appointments, and with the roles
of President and Senate therein. The wording was as follows:
The President by and with the advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall have power to make Treaties; and he shall nominate
and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, and other public Ministers, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the U[nited] S[tates], whose
appointments are not otherwise herein provided for. But no
Treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the
419
members present.
For reasons that will shortly appear, one other recommendation of the
committee, though seemingly unrelated, should be read in connection
with the above. The President, said this new addition to the executive
article,
may require the opinion in writing of the principal Officer in each
of the Executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the
420
duties of their respective offices.
The new committee on postponed parts was proposing three specific changes in the article on the Senate which the old Committee of
Detail had drafted. In the first place, it was giving the President a
definite role in treaty-making. In the second place, instead of authorizing certain appointments to be made by the Senate alone and others
by the President alone, it was lumping all kinds of appointments together and subjecting them to a uniform procedure involving joint
participation by President and Senate. In the third place, it was applying a two-thirds rule to treaty-making. Each of the three changes must
be examined in the context of the other decisions the Convention was
making, for the broad implications of what the committee was doing
are not immediately self-evident. Its decision to apply the two-thirds
rule is the easiest to comprehend, for there were obvious parallels to
the economic and sectional bargaining just examined.
Far less apparent is the significance of the new arrangement proposed for the making of appointments. The ultimate effect was to. alter
418
419
420

Id. at 497-99 (Madison's notes).
Id. at 498-99.
Id. at 499.
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fundamentally the relationship of the Senate to the executive branch,
changing it from a body completely apart from and independent of the
President into a council of appointment or executive council. And the
terms "advice and consent," traditionally descriptive of the role of
such a council, were carried over (though with a difference to be noted
later) into the treaty-making clause, thereby defining the relationship
between President and Senate in this matter as a conciliar relationship
also.
The Question of a Separate Council of State
The idea that there should be an Executive Council or Council of
State or Privy Council to advise the President was probably taken for
granted by most delegates from the very beginning of the Convention.
The Privy Council was a familiar historic feature of the British constitution, and royal government in the American colonies was exercised
by a governor with whom a council was regularly associated.4 21 More
pertinent, so far as the Federal Convention of 1787 was concerned, was
the fact that every one of the states that had adopted a written constitution since the beginning of 1776-and twelve of them had done S0422
-had provided a Council to advise the chief executive (usually styled
the Governor). 423 Labels differed-Privy Council, Council of State, ExSee notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
The first of the former colonies to adopt a constitution of its own was New Hampshire on January 5, 1776. Between that time and the meeting of the Federal Convention
in 1787, eleven of the thirteen adopted state constitutions, as did Vermont (whose admission
to the Union was delayed until 1791 by jurisdictional claims of New York and New Hampshire). Of the twelve states (including Vermont) which did adopt constitutions, three had
replaced their first versions with second ones prior to 1787. The fifteen onstitutions thus
adopted are here listed in chronological order, with references to the complete texts in the
seven-volume THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter cited as CONSTrruTIONS]: New
Hampshire, January 5, 1776 (4 id. at 2451-53); South Carolina, March 26, 1776 (6 id. at
3241-48); Virginia, June 29, 1776 (7 id. at 3812-19); New Jersey, July 2, 1776 (5 id. at 259498); Delaware, September 10, 1776 (1 id. at 562-68); Pennsylvania, September 28, 1776 (5 id.
at 3081-92); Maryland, November 11, 1776 (3 id. at 1686-1712); North Carolina, December
18, 1776 (5 id. at 2787-94); Georgia, February 5, 1777 (2 id. at 777-85); New York,' April 20,
1777 (5 id. at 2623-38); Vermont, July 8, 1777 (6 id. at 3737-49); South Carolina (second constitution), March 19, 1778 (id. at 3248-57); Massachusetts, March 2, 1780 (3 id. at 1888-1911);
New Hampshire (second constitution), June 2, 1784 (4 id. at 2453-70); Vermont (second constitution), July 4, 1786 (6 id. at 3749-61).
Connecticut and Rhode Island made do with their colonial charters until 1818 and
1842 respectively. See 1 id. at 536-47; 6 id.. at 3222-40.
423 Four of the twelve states that adopted written constitutions prior to 1787 used the
title President-South Carolina (1776 constitution), Delaware, Pennsylvania and New
421

422
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ectitive Council, or simply Counci1424-but the functions were the
same. Only New York varied the pattern by establishing two councils:
one for appointments, and one for "revision" of the laws (i.e., vetoing
them).425 In every instance the Council was made as independent of
the Governor as possible. Members of the Council were elected by
popular vote in three states, 426 by the legislature in eight, 427 and by a

combination of both methods in the remaining one. 428 Three of the
states required many executive acts to be performed by the Governor
and Council acting as an organized executive body. 429 Six of the others
Hampshire (1784 constitution). In its second constitution (1778), South Carolina shifted
to Governor, the title used from the outset by eight other states. New Hampshire made no
provision for a chief executive until its second constitution.
424 Four states used the term Privy Council-South. Carolina (both constitutions),
Virginia, New Jersey, and Delaware. Two used the term Council of State-Virginia and
North Carolina (Virginia, as the foregoing shows, used the terms interchangeably). Three
states used the term Executive Council-Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Vermont (both constitutions). New York had two specialized councils-a Council of Revision and a Council of
Appointment. The other three states spoke of a Council to the Governor or simply a
Council-Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire (1784 constitution). To avoid confusion, one must note that the upper house of the legislature in four states was called a
Legislature Council or simply a Council-New Hampshire and South Carolina (1776 constitutions), New Jersey, and Delaware.
Two states followed the pattern of colonial government by establishing a Council that
was both the upper house of the legislature and the executive council to the governor. In
New Jersey, any three or more of the Legislative Council could constitute a Privy Council.
5 CONSrrruTIONS 2596 (Article 8). In Georgia, the Executive Council, without the Governor,
sat almost as an upper chamber when the House of Assembly was in session. See 2 id. at
779, 781, 782 (Articles 8, 22, 27, 28). Finally, two states provided for a Council of Censors,
distinctly different from all other types of councils-Pennsylvania and Vermont (both constitutions).
425 See note 424 supra.
426 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont (both constitutions).
427 South Carolina (both constitutions), Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina,
Georgia, New York (the Council of Appointment), and New Hampshire (1784 constitution).
428 Massachusetts provided for popular election of forty persons who were to be councillors and.senators. 3 CoNsTrTrrUoNs 1895 (Part 2, chapter 1, section 2, article 1). Nine of
these would then be elected by joint ballot of the two houses to serve on the Council, and
the remainder would constitute the Senate. Id. at 1904 (Part 2, chapter 2, section 3, article 2).
429 Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Vermont (both constitutions).
The functioning of the executive council as a regular organ of government, with the
chief executive as a participating member, is graphically described in the Pennsylvania
constitution:
The president . . . with the council, five of whom shall be a quorum, shall
have power to appoint and commissionate [sic] judges . . .and shall supply every
vacancy in any office. . . . They are to correspond with other states, and transact
business with the officers of government, civil and military; and to prepare such
business as may appear to them necessary to lay before the general assembly. . ..
to take care that the laws be faithAnd shall have power to grant pardons ...
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applied the traditional phrase "advice and consent" to the situations
where power was to be exercised concurrently by Governor and Council.4 0 Two states made use only of the word "advice," but used it with
the almost inescapable implication that the approval of the Council
was what was required.4 3' Only a single state left the Council completely without mandatory authority, its constitution speaking vaguely
of a right "to consult." 4 2 To be sure, in every state the Governor was
required to act "by and with the advice and consent of the Council"
only on matters of certain specified kinds, such as making appointments, calling out the militia, invoking martial law, imposing embargoes, etc. 438 On other matters, where the constitution did not require
fully executed . . . and they may draw upon the treasury for such sums as shall be
appropriated by the house: They may also lay embargoes . . .in the recess of the
house only: They . . . shall have power to call together the general assembly
when necessary, before the day to which they shall stand adjourned. The president shall be commander in chief of the forces of the state, but shall not command in person, except advised thereto by the council, and then only so long as
they shall approve thereof. The president and council shall have a secretary, and
keep fair books of their proceedings, wherein any counsellor may enter his dissent,
with his reasons in support of it.
5 CONsrrruTIONs 3087-88 (Section 20). See 6 id. at 3745, 3756 for substantially identical provisions in the Vermont constitutions of 1777 and 1786 (Chapter 2, section 18, and Chapter
2, section 11, respectively).
430 South Carolina (both constitutions), Delaware, Maryland, New York (Council of
Appointment), Massachusetts, and New Hampshire (1784 constitution).
431 Virginia and North Carolina. Save for the omission of the word "consent," several
of the following clauses are virtually identical with those in notes 429 supra and 433 infra.
The Governor, according to the Virginia constitution,
shall, with the advice of a Council of State, exercise the executive powers of government, according to the laws of this Commonwealth; and shall not, under any
pretence, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute or custom of England.
7 CONSTrrUTIONS 3816-17.
The Governor may embody the militia, with the advice of the Privy Council;
and when embodied, shall alone have the direction of the militia, under the laws
of the country.
Id. at 3817.
The Sheriffs and Coroners shall be nominated by the respective Courts, approved
by the Governor, with the advice of the Privy Council, and commissioned by the
Governor.
Id. at 3818. In the last clause, in particular, it is difficult to see how the phrase "with the
advice of" can mean anything except "with the consent of." According to the North Carolina constitution, the Governor "shall have power, by and with the advice of the Council
of State, to embody the militia for the public safety." 5 id. at 2791 (Article 18). "He also,
may by and with the advice of the Council of State, lay embargoes . . . in the recess of
the General Assembly." Id. (Article 19).
432 The relevant portion of the New Jersey constitution provided that
the Governor, or, in his absence, the Vice-President of the Council, shall have the
supreme executive power . . . and . . . any three or more of the Council shall, at
all times, be a privy-council, to consult them . . ..
5 CONSTITTIONS 2596 (Article 8).
483 The following excerpts are illustrative of this point.
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that the advice and consent of the Council be obtained, the Governor
was free to consult it if he chose, but he was not obliged to follow its
recommendations. 34 Nevertheless, neither the giving nor the receiving
of advice was a casual, off-hand affair. Ten of the states required the
advice and the proceedings of the Council to be set down in writing,
usually with the yeas and nays recorded, and often certified by the
signatures of the members present. Moreover, seven of the states-a
majority-provided specifically that these records of the Council's "advice and proceedings" were to be laid before the legislature if the latter
called for them. 435 When an oath of secrecy was prescribed, it bound
[T]he president and commander-in-chief, with the advice and consent of the privy
council, may appoint .. .all other necessary officers, except such as are by law
directed to be otherwise chosen.
6 CONSTITUTIONs 3247 (South Carolina constitution of 1776, Artide 25). "All judicial officers
. . . shall be nominated and appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the council." 3 id. at 1902 (Massachusetts constitution, Part 2, chapter 2, section 1,
article 9). "[T]he Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Council, may embody the militia; and, when embodied, shall alone have the direction thereof." Id. at 1696
(Maryland constitution, Article 33). The New Hampshire constitution of 1784 stated that
the president hereby is entrusted with all other powers incident to the office of
captain-general and commander in chief, and admiral . . . provided that the
president shall not . . .grant commissions for exercising the law-martial in any
case, without the advice and consent of the council.
4 id. at 2464. Finally, the second South Carolina constitution declared that
the governor and commander-in-chief . . . by and with the advice and consent of
the privy council, may lay embargoes . . . for any time not exceeding thirty days,
in the recess of the general assembly.
6 id. at 3255 (Article 35).
434 The South Carolina constitution of 1776 provides a good example.
The privy council (of which four to be a quorum) to advise the president and
commander-in-chief when required, but he shall not be bound to consult them,
unless in cases after mentioned.
6 CONsTrrUTIONs 3244 (Article 5). Among the "cases after mentioned" were the filling of
vacancies and the appointment of minor "necessary officers;" in these "the advice and consent of the privy council" was required. Id. at 3246-47 (Articles 24 & 25).
435 The archetypal provision was that of the Virginia constitution. The legislature
was to choose a "Privy Council, or Council of State, consisting of eight members," and
they were to choose a President from among their own number.
Four members shall be sufficient to act, and their advice and proceedings shall be
entered on record, and signed by the members present, (to any part whereof, any
member may enter his dissent) to be laid before the General Assembly, when called
for by them.
7 CONsrrruTIONs 3817. Six other states made similar provisions-Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina (1778 constitution), Massachusetts, and New Hampshire (1784 constitution). See note 429 supra for the provision of the Pennsylvania constitution that
required a record to be kept but which said nothing about making it available to the
legislatire. Two other states--Georgia and Vermont (both constitutions)-followed Pennsylvania in this.
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the councillor to reveal nothing "until leave given by the council, or
46
when called upon by the house of assembly."
During the early part of the Federal Convention of 1787 little attention was given to the question of incorporating in the constitutional
system of the Union the kind of Executive Council or Council of: State
that had been universally established within state governments. Most
of the plans that were presented and discussed made some provision for
a council, but details were various and vague. In frank imitation of
the New York arrangement, the Virginia Plan of the 29th of May
called for a Council of Revision, but not for the equivalent of the New
York Council of Appointment.487 Charles Pinckney's plan, presented
the same day, proposed that the President should "have a Right to advise with the Heads of the different Departments as his Council." The
same officers would constitute a Council of Revision also.48 Since they
would be appointed not by the President but by Congress, this Council
would theoretically be as independent as those in the states. The New
Jersey Plan of the 15th of June proposed a plural executive, which
would be in itself a council. 439 Prior to the appointment of the Committee of Detail at the end of July, however, nothing had been decided
440
relative to a council, and the discussion had been rather desultory.
When, however, no provision for a council appeared anywhere in
the draft constitution reported by the Committee of Detail on the 6th
of August, the omission soon gave rise to debate. On the 18th of August, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut "observed that a Council had not
yet been provided for the President," and he proposed one that would
include members from each of the three branches; the President of the
Senate, the Chief Justice, and the heads of the principal executive departments. This council "should advise but not conclude the President." 441 Each of the three speakers who followed took a different view.
E.g., 2 CONSTITUTIONs 782 (Georgia constitution, Article 30).
1 RECoRDs 21 (Virginia Plan, resolution 8).
438 2 RECORDS 135 (Committee of Detail) (outline of the Pinckney Plan found among
James Wilson's papers). These two clauses were incorporated into Professor Jameson's reconstruction of the Pinckney Plan, referred to in note 185 supra. See 3 RECORDS 606 (Appendix D). See also id. at 110-11 (excerpts from Observations on the Plan of Government
Submitted to the Federal Convention, a pamphlet published by Pinckney following the
Convention). See note 185 supra.
439 1 RECoRDs 244 (Madison's notes).
440 See, e.g., id. at 66-67, 70-71, 74 (Madison's, King's & Pierce's notes, June 1), 97-98,
110-11 (Madison's & Mason's notes, June 4); 4 id. at 15-17.
441 2 REcoRws 328-29 (Madison's notes). Four days earlier, John Francis Mercer of
Maryland had spoken of the need for a council, which he thought should be composed of
"members of both Houses." Id. at 285 (Madison's notes).
436

437 See
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Charles Pinckney, who was on record as favoring a council differently
constituted, 442 wished the President to be at liberty "to call for advice
or not as he might chuse," and he warned: "Give him an able Council
and it will thwart him; a weak one and he will shelter himself under
their sanction." 44 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, assuming that the
council would act as a council of revision in vetoing acts of Congress,
announced that he "was ag[ain]st letting the heads of the departments
• . . have anything to do in business connected with legislation," and

he objected also to the participation of the chief justice. 444 John Dickinson of Delaware "urged that the great appointments should be made by
the Legislature," in which case the officers concerned "might properly
be consulted by the Executive," but they would hardly be the independent advisers that Dickinson had in mind if the appointments were
"made by the Executive himself." 445 Faced with such divergent views,
the Convention "by general Consent" allowed the subject to lie over.446
On the next business day, Monday, the 20th of August, Gouverneur Morris, seconded by Pinckney, submitted an elaborate proposal
on the subject, which was referred, without debate, to the old Committee of Detail. Its purpose, according to its opening words, was to
establish a "Council of State" which would "assist the President in
conducting the Public affairs." 447 Madison, in his original Notes, characterized the document more accurately as "asett [sic] of resolutions or442 The Pinckney Plan proposed a council made up exclusively of the President and
heads of executive departments. Id. at 135 (Committee of Detail); 3 id. at 606 (Appendix
D). The proposal of Gouverneur Morris, which Pinckney would second, added the chief
justice, but no members of the legislative branch. See 2 id. at 342-43 (Madison's notes,
August 20). This proposal was not actually introduced until the 20th, but Pinckney had
announced on the 18th that it was in the offing. See id. at 329 (Madison's notes). Pinckney
was originally "opposed to an introduction of the Judges into the business." I id. at 139
(Madison's notes, June 6).
443 2 REcoRDs 329 (Madison's notes). Pinckney was following the example of his own
state's constitution, which only required consultation in certain named situations. See note
434 supra.
444 2 REcoms 329 (Madison's notes). Gerry had made the same objection to the inclusion of the judiciary on a council of revision as early as June 4. "It was," he then said,
"quite foreign from the nature of ye. office to make them judges of the policy of public
measures." 1 id. at 97-98 (Madison's notes). Others invoked the doctrine of separation of
powers to the same effect. See id. at 110 (Pierce's notes, June 4) (speech of John Dickinson),
139-40 (Madison's notes, June 6) (speech of Mason). Madison, however, defended the idea
of "annexing the wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to the Executive" in a council of
revision. Id. at 138-39 (Madison's notes, June 6); see id. at 110 (Pierce's notes, June 4).
445 2 RacoRns 329 (Madison's notes).

446

Id.

447

See id. at 342-44 (Madison's notes).
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ganizing the Executive department. 4 48 What the propositions really did
was spell out in considerable detail the administrative duties of six
principal executive officers-five heads of departments and a Secretary
of State 4 49 -as well as certain advisory functions to be performed by
the chief justice, who would preside over the council in the President's
absence. 450 The traditional function of a Privy Council-to express an
independent judgment on great issues of policy-was little more than
an appendage to the administrative responsibilities of the several members. The President, it is true, might "submit any matter to the discussion of the Council of State" and he could "require the written opinions of any one or more of the members," but he was free to "[c]onform to such opinions or not as he may think proper." 451 These "opinions" were apparently conceived of as expert recommendations concerning matters within the purview of the particular official's administrative responsibility, for the proposal ended with a warning, backed
up by the threat of impeachment, that "every officer . . . shall be responsible for his opinion on the affairs relating to his particularDepartment. '452 One traditional function of a council of state-to give
advice, and often consent also, on appointments to office-was nowhere
mentioned.
Adding a Council of State so conceived would not alter in any
appreciable way the machinery already contained in the draft constitution proposed by the Committee of Detail. In particular it would not
shift the responsibility for appointments, which the draft constitution
allocated exclusively to the Senate where ambassadorships and Supreme
Court judgeships were concerned and exclusively to the President
Where executive offices were to be filled. 453 Because the proposal would
add only a few administrative details to the original draft constitution,
448 Id. at 340-41 n.4. This was the entry Madison made at the time. Eventually he
replaced it with a full transcript of Morris' proposition, copied from the subsequentlyprinted Journal. Id.
449 This officer was to be "Secretary to the Council of State, and also public Secretary
to the President," with the duty of preparing "all public despatches from the President
which he shall countersign." Id. at 343 (Madison's notes). There was also to be a Secretary
of Foreign Affairs. The merging of the two functions by the First Congress when it created
the executive departments in 1789, and the decision to use the word "State" rather than
"Foreign Affairs" in the name of the Department and in the title of its chief officer, accounts for the present-day American connotation of these terms.
450 Id. at 342 (Madison's notes).
451 Id. at 343-44 (Madison's notes).
452 Id. at 344 (Madison's notes) (emphasis added).
453 Id. at 183, 185 (Article 9, section 1; Article 10, section 2).
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the Committee of Detail showed no hesitation in reporting out an ab
breviated version of the Morris/Pinckney resolutions two days after
they were introduced and referred. The new text underlined the point
that since any advice given to the President did not bind him, it would
454
not "affect his responsibility for the measures which he shall adopt."
This recommendation from the Committee of Detail reached the
floor of the Convention on the 22nd of August, toward the end of a
day spent in debating the two-pronged issue of navigation acts and
slave importations. 455 On the next day, the 23rd, the Convention took
up the article on the Senate, which assigned to that body not only the
power to make treaties but also the power to appoint ambassadors and
Supreme Court judges. The day's debate on treaty-making has already
been examined. 458 Before it took place there was a brief discussion of
the appointing power. Gouverneur Morris "argued ag[ain]st the appointment of officers by the Senate," on the ground that the body was
"too numerous for the purpose" and would therefore be "subject to
cabal" and "devoid of responsibility." Whether he was suggesting a
Privy Council as a substitute for the Senate cannot be determined, for
the existing record of the speech contains no allusion to his previous
proposal for a council, even though it had been favorably reported the
day before. After an expression of agreement by Wilson, the Conven457
tion turned to other matters.
On the 24th of August, after the article on the Senate had been
sent back to committee, 458 another discussion of the appointment
procedure took place, this time apropos of the clause giving the President exclusive power to "appoint officers in all cases not otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.14 59 Fear of executive power was
expressed, and changes were voted to prevent the President from using
the appointing power to create new offices. 4 60 Randolph, distrustful
of both the legislative and the executive branches where appointments
were concerned, suggested that various appointments to federal offices
454 Id. at 367 (Journal, August 22). The committee version used the term "PrivyCouncil."
455 Id. at 375 (Madison's notes). The report was made just after the Convention had
appointed the committee to seek a compromise on the question of navigation acts and the
slave trade.
456 See notes 390-400 supra and accompanying text.
457

See 2

RECORDS

389 (Madison's notes, August 23).

See note 400 supra and accompanying text.
459 2 REcoRDs 185 (Article 10, section 2).
460 See id. at 405-06 (Madison's notes). This sentiment was expressed again later in the
Convention. See id. at 544-45 (Journal, September 8), 550, 553 (Madison's notes), 621 (Journal, September 8), 628 (Madison's notes).
458
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might: be referred "to some.State Authority."' 461 Strangely enough. no
one seems to have brought up on this occasion the idea that a council
might give advice and consent on appointments.
By this time the proposed compromise on navigation acts and the
importation of slaves was before the Convention, 462 and debate thereon
pushed aside further consideration both of the appointing power and
of the proposal for a Privy Council. That the latter proposition was
still alive was shown by an incidental remark of Madison's on the 27th
of August. Impeachment was under discussion, and Madison suggested
that should a vacancy in the presidency be created, the executive
powers might be exercised "by the persons composing the Council to
463
the President."
By the end of August no decision had been reached on the proposal for a Privy Council, and there had been no satisfactory resolution of conflicting views on the matter of appointments. These, then,
were two of the "postponed" parts of the constitutional system which
the Brearley committee was created to deal with. 46 4 Together with the
question of presidential participation in treaty-making and the possible application of a two-thirds rule in the approval of treaties, they
made up a group of four interrelated issues that could be set off against
one another and a balance reached.
The one bit of evidence we have concerning the proceedings
within the Brearley committee reveals that the idea of creating a new
Privy Council was considered and rejected. 465 On the other hand, as its
report proves, the committee was impressed by the contention that
appointments should not be made with finality either by a cabal-prone
body like the Senate or by a President acting alone. The answer of
the Brearley committee was to convert the Senate itself into a council of appointment, placing in the hands of the President the exclusive
power to nominate all officers (including ambassadors and Supreme
461 Id. at 405 (Madison's notes). This was put in the form of a motion and eventually
voted down. See id. at 406, 407 & n.17 (Madison's & McHenry's notes, August 24), 418-19 &
n.15 (Madison's notes, August 25).
462 The compromise committee had presented its report at the beginning of the day
on August 24, prior to the debate on appointments. Debate on the compromise began the
next day. See text accompanying notes 401-04 supra.
463 2 REcoRDs 427 (Madison's notes).
464 See text accompanying note 414 supra.
405 Gouverneur Morris, a member of the committee, said in debate on September 7:
The question of a Council was considered in the Committee, where it was judged
that the Presid[en]t by persuading his Council-to concur in his wrong measures,
would acquire their protection for them . ...
2 REcoRDs 542 (Madison's notes).
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Court judges, whose appointments had previously been vested in the
Senate alone), and requiring approval by the Senate of all such nomi,
nations (including purely executive officials, with whose appointments
the Senate had previously had nothing to do).4 66
"Advice and Consent" as the Formula
for Treaties and Appointments
Having in this manner brought the executive and legislative
branches into partnership in the matter of appointments, the committee employed a similar approach in settling the question of presidential participation in treaty-making. Madison's suggestion-the only
one that had been made on the subject-was that "the President
should be an agent in Treaties." 467 Now in a narrow sense the President would necessarily be an agent in the matter, simply by virtue
of his constitutional responsibility for executing the laws (among
which treaties are included). But if Madison was thinking, as Seems
probable, of the relationship between the old Congress and its Secretary for Foreign Affairs, John Jay, then to be an "agent" meant giving as well as receiving advice and thus participating in the process
by which a consensus was reached on the policies to be carried out. It
was certainly the larger and not the narrower concept that the Brearley committee had in mind. And it chose to describe this joint
responsibility in the traditional language of "advice and consent,"
thus employing a formula that had headed every English statute for
more than a century, that had summed up the demand of British reformers for parliamentary deliberation on treaties, that had defined
the relationship between royal governor and provincial council in the
American colonies, and that was being used to describe a similar
relationship in many of the new American state constitutions.
Though the phrase "advice and consent" was used in both the
treaty and the appointments clauses, there was a significant difference.
It involved the authority to initiate the process. Generally speaking,
every governmental measure is consummated by an executive act. It
is the President's signature (and in England the royal assent) which
finally makes a legislative enactment a law. From the point of view
of international law it is the President who, in the end, makes a treaty
binding by authorizing the exchange of ratifications. And a person
is actually appointed to a constitutional office when the President
466 See text accompanying note 419 supra.

467 See text accompanying note 390 supra.
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executes the commission. Only with respect to appointments, however,
does the American Constitution vest in the President the exclusive
authority to take the initial step, and it does this in explicit terms. The
President alone can make a nomination. There is no comparable
language in the treaty clause. 4 8 Only after the Convention was over
did any member of it suggest that the Senate was precluded from
considering the terms of possible, international agreements until the
President should have laid before it a completed treaty.469 A quite
different assumption underlay several of the speeches made in the
Convention when the treaty clause was under discussion. In particular,
there was serious discussion of a proposal that the Senate be authorized
to carry through to completion the negotiation of any treaty of peace
even though the President himself might oppose it. This debate deserves to be quoted verbatim and in full from Madison's notes.
Under discussion was the Brearley committee's proposal to insert
in the treaty clause the following proviso: "But no treaty shall be
made without the consent of two thirds of the members present."
Wilson immediately objected to putting it "in the power of a minority
to controul the will of a majority," and King concurred in the objection. Madison then suggested a middle ground, thereby inaugurating
the following colloquy:
Mr. Madison moved to insert after the word "treaty" the words
"except treaties of peace" allowing these to be made with less difficulty than other treaties-It was agreed to nem[ine] con[tradicente].

Mr. Madison then moved to authorize a concurrence of two
thirds of the Senate to make treaties of peace, without the concurrence of the President.-The President he said would necessarily
derive so much power and importance from a state of war that he
might be tempted, if authorized, to impede a treaty of peace. Mr.
Butler 2ded. the motion.
Mr. Gorham thought the precaution unnecessary as the means
of carrying on the war would not be in the hands of the President,
but of the Legislature.
The two clauses should be laid side-by-side:
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties . . . and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ....
U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
469 In the Pennsylvania ratification convention on December 4, 1787, James Wilson
asserted: "The Senate can make no treaties: they can approve of none, unless the President
of the United States lays it before them." And in a later speech the same day he remarked,
apropos of the Senate: "With regard to their power in forming treaties, they can make
none; they are only auxiliaries to the President." 2 DrBATEs, supra note 318, at 466, 477.
But see note 474 infra for Wilson's subsequent remarks to the same body.
468
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Mr. Go[u]v[erneu]r Morris thought the power of the President
in this case harmless; and that no peace ought to be made without
the concurrence of the President, who was the general Guardian
of the National interests.
Mr. Butler was strenuous for the motion, as a necessary
security against ambitious & corrupt Presidents. He mentioned the
late perfidious policy of the Statholder in Holland; and the artifices of the Duke of Marlbro' to prolong the war of which he had
470
the management.
At this point the focus of attention shifted from the role of President (who was not thereafter mentioned) to the importance of a twothirds rule even in treaties of peace. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
argued that "[i]n Treaties of peace the dearest interests will be at
stake, as the fisheries, territory &c." In such treaties, moreover, it is
"the extremities of the Continent" whose interests are most in danger
"of being sacrificed." Therefore, he insisted, peace treaties should require "a greater rather than less proportion of votes." Hugh Williamson of North Carolina agreed, to the extent of insisting that "Treaties
of peace should be guarded at least by requiring the same concurrence
as in other Treaties." After Williamson's speech a vote was taken on
Madison's motion and it was defeated by a vote of eight states to three,
4 71
with Madison's own state of Virginia recorded in the negative.
The remarkable thing was not the defeat of the proposal but the
fact that Madison and the delegates who agreed with him took it for
granted that the Senate would possess (even under the new phrasing
of the treaty clause) both the authority and the means to direct diplomatic negotiations over the opposition of the President. Even the opponents of Madison's proposal did not question or challenge this assumption, but instead based their opposition on two clearly specified
grounds of a quite different character-namely, that the two-thirds
rule should not be relaxed under any circumstances, and that the concurrence of the President should be required in every case, because he
was "the general Guardian of the National interests." 47 2 To speak of
the President's "concurrence" (as Gouverneur Morris in fact did),
instead of the concurrence of the Senate, was to affirm the policy-mak2 REcoRms 540-41 (September 7).
Id. at 541 (Madison's notes). Later the same day Williamson (seconded by his
fellow North Carolinian, Richard Dobbs Spaight) moved that a two-thirds vote be required
for any "Treaty of Peace affecting Territorial rights." Rufus King of Massachusetts, mindful of his section's interest in the fisheries, insisted that it would be "necessary to look out
for securities for some other rights," and moved to extend the provision to cover "'all
present rights of the U[nited] States.'" Id. at 543 (Madison's notes).
472 See id. at 541 (speeches of Hugh Williamson and Gouverneur Morris, respectively).
470
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ing role of the latter body and to suggest that the President's power
would be akin to that exercised by him when approving or vetoing 'a
piece of domestic legislation. In the Convention debates of the 7th and
8th of September, in fact, the President's role in treaty-making was
twice described as constituting a check on the Senate. On the first
occasion the word "check" was actually used. In opposing the' twothirds rule, Rufus King remarked that
as the Executive was here joined in the business, there was a check
which did not exist in Congress [i.e., in the old Congress under the
Confederation] where The concurrence of 2/3 was required. 473
When an even more stringent two-thirds rule was urged on the basis
of "the example in the present Cong[res]s," Gorham used the same
argument (though not the word "check") in reply: "There is a difference in the case, as the President's consent will also be necessary in
474
the new Gov[ernmen]t.
Whether the conduct of foreign relations would be in reality
a joint responsibility depended, in the last analysis, on whether or not
the instructions to diplomatic representatives would be issued with
the concurrence of both the Senate and the President. And the correlative question was whether ambassadors were to be official representatives of the Senate and President conjointly, or simply executive
agents. Prior to the Brearley committee's proposal of the 4th of September 1787 there had never been the slightest doubt that ambassadors were to be appointed by and responsible to whatever body the
treaty-making power might be vested in. Under the Confederation the
old Congress had always appointed the envoys and debated and voted
their instructions. In the plan that Alexander Hamilton presented to
the Convention on the 18th of June, he proposed (precisely as the
Brearley committee would later do) that the chief executive should
"have with the advice and approbation of the Senate the power of
making all treaties." Though the chief executive would appoint on
Id. at 540.
Id. at 549 (Madison's notes, September 8). In the Pennsylvania ratification convention, James Wilson also spoke in terms of "concurrence," and described the President's
power as a "check":
We are told that the share which the Senate have in making treaties is exceptionable; but here they are also under a check, by a constituent part of the government, and nearly the immediate representative of the people-I mean the President of the United States. They can make no treaty without his concurrence.
2 DEBATEs, supra note 318, at 505 (speech of December 11, 1787). Wilson continued:
Neither the President nor the Senate, solely, can complete a treaty; they are
checks upon each other, and are so balanced as to produce security to the people.
Id. at 507. See also note 469 supra.
473
474
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his sole authority the heads of the executive departments, including
that of Foreign Affairs, he was empowered only to nominate ambassadors, who were to be subject to the Senate's power of approval or
rejection-a clear indication that they were not to be agents of the
executive alone.475 The report of the Committee of Detail, presented
on the 6th of August, made the same sharp and unmistakable differentiation between ambassadors and executive officers. The Senate
alone was empowered, in a single unbroken sentence, "to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors," whereas the President was authorized to appoint, without the concurrence of the Senate or any
other body, not only his associates and subordinates in the executive
branch but also other officers "in all cases not otherwise provided for
476
by this Constitution."
The Brearley committee, however, obscured this long-time distinction by providing a single uniform procedure for all appointments
-ambassadors,

judges, and officers "not otherwise . . . provided for."

All alike were to be nominated by the President, submitted to the
Senate for its advice and consent, and finally appointed by the President. 477 The status and responsibility of the different classes of officers
were not necessarily altered by this homogenization of appointment
procedures. The same three classes of officers were specifically named
in the new clause as in the old. Supreme Court judges did not become
executive agents because they were now to be nominated by the President, and executive officers did not cease to be such because the Senate
was now admitted to a role in their appointment. There is no evidence
of an intention on the part either of the Brearley committee or of the
Convention to break down the established distinction between ambassadors and executive officers, and to convert the former into agents
of the President, responsible to him alone. What little evidence there
is runs the other way. George Mason, urging once more the creation
of a Privy Council to advise the President, reiterated "his dislike of
any reference whatever of the power to make appointments to either
branch of the Legislature," and he said he was equally "averse to vest
so dangerous a power in the President alone." If there were a Privy
Council to deal with appointments, Mason continued, then "the concurrence of the Senate [would] be required only in the appointment of
Ambassadors, and in making treaties, which are more of a legislative
See text accompanying notes 226-28 supra.
2 RacoRDs 183, 185 (Article 9, section 1, and Article 10, section 2, of the draft
constitution).
477 Id. at 498-99 (Madison's notes, September 4).
475

476
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nature."478 Charles Pinckney likewise objected to involving the Senate
in the appointing process, "except in the instances of Ambassadors
who he thought ought not to be appointed by the President."4 79 No
one argued to opposite effect.
In the course of the last few pages remarks concerning the role
of the President in foreign affairs have been quoted from the debates
of the 7th and 8th of September 1787 on treaty-making, on appointments, and on a possible Privy Council. Seven speakers were involved
-Madison, Gorham, Gouverneur Morris, Butler, King, Mason, and
Charles Pinckney4S°-and the extant reports of their eight speeches on
the matter have been quoted in full. Though seventeen different
speakers made a total of 53 speeches on this group of topics during the
two days mentioned, 48 ' these seven speakers were the only ones who
discussed the relationship that would or should exist between the
Senate and the President in the conduct of foreign relations.
The overwhelming majority of the speeches on the revised clauses
relating to treaty-making and appointments were devoted, as one
might expect, to the economic and sectional aspects that had all along
been uppermost in most delegates' minds. Thus the treaty debate began with a motion to give the House of Representatives an equal
share with the Senate in the making of treaties, on the ground that as
treaties were "to have the operation of laws, they ought to have the
sanction of laws also." After this was voted down, by ten states to
one, 4 2 the two-thirds rule became the issue, occupying parts of two
days' sessions. Wilson objected that a two-thirds rule "puts it in
the power of a minority to controul the will of a majority," 48 3 and,
in particular, that "[i]f two thirds are necessary to make peace, the
minority may perpetuate war, against the sense of the majority. ' 48 4
His motion to strike out the two-thirds requirement was, however,
defeated by a vote of nine states to one, with one divided.48 5 Then
began a series of attempts to tighten the restriction-by requiring twothirds of all members rather than two-thirds of those present, by requiring a majority of the whole number, by defining a quorum, by
478 Id. at 537 (Madison's notes, September 7).
479 Id. at 539 (Madison's notes, September 7).
480 See text accompanying notes 470, 473, 474, 478 & 479 supra. Two speeches by

Gorham were involved.
481 See 2 REcoRDs 538-43, 547-50, 553 (Madison's notes).
482 Id. at 538.
483 Id. at 540 (September 7).
484 Id. at 548 (September 8).
485 Id. at 549.
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requiring previous notice.48 6 All. these motions were defeated, and
finally the Convention voted, eight states to three, to adopt the two48 7
thirds rule exactly as recommended by the Brearley committee.
So far as appointments were concerned, debate focussed on the
committee's refusal to set up a Privy Council that would, in substitution for the Senate, advise the President on appointments and on
other matters-presumably domestic rather than foreign, though the
point was not made clear. George Mason declared that "in rejecting
a Council to the President we were about to try an experiment on
which the most despotic Governments had never ventured"--even
"[t]he Grand Signor himself had his Divan. ' 488 His motion to instruct
the committee to bring in a clause establishing an Executive Council
or Council of State was supported by an array including Benjamin
Franklin, Madison, Wilson, and Dickinson, but it went down to defeat
by a vote of eight states to three. 48 9 This meant, in effect, that the
Senate was to serve as the council of appointment and also as a council of state where foreign affairs were concerned, but that in the
handling of domestic matters there would be no independent privy
council to advise the President. Instead he would be authorized to
require the opinion in writing of the principal Officer in each of
upon any subject relating to the duties
the Executive Departments,
490
of their respective offices.
On the 8th of September 1787 the Convention adopted the clause
relating to treaties and appointments in the form proposed by the
Brearley committee. 491 In the nine days that remained, the clause
underwent no change in substance, only a slight change in word order,
but a change that was to be of some significance in its placement
among the other clauses, sections, and articles of the finished Constitution. In the draft constitution that the Committee of Detail had presented on the 6th of August, an entire article had been devoted to the
functions and powers of the Senate, an article that followed those devoted to the legislature as a whole and preceded the one devoted to
the executive. Its two longest sections, borrowed from the Articles
488

Id. at 544 (Journal, September 8), 549-50 (Madison's notes).

487

Id. at 550.

488

Id. at 541 (September 7).

489

See id. at 542.

Id. at 499 (Madison's notes, September 4) (Brearley committee report). After the
defeat of the motion for an Executive Council, this clause was adopted with one state
dissenting. Id. at 542-43.
491 Id. at 550. The Journal, rapidly deteriorating in completeness and accuracy during
these closing days of the Convention, failed to record this vote.
490
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of Confederation, imposed on the Senate the task of handling boundary and other jurisdictional disputes between states, and controversies
over lands claimed under grants from different states.492 On the 24th
of August the settlement of all such disputes was transferred to the
judiciary, 493 thus reducing the original senatorial article to a single
section of 22 words-the one giving power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors. When the Brearley committee gave the clause a
new beginning-"The President by and with the advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall have power . . ."-it also transferred the provision to the article dealing with the executive, making it the fourth
section thereof. 494 The final change was made by a Committee of Style

and Arrangement, which was appointed on Saturday, the 8th of September, and which reported on Wednesday, the 12th, completing in a
weekend and two extra days a comprehensive redaction of the muchamended draft constitution. Thanks to the skill of Gouverneur Morris,
to whom most of the literary labor is attributed, the finished Constitution assumed the symmetrical and logical form familiar today, consisting of three long articles, each devoted to one of the great branches
of government, followed by four shorter ones dealing with matters
less easily classifiable. 495 In this process, whether intentionally or not,
the provision respecting treaties and appointments ceased to be even
an independent section and was reduced to the status of a clause,
sandwiched between clauses relating to powers of a completely executive sort, exercised by the President on his sole authority. So com492 Id. at 183-85 (Article 9, sections 2 & 3). The corresponding part of the Articles of
Confederation is set out in 19 JCC 217-19 (Article 9).
493 See 2 REcoRDs 400-01 (Madison's notes).
494 Id. at 498 (Madison's notes, September 4). Oddly enough, the committee did retain
a separate article for the Senate, placing in it a section on the trial of impeachments,
but nothing else. Id. at 497 (Madison's notes, September 4). This was the format in which
these articles were referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement. See id. at 572, 574
(Article 9; Article 10, section 4).
495 The five-man committee "to revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed to
by the House" was elected on September 8. The Convention passed a few more motions
before officially turning matters over to the committee two days later, but it then did no
more business till the report was ready on the 12th. See id. at 547 (journal, September 8),
553, 554 (Madison's & McHenry's notes), 564 (Madison's notes, September 10), 581 (Journal
& Madis6n's notes, September 11), 582 .(Journal, September 12), 585 (Madison's notes).
Madison, who was a member of the committee, along with chairman William Samuel
Johnson of Connecticut, Hamilton, and King, noted that "[the finish given to the style
and arrangement of the Constitution fairly belongs to the pen of Mr. [Gouverneur]
Morris." 3 id. at 499 (letter from Madison to Jared Sparks, April 8, 1831). See id. at 170
(Ezra Stiles' diary), 420 (letter from Morris to Timothy Pickering, December 22, 1814),
497-98 (letter from Sparks to Madison, March 30, 1831).
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plete was the integration into the presidential article that the clause
now begins with a pronoun:
He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of
the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators
present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice
and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other
whose appointments are not herein
officers of the United States,
496
otherwise provided for.
At the last moment, on the 15th of September, two additions were
voted 4 97 so that the completed Constitution (dressed up with the
capitals that the calligrapher affected) reads as follows:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
alone, in
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
498
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
XIV.

THE FOREIGN-AFFAIRS PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
INTERPRETED

This clause, and the clause in a subsequent section which says
that the President "shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," 499 provide the foundation-the only foundation in the text of
the Constitution-upon which has been erected the present-day con496 2 REcoDs 599 (Article 2, section 2, paragraph 2, of the Constitution reported by the
Committee of Style).
497 Id. at 627-28 (Madison's notes). The provision that offices to be filled should first
be established by law was one that had previously been twice moved and twice rejected.

id. at 544-45 (Journal, September 8), 550, 553 (Madison's notes).
498 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. The engrossed copy of the Constitution, now on
permanent display in the National Archives, is ordinarily taken to be the official text. A
facsimile is published in U.S. NATIONAL ARciuvEs, CHARTERS OF FREEDOM 5-9 (1952). An
interesting case has been made for regarding the first printed text as the official one, for
it was the text submitted to and ratified by the state conventions. Capital letters are used

in it with far greater restraint. See
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499 U.S. CONsr. art. HI, § 3.

STATES, LITERAL

PRINT,

SEPARATION OF POWERS

1974]

tention not only that the President possesses plenary authority over
the conduct of American foreign relations, and not only that this
authority is so great as to exclude the Senate from any participation
in, or even right of inquiry about, the instructing of diplomatic envoys, but also that the framers of the Constitution intended the system
to operate in this way.
A Twentieth-Century Doctrine of Presidential Dominance
Early in the twentieth century this theory of the framers' intent
was given full and elaborate exposition in a speech of Senator John
Coit Spooner, Republican, of Wisconsin, reputed "one of the best
constitutional lawyers of his time."500 The occasion was-a Senate debate
on the 23rd of January 1906, precipitated by Theodore Roosevelt's
decision to involve the United States in the Algeciras conference on
Morocco, and his agreement to administer the customs houses and
manage the debt payments of Santo Domingo, in accord with what
has been called the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrinethe latter action having been taken despite the refusal of the Senate
to ratify the treaty authorizing it.501 At the time Spooner addressed the

Senate, a resolution had been introduced asking to see the instructions
given the delegates to Algeciras in order (as Spooner paraphrased it)
that the Senate might, sitting in judgment upon the executive conduct of our foreign relations, determine whether they were being
conducted5 02 in accordance with the traditions of our country ....

At the same time there was demand for full discussion of President
Theodore Roosevelt's action in Santo Domingo on the ground that
it represented
a new policy on the part of the United States, affecting our relations not only with Santo Domingo, but with all the Caribbean
States, Central American and South American Republics.5 03
Senator Spooner not only opposed the moves themselves but also
500 C. BERDAHL, WAR Powss OF THE EXECUTvE IN THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 1 & 2 (1920)).
501 For brief accounts, see S. BEMtS, A DWLOMATIc HISTORY OF THE

245 (9 UNI-

VERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,

UNITED STATES 525-

29, 581-86 (rev. ed. 1942).
502 40 CONG. Rac. 1418 (1906) (resolution introduced by Senator Augustus 0. Bacon of
Georgia, as summarized by Spooner at the beginning of his speech).
503 Id. (remarks of Senator Francis G. Newlands of Nevada, preceding Spooner's

speech).
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denied that the Senate had any authority, constitutionally speaking,
to meddle with diplomatic questions until a completed treaty should
be presented for its approval. Excerpts from his interpretation of constitutional law follow:
The Senate has nothing whatever to do with the negotiation of
treaties or the conduct of our foreign intercourse and relations save
the exercise of the one constitutional function of advice and consent which the Constitution requires as a precedent condition to
the making of a treaty ...
From the foundation of the Government it has been conceded
in practice and in theory that the Constitution vests the power of
negotiation and the various phases-and they are multifariousof the conduct of our foreign relations exclusively in the President.
And . . . he does not exercise that constitutional power, nor can
he be made to do it, under the tutelage or guardianship of the
°4
Senate or of the House or of the Senate and House combined.
Asked what interpretation he placed on the word "advice," and
whether it is possible to give advice after a thing has been done,
Spooner answered:
The words "advice and consent of the Senate" are . . . well
translated by the word "ratification" popularly used in this connection. The President negotiates the treaty, to begin with. He
may employ such agencies as he chooses . . . . He may issue to the
agent chosen by him-and neither Congress nor the Senate has any
concern as to whom he chooses-such instructions as seem to him
wise. ... The Senate has no right to demand that he shall unfold
to the world or to it, even in executive session, his instructions or
the prospect or progress of the negotiation. . . . [U]nder the Constitution the absolute power of negotiation is in the President and
the means of negotiation subject wholly to his will and his judgment.
I do not deny the power of the Senate either in legislative session or in executive session . . .to pass a resolution expressive of
its opinion as to matters of foreign policy. But if it is passed by the
Senate, or by the House or by both Houses it is beyond any possible question purely advisory, and not in the slightest degree binding in law or conscience upon the President. ....
' . * [S]o far as the conduct of our foreign relations is concerned, excluding only the Senate's participation in the making of
treaties, the President has the absolute and uncontrolled and uncontrollable authority. Under the confederation there was felt to
be great weakness in a system that made the Congress the organ of
communication with foreign governments; but when the Constitu504 Id. (speech of Senator Spooner).

1974]

SEPARATION OF POWERS

tion was formed, it being almost everywhere else in the world a
purely executive function, it was lodged with the President.505

The question here is not whether the precedents that had accumulated by 1906 justified this statement of constitutional law. The
question is whether it represents the original intent of the men who
drew up the Constitution. This is an historical question and historical
questions are settled by contemporary evidence. The hard fact is that
nothing in the records of the Convention or in the explanations that
delegates offered in the months that followed corresponds in any degree
with the assertions of Senator Spooner.
John Jay's understanding of the treaty provision of the Constitution has already been examined.50 6 Even greater authority attaches to
the exposition by Alexander Hamilton of the intended meaning of the
foreign-policy provisions of the document, for he was a member of the
Convention as Jay was not. In its proceedings, moreover, he was a
consistent advocate of a powerful chief executive and was therefore
unlikely to minimize the latter's authority. A few years later, indeed,
at the time of Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, Hamilton would formulate, in controversy with Madison, a full-fledged
theory of inherent presidential. prerogative in foreign affairs.5 0 7 But
in 1788, when he contributed to The Federalist papers, he undertook
to expound, not his own sometimes divergent ideas, but the true intent, as he understood it, of the actual document that was before the
states for ratification.
The Interpretation of Hamilton in The Federalist, 1788
In the 75th number of The Federalist,first published on the 26th
of March 1788, Hamilton 'examined all aspects of the treaty clause.
At the outset he took notice of an objection to its "intermixture of
powers," that is, to "the union of the Executive with the Senate, in
the article of treaties." Far from condemning it, Hamilton found "a
peculiar propriety in that union." He rejected as "arbitrary" the doctrine which placed treaty-making "in the class of executive authorities," and insisted instead that if carefully considered the treaty
power would be discovered "to partake more of the legislative than
of the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall

506

Id.
See text accompanying notes 323-30 supra.

507

See note 259 supra.

505
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within the definition of either." It should properly "form a distinct
department." 5 8 Hamilton continued:
The qualities . . . indispensable in the management of foreign
negotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit agent in those
transactions; while the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of tie
whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making
509
them.
Hamilton warned against confiding the treaty power to either
the President alone or the Senate alone, but the tocsin rang loudest
in his discussion of the first possibility. "[I]t would be utterly unsafe
and improper," he wrote,
to intrust that power to an elective magistrate of four years' duration.... The history of human conduct does not warrant that
exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in
a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind,
as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to
the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as
510
would be a President of the United States.
To Hamilton the conclusion was so clear as to amount to a
demonstration:
[T]he joint possession of the power in question, by the President
and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than the
51
separate possession of it by eiiher of them. '
Similar phrases occur in Hamilton's other discussions of the treaty
power. "[T]he Senate," he had written in the 66th number of The Federalist earlier the same month, "is to have concurrent authority with
the Executive in the formation of treaties." The relationship was also
described as "the junction of the Senate with the Executive," and
5 12
their "union with the Executive in the power of making treaties."
Hamilton used capitals to emphasize his point:
The security essentially intended by the Constitution against
corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be
sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to make
them. The JOINT AGENCY of the Chief Magistrate of the Union,
and of two thirds of the members of a body selected by the collec508 THE FEDERA.isr No. 75, at 465-67 (A. Hamilton).

509 Id. at 467.
510 Id. at 467-68.
511 Id. at 468.
512 Id. No. 66, at 414, 417 (A. Hamilton).
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tive wisdom of the legislatures of the several States, is designed
to be the pledge for the fidelity of the national councils in this
particular.5 18

That the advice of the Senate was to be active advice, not passive
consent, was underlined when Hamilton went on to say that the Federal Convention in providing a procedure for impeachment
might with propriety have meditated the punishment of the Executive, for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate, or a
want of integrity in the conduct of the negotiations committed to
him .... 514
CONCLUSION

The phrase "advice and consent" meant to the framers of the
American Constitution what it had meant for a century or more in
both English and American constitutional usage. Its two crucial words
meant two things not one. By "advice" was meant legislative deliberation on policy before executive action was initiated. By "consent" was
meant approval of the result after negotiations (with their inevitable
compromises) had been carried to completion. In the political lexicon
of the youthful republic, "advice and consent" signified the "concurrent authority" of the Senate and the President-their "joint possession" of the power-to decide the great and delicate questions of foreign policy.
513 Id. at 417.
514 Id.

